THE CRY FOR AN AIR-FLEET.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 145, 19 June 1915, Page 4

THE CRY FOR AN AIR-FLEET.

As tho war progresses and tho efficiency c/f the air-craft on both sides _ every day more clearly demonstrated, it is natural that military and naval

experts at Home, should be engaged in planning and devising and conjecturing ways and means to render tho "fifth ami" of our serviced more effective

still. One inipoi'Lartt fact has already been proved to demonstration—that tho Briti-h and French aviators, probablyowing to their racial temperament and their instinctive tendency to take risks rather than avoid them, have established a definite superiority over the airmen of the enemy. Another point to he observed is that the aeroplane has proved its relative superiority to tho Zeppelin as a lighting machine. And a third point is that tlie capacity of the aeroplane for offensive warfare, bydropping bombs and explosives, is far greater than was at first anticipated. But it must lie _nderst-0_ that the effectiveness of aerial warfare thus conducted depends chiefly on the number of Hying machines operating and the continuity of their efforts. The official reports of the last two aerial raids directed by the Admiralty, in which from 30 to 40 aeroplanes took part, acting in conjunction, show that the - destructive effects of such an attack

are very greatly enlarged by increasing the number of the machines engaged. From all these facts the conclusion bas been drawn that " a comprehensive and su-tained aerial otTen-

sive" by the Allies would produce an overwhelming effect upon the present military and naval situafion. and would, go a long way towards bringing the war to a close. The whole problem has been discussed recently at length by many expert- m areonruitics. notably by M. Dcs-lcd- in " Land and Water.'' and the conclusion to which tbis dsstin--lii-hed authority has come is. briefly, that for £10.000.000. England could buiid and equip and man a fleet of -.000 aeroplanes, which, by Mistainod and continuous attacks. would practically render the enemy's position untenable. " With a powerful offensive air fleet." writes M. DesWe-s. "out airmen could attack night and day the roads and railways behind the hostile lines, and could prevent the enemy from receiving supplies, ammunition, or reinforcements." He m_int_ins that such an air licet could, wiith absolute certainty, destroy the great Krupp works at Essen, from which the greater part of the German rnvmiti-on supplies is drawn, and he argues at great length to prove tiha.t a "comprehentsive and sustained aerial offensive" would render it in>poi>3iblo for the hostile aTtmies to keep the field. Of courtse, it ie evident that ti'icre i,s nothing to prevent the enemy from following our example. Bat the incidents of the war have already proved nit only that the Allies are stronger in aerial offensive operations than the eirf-mv, but that the aeroplane is an infiniitely more destructive weapon than had been suspected: and, considering the fact that a huge fleet of aeroplanes, certainly able to infliiet an enormous amount of damage, could be provided for less money than one week'- wairfare is costing England just now, the experiment seems well wort- trying.