SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1915. THE WAR IN THE EAST.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 223, 18 September 1915, Page 4

SATURDAY, SEPTEMBER 18, 1915. THE WAR IN THE EAST.

It would lie hazardous to express any decided opinion about the probable course of events at Gallipoli and the Dardanelles in the near future; but it is hardly probable that the encouraging reports now reaching us from the Near En-it are ultogether erroneous and misleading. For some weeks past it ha» been currently rumoured that the Turkish armies are short of food and ummuuition, while the tremendous losses they have sustained have produced general depression in their ranks. At the same time the Turkish population, more especially in the. capital, have been reduced to grievous struils through shortage of food supplies, and are evidently in n very gloomy frame of mind. The exploits of British and Russian submarines in an.l about the Sea of Marmora have terrorised them; and we must remember that the Turkish people as v whole have never regarded the war with any favour. Turkey unpractically inveigled into tho war by the astute diplomacy of the Herman.-, aided by HniT-r Hey and the militarist section oi the Veiling Turks, who seem to have hailed this hazardous enterprise as a last desperate expedient for regaining their lost ascendancy, and securing permanent authority for tlict__clve_. But even from L'nver Bey's standpoint the only hope of Mice.*-, for Turkey lay m continued assintance from the I cntral Towers, and for this apparently the lurks are now asking in vain. It is true that ficrman.v has supplied artillery and olliiers to the Turkish forces. But it it, n matter of common knowledge that the Turkir.li stock ..f war material is being rapidly exhausted, and that there is severe friction between the Turkish sol dier* and their (lernian superiors, duel , fur the most pari to the overbearing| arrogance and tyrannical demeanour of] the foreigners. Two months ago the, Turkish Orand Vizier represented the s.tuntion to the Herman Ambassador at ( onstnntincple s.. strongly that ricrl.n and Vicnni became alarmed, and thc| Kaiser is said to have promised that help should speedily be foiincoming. But cir cumstanocs have prevented him from fulfilling his pledge, and the general impression produced on Turkey by this failure is that the position at the Dardanelles i- hopeless, and that the fall of the riipiLll itself cannot be long delayed. Il may occur to our readers that, even if (Jalbpoli were -'.rared of the enemy, tln> Turks might still make good their defence of the capital on the bind side. Hut once Cnllipoli is in the hands of the Allies, and the land buttcrie.- arc turned from the rear, the Dardanelles will be open to our war-hip-, and nothing could save (Tin-I.mtiiu.ple from an attack delivered from the sen. At the -.unic lime, in view of the enormous losses the Turks have already sustained, it is not lkcly that their armies would be in n position! to make any elTcctive resistance alter flallipoli has been captured. These facts explain how vitally Important it h,ibeen from the point of view of the Turk* that help should reach them from the north through the Balkan States. Austria's invasion of Serbia was meant to enable the (cntral Powers to join hands with Turkey. After Austria's failure, it became urgently necessary to induce Bulgaria to assist Turkey, and to prevail upon Rumania to allow war material to pa-s through her territory from (lerninny and Austria. SO lis to reach the Turks. Dut though Bvile-vria has remained neutral, she has steadily refused to commit herself to an at ive j alliance with the Central Powers and (Turkey; while Rumania haß for some time past been gravitating toward the Entente Powers. Under the circumstances the only course left for the tenI tral Powers to take was to endeavour to force their way down through the western provinces of Russia, past Kiev to Odessa and the Black Sea, and thus bear help to the Turks. This was one of the chief objects to l>e achieved by yon Mnokcnsen"s invasion of Gulicia and Poland, and his attempt to break up and destroy the Russian armies. But that attempt has failed, as we have already explained, and the Turks cannot now expect any direct assistance from the Central Powers except by way of the longdelaved invasion of Serbia, which, so far as can be judged at present, the Germans and Aiwtrians cannot venture to undertake through lack of men. and in view of the heavy calls now being made upon their resources on the Italian and western fronts. All these facts in conjunction appear to justify the belief now generally expressed at Home that decisive eventwill happen in the Near East before long. And this seems an appropriate occasion for reminding our readers once more that if the Allies succeed speedily in the daring enterprise they are now conducting at the Dardanelles, they will have to thank Russia chiefly for their s'lecess. The story of the last German invasion of Galicia and Poland has still to be written in full, but already enough of the truth has been learned to give us some clear idea of the tremendous crisis that the Russians had to confront, and the skill and courage with which they face,! it. From the very outset the Russians have pursued, patiently and unvaryingly, one consistent line of policy—

to exhaust the strength of the enemy and to encourage him to follow a line of strategy calculated to inflict upon him the greatest possible loss and delay. To justify this assertion in detail would need a long excursion into the whole history of the war on the eastern front. It is sufficient however, to refer in a more or less cursory way to the principal events that followed cm the Russian campaign in the Carpathians, and their seizure of the passes leading down to the Hungarian plain. To meet this menace the Hermans constructed what has been described as the most terrible engine of war ever devised by man. Holding tho Allies on the west with machine -guns and heavy artillery, to which, through lack of ammunition, could not adequately respond, they gathered on the eastern frontier not less thun 4000 pieces of heavy artillery an 1 three million laTge shells. When we remember that Germany's whole stock of artillery before the war began was put down at 2000 pieces, while England possessed only 700 Kun:»- we may get some idea of the effect of this prodigious concentration of lire. The first weight of the attack fell on Di-iiitriofT, the Bulgarian noro of the Balkan War. who has been one of the most brilliant leaders on t.ie Russian side; and though he had only '200,000 men against yon Mackenscn's million, and no means of an-swering effectively 'llie tempest of shells hailed upon him, he held bis ground for a wo.-'c with such skiil and tenacity that Inenabled Brussiloff, on bis left wins, to withdraw his troops from the Carpathians, and saved a whole army from being cut off. But aga-iisit tiie devastating Austro-Germaii artillery the Itussiiins i-ouM make no permanent stand. Their policy was then, as before, to retreat ill such a vvav as to inflict the • heaviest possible losses upon t.he enemy; and the skill with which thisstratey was was carried out by the Grand Duke, Dimitneff, and Ivanoff we.l] deserved the praise bestowed u|h>ii i: a few days ago by Karl Kitchener himself. It is literaly true tlnat the German offensive iv Poland ha-, failed, for it has reached the limit of its powers without inflicting any decisive reverse upon the Rusiaus or crushing (heir armies or breaking down their military resistance. But if it had succeeded, a path would have ! been open for llprtrmny to linng help to Turkey hy way of the Black Sim. And |if the "Russians, by their bold inroad | mto Hungary, had „•>; forced (iennany :to concentrate her mam strength | again-st titc-m, ion Mackenscn, 4.000 I heavy puns would have -one to the : western front, with consequences that, | happily, we need not now con: eniplnl >. I Truly the Allies owe a heavy debt of gnu iUl.le i<> __ y , ._ -:,_.,, ,