The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1915. THE FRENCH REVIEW.

Auckland Star, Volume XLVI, Issue 71, 24 March 1915, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

WEDNESDAY, MARCH 24, 1915. THE FRENCH REVIEW.

For (A* crnuxe that lacks assistance, For the w*o»g that need* reaiataswe, J?or the futwre'n the-distanca, Aad the good that we oem da.

As a rule official criticism of military operations is carefully reserved until its character can have no practical bearing on the course of the war. But the French War Office has broken so many precedents during the pact six months, that it is no surprise to find it issuing a retrospect of the war which deals with the tactics and strategy of the first campaign in Belgium and France, and criticises the movements of its own armies with frankness and severity. There is no attempt at minimising the mistakes and failures that in certain directions marked the opening stages of the war; and what the French "review" now tells us may help to elucidate one of the most inexplicable mysteries of the first campaign—the dancer to which the British 'Expeditionary Force was exposed at Mons and during the subsequent retreat.

There acems to lie no doubt that General Joffre intended to make his stand in tbe first instance along the French fronta'cr line from L/iHe to Maubeuge and easrbwand. In view of the short time left ifor mobiliEatiion —the few days that were caved for France and England solely by the heroic stand of the Belgians at Liege —it seemed inadvisable to attempt a forward moremeat beyond those limits. But it appears that the appeals of the Belgians tfor help induced the French, for politica" and eentimental reasons, encouraged asi they were by the unexpectedly ohstinatc resistance that Belgium was offering ■bo the Invaders, to push forward into the salient between the Sambre and the Mcuso, at the extreme point of which lies Xamur. A glance at the map shows that while Namur held out the positions taken up by the French at Charlerwi and Givet, and by the English at Mons, were safe from a surprise or an overwhelming attack. But Instead of holding out for a month or two, Xamur fv"l in three dare, and the Germans h-.\v-ing concentrated with great rapidity in numbers which the French appeair to have underestimated very seriously, were able to sweep tho Allies before them in the headlong rush that brought 'them clown to the very gates of Paris.

What the world has been able to learn of the events of that last eventful fortnight in August shows that th e Germans did make a deliberate attempt to destroy or capture the whole British force between Mons and Maubeuge. and that they expended a disproportionate amount of their fighting strength in the effort. "But the danger which Sir John French's divisions had to face was due, not simply to the enormous numerical superiority of their assailants, but to their complete isolation, and the apparent inability of the armies on their right flank to get into touch with them or support them. So .precarious was the position of the force, and so narrowly did it escape absolute annihilation that public opinion was for some time inclined to attribute its peril to treachery, and many wild rumours about French spies and traitors were circulated. But from the military point of view the fate of Xamur explains everything. "Xamur, it is now clear," say ß a recent critic, "was one gigantic mistake. A campaign was hinged on its invincibility without any attempt to make that invincibility certain." It is indeed strange that the French Commander-in-Chief, with the fate of Liege before him, should have been willing to stake so much on. the impregnability of any fortress: and reading between the lines of the French War Office's "review," we can almost hear General Joffre publicly admitting his mistake..

But when we come to consider the subsequent operations with which this interesting documents deal 3, the verdict must be of a different character. F.ir it was undoubtedly a great achievement to conduct the retreat of half-a-dozen armies for a hundred miles without ever allowing their military organisation to suffer or their fighting spirit to deteriorate. But Joffre did far more than this—he made his dispositions with such skill that when the time came to stand firm and deliver the long-expected counter attack, it was possible for him Ito anticipate all the enemy's movements, I and practically to ensure victory before j I the fight began. There was a moment J during the retreat from the Belgian frontier, after General Pau had checked yon Kluck at Guise, and the British forces had beaten off the pursuing Germans at Compiegne, when it seemed very probable that the Allies would take their stand in the valley of the Aisne. ' But Joffre realised the strength of the positions that the Germans would hold there, and he wished to draw them within striking distance of the two' armies forming 'up near and , around Paris, to assail their left wing. He, therefore, allowed the three western armies, D'Amade's, French's, and Pau's j to give ground, and retire again. He refused to reinforce his left wing, and | he informed the French Government that he could not guarantee Paris against a siege. The intelligence that the French Government had abandoned the capital encouraged the Germans to renewed efforts, and they pressed on into what "has been aptly "termed a "gigantic ambuscade," where they were for the moment in a strategical sense practically at the (mercy of their enemy.:

It is difficult without the help of diagrams.to give any iclear conception of the very complicated movements that made up the great battle of the Alarne. But it must be remembered that while yon Kluck was moving down upon Paris, two German armies were trying to force their way past the barrier fortresses on the eastern frontier of France, so ac to open new lines of advance for the invaders, and to take the French anmies in flank. W*cn yon Kluck had arrived within- striking distance of Paris he decided that it wae impracticable" to invest that huge fortress while the strongarmy of the Allies was still unbeaten in the field. At the same time he seems to have concluded that a blow struck at the French centre, at the very moment when the Crown Prince, with two armies to help him, assailed the "French right near Verdun, would break and roll up the whole French line. Joffre had anticipated this, and to lure the Gcrmani on he had withdrawn the /British force entirely from the extreme left of the Allies, producing the imprtssion that it had been driven off the field entirely. This "masterly piece of strategy," as it has been well termed, was timed to coincide with the concentration of the new French army from Paris on the left, while the British fell back into a concealed position nearer the centre, and the fifth French army also retired further south, to leave an apparent gap in the French line. It was by these skilful readjustments of Joflre's forces that yon Kluck was induced to take the daring, but incautious, step that gave' Joffre his opportunity, and led at once to the rout and retirement of the invading armies.

What followed has already been, subjected to very minute analysis by military experts throughout the world. The German right, ignoring the FrancoBritish armies on the Allied left, swung inward and across to attack the French centre. Yon Kluck's forces were assailed on flank and front at once by three armies, and driven back toward the north-east. But yon Kluck must be given full credit for the skill and courage with which he faced an almost desperate situation. He had massed his heavy artillery so as to cover his line of retreat, and it did its work so well that it kept off a quarter of a million men till he was able to make good his retirement to the Ourcq and the Aisne.. But his withdrawal meant that the flanks of the-two German armies next in line—the Prussians under yon Buelow and the Saxons under yon Haussen— were for the moment uncovered, and Joffre had prepared for this very contingency. He had opposed his seven armies to the German six in such a way that each Franch army covered the ' gap between the German armies facing °it. Thus the left of one German'army and the right of amotheT was attacked by the same French army, and cveTy German general had to resist two independent French attacks. It Is impossible in brief space Co show how this plan worked in detail, it ie enough to • say that it acted admirably against- the German right, where yon Kluck had to secure his own retreat, and at the same time' "hold up" the remnants of yon Buelow'a and yon Haussen"s armies, which were a'most annlihilafced by the frontal and flank attacks combined. AM this time, it must not be forgotten, the French army near Verdun was resisting desperately the onslaughts of two German armies. If Troyon and Verdun had fallen,- the Froncu right would have been turned, Joffre's plans would have failed) and Paris could hardly have been saved. But when Troyon had only four guns still in action, and its garrison was reduced to 42 men, the French army next in line was able to d-raw the attack of the Crown Prince's force; and the retreat of the Crown Prince through the Argonne not oriy put the finishing touch to the victory of the Marae, but finally justified the main principles of Joffrc's strategy •throughout his conduct of'this remarkable 'campaign.