THE NEAR EAST.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 307, 27 December 1915, Page 4

THE NEAR EAST.

(By REV. W. G. MONCKTON.)

Bulgaria's entry into the war has not been an unmixed blessing to Turkey, since it has opened a new road to Constantinople for the Allies. The Dardanelles campaign was originally undertaken because Russia virtually guaranteed military action on the part of Bulgaria if our fleet commenced active operations in the straits. The real land route to Constantinople is the route' of the Bulgarian armies in the first Balkan war, and as Bulgaria did not join us that route was denied us since it was impossible to strike the line from Adrianople to Constantinople without entering neutral territory. Now that the Bulgarian coast on the Aegean lies open to us it will be possible to land forces to strike the railway behind Dedeagach, and so advance to Lule Burgas and Chatalja. The famous lines of Chatalja acquired a great reputation for impregnability in the Balkan war owing to the Bulgarians having given up the attempt to pierce them after two days' unimportant fighting, and it was assumed that General Savoff feared the task would prove impossible, but seeing that the operations were stopped on I receipt of a telegram from Sofia, it is much more likely that the real reason jwas not the seeming difficulty of the task sa much as political considerations dictated by jealousy of Greece and Serbia, and a desire to conclude an armistice before these two nations could definitely establish themselves in Macedonia. The Serbians captured Monastir on November ISth, and it was on the 19th that operations in front of Chatalja were abandoned. Seeing that the Bulgarians had already pierced the lines near Derkos early on the second day, it does not seem likely that the lines would have presented any insuperable obstacle to the victors of Lule Burgas. The lines have doubtless been considerably strengthened since, but the reputation they gained in the Balkan war seems to have been largely fictitious.

Russia had good ground for believin" Bulgaria would give us active military assistance, since the people had sent Russia a message of goodwill at the beginning of the war, and had also sent their best general in the person of Ratko Dimitrieff. It is quite, sate to say that the sympathies of the people are still on the side of Russia, but the German party have skilfully played on the national hatred of Serbia so as to make some sort of national support for the policy of Ferdinand. If, however, Russia succeeds in invading Bulgaria it is doubtful if the discipline of the army will be sufficient to counteract the natural sympathies for the Russians, and it is exceedingly likely that there will, either be something in the nature of a revolution ot else disaffection in the army will 'become so rife that military operations against the Allies will be seriously handicapped. It is difficult to believe that the Bulgarians would be able to offer 6erious and whole-hearted resistance to -any operations the Allies make against Constantinople from the west, while if Greece and Rumania joined us the ability to use Bulgarian territory as being the territory of a hostile power would, from the military point of view, be almost better than having that territory closed to u« as being the territory of a neutral

For ourselves, just at present, however, the main interest of Bulgaria lies in the sinister influence she was able to exercise on the Dardanelles campaign. France seems to have been as certain of the help of Greece as Russia was of the help of Bulgaria, seeing that the Greek army owed much of its success in the Balkan wars to the help of French officers and munitions. Indeed, Greece had definitely promised military help, and it was probably only tho fact that the Queen of Greece knew of the secret agreement between

I Ferdinand and the Kaiser, and she communicated her knowledge to her husband that upset the plans of Venizelos at the last moment. Had the British Government known for certain the exact position of Bulgaria it is more than probable that the attempt to force a passage through the Dardanelles would have been discontinued before the military operations were undertaken. The Turks seem to have been doubtful of Bulgaria up to a certain point, since they seem for long to have kept their forces round Constantinople instead of concentrating them on Gallipoli.

Sir lan Hamilton was ln a difficult position when he took over the military command. The British Government supplied only a small force, and even the whole of this force was not original'y intended for the Dardanelles. They contemplated nothing more than assistance to the fleet, against positions at that time supposed to be weakly held. The transports were arranged with a view to a single landing, probably in the region of the lines of Bulair, and Hamilton decided that several landings ought to be made simultaneously, and this necessitated sending the ships back again to Egypt since Greece had revoked her promise to give us the use of Samothrace and Mitylene as naval and military bases. Turkey, in the meantime, seems to have had her natural suspicions of Bulgaria allayed, and to have removed her troops from Constantinople and enormously strengthened her army on the peninsula. Hamilton seems to'have acted with caution and prudence, but it would seem that the situation was really one calling for decisive and immediate action, and the delay caused by the rearrangement of the transports proved more costly to our forces than a plan less strategically sound, but having the merit of allowing of prompt attack. As it happened, instead of merely assisting the fleet while the main attack on Constantinople came from the west, or while the main Turkish armies were posted to ward off such an attack, we found ourselves facing the flower of the Turkish army posted in one of the strongest defensive positions in the world. But this much may be said: Our feats in the Dardanelles have gained for us a moral victory greater than any facile victory over a weak foe could ever have done; we have proved ourselves superior to the Turk, even when he is led by the German, and this fact ought to prove a decisive factor now that it seems probable the Allies intend to attack Constantinople by an easier route. The second Balkan war showed Salonika to be an ideal base for operations against Bulgaria; our fleet relieved of much work by our decision to confine operations in the Dardanelles to the southern end of the peninsula, will lie able to bombard more actively the Bulgarian coast, and our own troops will be able to escape the stalemate of Anzac, and take part in operations offering wider scope. The clever way in which the small allied force in Serbia managed to prevent the envelopment of the Serbian army, and so enabled it to retreat to Albania and Montenegro, shows that the hand of some master strategist was at work, and augurs well for the future of this campaign.