The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1915. WILL ENGLAND BE INVADED?

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 147, 22 June 1915, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

TUESDAY, JUNE 22, 1915. WILL ENGLAND BE INVADED?

For the cause that larks ateittonea, For the wrong that need.* re*\staf*M, For the future in the distance, And the good that we am «k).

Before the war began most of the n.ival ami military experts who had given any seriotis attention to "the German peril" believed that if Germany ever diil attack us she would !>e_'in by making an armed descent oi. Kngkuid's shores. It line been demonstrated over and over again that there was no insuperable obstacle to such a plan, always supposing that the German-; were prepared to risk a considerable body of men in an enterprise thai offen-d only a iiroblem atical eli-.iTiee of succcHS. Bui the old argimient. that while it '.■<■ »msv for an invading army to land in England, it would hltxe no way or retreat. is heavily discounted by the willingness of the Germans to sacrifice their troops with the most reeklc-s p-vlnivacanoe to attain a given object, and it is . \tremelv prob;ible that if a favour. di'.s opportunity for the in-vasion of Knplan.l had presented itself ai the outbreak of the war tin- Germans would not have hesitated to seize it. We do not yet know I how much Kiij;laml and the Kmpire owee * to tiie Ministers TesponslMe for the ! mobilisation of tJie Navy and it* readiness for war when tlu- Wow fell. But i even if the reports of German preparations for transporting 150.000 troops across the North Sea during tlie firx-t ' week of August have been exaggerated, ' we mil be sure that nothing but the eer- i tainty of immediate destruction drove their Meet to shelter under the guns of ' their naval bases, and so deprived tiie : transports of the convoy they required. But while it is true that this chance h.is gone by irrecoverably, the question still remains whether the Gernrane. when they recognise that their position is desperate, may not decide to make a furious onslaught upon the British const, and attempt to land troojfc for tlie purpose of striking terror into the people, and doing as much damage to the conn try aj possible before the inevitable cud comes. This phase of the invasion problem was discussed at length s mc month.-, ago in several Icuiing British journals.! and it is interesting to follow tin- i iewe on tins subject liy tiie navnl and military experts of the "Times." . Both these distinguished authorities ' think it quit* possible that the Germans will make son.c attempt at invading . Kngland. and though it would be. from the enemy's standpoint, a most desperate undertaking, they maintain that Gov- , eminent and the country should be prepared to meet it. TiK' "Time--" naval expert assumes that the German fleet will probably sally fortih so -hut or later, eitiier to put heart into the despairing people by striking a blow for Germam-'a naval prestige, or to attempt to relieve famine and indiistrhil pressure produced by the British blockade. There is no drnrbt that, without phenomena) good luck. rihe greater part of the , German warships would V doomed to inevrtaMe destruction very coon after *'.iev enwrgeil. ''"'■ " l 0 ifii<*t':on is whether they would venture to ' ni.-V a large !-.-!y if transports , loaded with troops Heroes the southern , p.iTt of the North Sea. in spite of , and torpedoes, trusting more than anything else to the confusion of ,i rrrcat sea , light to achieve their oh, s<. without at- , trading too much attention from the de fending lleet. It certainly sounds like a suicidal project. But it must be remembered that with the British licet j still "in being" and controlling th" North Sen. such an invasion would only be a last despairing effort to inflict tin; maximum of damage upon a hated enemy: and though the "Times" naval expert admits that the experiment would be dangerous in the extreme and would almost certainly end in irretrievable disaster, still ihe possibility remains that the Germans might try it. as a last ■forlorn hope." and that they nvij'ht succeed to the extent of landing a ecrlain nunrber of troops, who could he trusted to do a great deal of harm to the country and its people before they were raptured or annihilated. This view of the question is strongly I confirmed by tlie opinion of the "Times" , military expert. "There is ample ship- i ping in Germany pords," lie says, "for i the embarkation of a quarter of a million j men or more, and from the evidence which we have had of the calmness with i, which (ierman generals sacrifice life to attain their objects, we can be sure that !' the loss even of 50,000 men in transit will be considered a cheap price to pay for throwing the remainder ashore." Of course the enemy may be trusted to realise that this would be a difficult problem to solve. The "Spectator." which has given a greal deal of attention to the whole subject, has made -onic interesting suggestions a- to how the actual work of transporting and landing

the troops might be carried out. "First, we presume, would conic the submarines, then tho destroyers, then the Bght cruisers, then the battle cruisers, and lust of all the great battleships. Behind them would march the transports. T3ie notion i 3 thut tliie vast and mixed' Armada could make its dash at our shores, coming on wry much like the German columns which have attacked our positions in mass with their machine pun* in front. ]f they wore undetected l.v our Floot till they -cached our shori'3, llioy would, it ie suggested, beach the transports while the fighting craft formed a protecting iron ring around th<™. a ring outside which minelayers would have Inid a plentiful store of minis. In this proteelod area the transports would dUemhark their men and ■ stores with feverish haste. Tho hoTses would be thrown into the sea and left io swim ashore. The men would tumble into fhu-bottomed hoate specially proviili'd for die purpoee and towed by launches, franca on board tho ships would lift the heavy guns into huge, lighters brought from Germany, and" then by inclined planes and so forth the pins would somehow ot other be dragged up the beach: for it i> quite clear that an army of non-marksmen—if wo may, without offence, ho describe tho German infantry—could not afford to come with- I i>ut a very plentiful supply o f powerful artillery. This doc* not, we confer," adds the "Spectator, ,, "sound a very hopeful plan, but the German answer to such criticism would n o doubt bo: -It ! is a groat deal Setter than doing nothing, and it may succeed, if it duos, you arc ruined. If it doce not succeed, we. are no wor.vc oIT than we wore before. We can easily spare two hundred and lift}- thousand out of seven millions.'" Rut all this assume* that the p.is*age I of 15O.IHHJ troops or more ae.ro.-* the North Sea would not be directly inter fered with by our lleet, and if they did not escape dftectiou, further eomplica tions would no doubt arise. ■■[{ the Oermau .Vrmada did not wuccoed in getting out or. Emden and the Bight of Heligoland witihou.: being sighted, and if the mifiht of Kn-land. oin-e more flashing "to anticipate the scene.' found and en _-H,2vd the enemy* battle Moot, the id*-a seems to be th.it." while the Herman *ub- : marines were endeavouring to t~ink -uir ■ vcswle, ami a great llect notion wa* i going on. the transport*, unnoticed in the lurmoW, would nir-h to the selected ' place of disembarkation—here. Urn, pro tevting themselves by a rin™ of mine.-, in case the jrrcat naval action should in>t tn> in favour of the fJcrmans. Of course, the trouble here would bo that then- , !iuj;ht !>e enoiijjh of <wir submarines over and above tluwe required for the battle work to follow the transports, and get in anion? them." But once more comes the Oertnan answer; "It is hotter to try n desperate thing - than to try nothing." It is nioro ' than probable that. <>f the Cexinan ; tTOi»pe> tln»~ diaembarked in England, evnry survivor w.'ul.l l.c a prisoner in Hri(K-':i hands within n we,-k or a fort- • night from landing. But in the intcxval ' the p.irt of the tountry exposed to their ' ravagfs would j.rol.abJy learn by b.tter e\porioneo will at tionnan "frigiitfullKTas™ really means. Tlie chance of succcee f>r tho liermans »• n-tnoti , and !nnniti«imal, . but the danss«r of invasion may still remain a coneUnt menace to England till i the (ierman navy t. amwbilated or peace I is declared. "The attack on t-':ie British ' i.-Jet." as the "Times" sa\s. "is one of ' the ni<t-t <l:Ili.-ult operations that can be , imagined while we ikjsscso an unbeaten j fleet; but the less the ciiance for the f 1_; off ma to hrinfr off a groat success on ' land, the more they ire likely to risk a blow at Iβ*. Convinced as wo may be that we arc safe under our naval ohield. ' and knowing -.v* we do that our land armaments improve daily, we must not allow ourselves to be lulled into a false } sense of security. The more completely . we are prepared, the let-is w the chance ' tihat the grtroke will bo delivered."