RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXIX, Issue 69, 20 March 1908, Page 4

RUSSIA'S AMBITIONS.

The third Douma has generally been regarded as entirely subservient to tbe will of tie Czar, but its refusal to vote the enormous sums required to carry out the new naval programme indicates that it is a much more independent and resolute body than might have been supposed. So carefully were the last elections managed by M. Stolypin that nearly all the "dangerous" members of the first two parliaments -were excluded, and the early proceedings of the new assembly were marked by frequent demonstrations of loyalty to the throne. But quite apart from the impossibility of reconciling the demands of the autocracy with any respect for the rights and liberties of the people, the Douma has taken alarm at •the scope of the new naval policy and the immensity of the burden it would lay upon the convulsed and exhausted empire. The Czar's first proposal was for a vote of £225,000,000, to be expended in 12 years'in reconstructing the fleet and placing Russia in a stronger naval position than before the war. Even the Conservative element in the Douma would not sanction this vote, and though the Octobrists were willing to grant £100,----000,000, nothing but the fEreat of dissolution seems to have induced the Assembly to treat the proposal seriously. M. Stolypin then decided that moderation waa advisable, and he laid before the Douma two alternative plans—one requiring ' £ 49,000,000 to be spread over four years, and the other £200>)00,000 spread over ten years. The Government was particularly anxious for the Douma to commit itself to the larger amount, so as to insure the new naval policy against any risk of abandonment. But apparently not even the fear of tLe Czar's displeasure has been potent enough to induce the Douma to adopt the" Premier's suggestions, and the Russian Parliament has deliberately defied the Throne by rejecting the vote for battleships, and approving only the small and relatively unimportant expenditure on torpedo boats and submarines.

It will be interesting to. learn if the Czar will venture to meet this challenge by carrying out his threat and dissolving the Douma. But the mere fact that such an enormous extension of the Russian navy has been proposed is an important indication of the line that Russian Imperial policy is now endeavouring to follow. It would be a great mistake to imagine that because Russia was so decisively beaten in the recent war, therefore her power is permanently broken, and her hopes of foreign aggrandisement are blighted. Great empires are not so easily ruined, nor are the ambitions and aspirations of powerful nations so lightly surrendered. We have recently attempted to show that even in Manchuria, where Russia lost most heavily, she has gained far more than Japan, and that her position, now that she is no longer exposed to a sudden attack by sea, is far stronger than in the days when Port Arthur was the focus of her En stem policy, Putnam Weale, one of the foremost Orientalists of the day, tells us that it is quite vain to suppose that the war has accomplished anything more than the destruciton of Russian naval strength in the Far East for a period of fifteen years and the establishment of Japan, at a coet out of all proportion with the result attained, as a first class military Power. Indeed this distinguished authority goe9 so far as to assert that if it. were not foi the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, which has only eight years to run, Russia would be in a far stronger position to-day in the Far East than she was before the war. Japan has certainly not driven the Russians out of Manchuria, as they retain more than three quarters of the country and most of the railway. Vladivostok is probably a far better centre of operations than Port Arthur; and the proposed duplication of the Siberian line, and the linking up of the OrenburgTasnkent and other great western railways with it will enable Russia to enjoy unrated facilities for supplies of troops, fooc? and munitions of war. Tho lessons of the waz have not boon lost upon the Czar and his ministers, and when the time comes they will be infinitely better prepared than four years ago for a struggle for supremacy in Asia. And we may add that the Anglo-Russian Convention, as it has at least, disarmed British suspicions, is from the Russian point of view a valuable set-off to the Anglo-Japanese alliance. Considering all thinjrs it is incredible that Russia has abandoned hope of regaining her lost status in the Far East, and this her new naval programme clearly shows.