The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1906. THE UNIONIST CRISIS.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXVII, Issue 35, 9 February 1906, Page 4

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

FRIDAY, FEBRUARY 9, 1906. THE UNIONIST CRISIS.

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The rumours that have been lately current to the effect that Mr Balfour might be superseded in the leaderahip of the Unionist party have now received an emphatic contradiction. In one of those "open letters" waieh play so important a part in modern British polities, Mr Chamberlain has given his assurance that under no circumstances will he enter into personal competition with. Mr Balfour, He has already proved Ms personal loyally to Mr Balfour beyond fear of question; and he holds that a party Afchich includes a large majority of Conservatives should naturally be directed by a Conservative leader. An attempt has been made to interpret Mr Chamberlainfs recent utterances on the party policy in the light of an ultimatum to Mr Balfour. This charge Mr Chamberlain categorically denies. But he puts very clearly the claim of the Tariff Reformers to receive some clear intimation fiom the party and its leader as to the cotttse which is to be followed with respect to Fiscal Policy. At present the more strictly Conservative section of the Unionists is inclined to drop Tariff Reform for the moment, so as to give the party a chance of reconstructing itself on some less debateable principle But, as Mr Chamberlain says, this coarse would be altogether inconsistent with Mr Baifour's own contention that Tariff Reform is "the first item of the constructive policy of the Unionists," and that Imperial Reciprocity is the most urgently needed feature of Tariff Reform. The alternative, of course, ia to adopt Mr Balfour's own conception of Tariff Reform as the basis of the party's policy; and this is precisely where Mr Chamberlain and his followers meet their most serious difficulty. For whatever Mr. Balfour's intentions may be, he has not yet succeeded in making clear to friend or foe exactly what he means by his belief in the new fiscal policy- The famous of notepaper" scheme to which our cables refer : and which some of the Unionists would prefer to see adopted as the basis of the party programme is neither clear enough nor comprehensive enough to suit those who have accepted Mr. Chamberlain's gospel. When. Mr. Balfour replied to Mr. challenge by reducing his fiscal faith to writing; he endeavoured to state briefly bis reasons for advocating a change in the fiscal system and to define within certain limits the course that he was prepared to take. He desires fiscal reform, he says, so that England may secure for herself greater freedom of action in commercial affairs; and that for thiec reasons. This increased freedom he holds would enable us to secure better terms in arranging commercial treaties; it would enable us to protect our colonies from foreign commercial aggTession; it would enable us to check the importation of foreign bounty-fed or protected products. Further, he considers that a closer commercial union with the colonies is desirable, and that consideration of this question should be referred to a Colonial Conference, without any limitation as to subjects of discussion. And he concludes his programme with the general statement that he does not wish to raise Home prices for the purpose of aiding Home productions. This is all very well as far as it goes. But it is very little more than a general expression of sympathy with the objects of the Tariff Reformers. There is not a word as to the way in which those objects might be attained; and on the whole the "halfsheet of notepaper" contains little more than what Mr. Balfour told the Conservative party in the singularly vague and unconvincing speech that he delivered to them at Newcastle last November. Naturally enough, Mr Chamberlain, in spite of his fidelity to his leader, and his refusal to enter into personal rivalry with him, feels that something more than this is needed to keep the party together, and to provide it with a practicable basis of action. If possible, room must be found in the party for the Unionist Free Traders as well as the Tariff Reformers, and Mr Chamberlain fully comprehends the difficulty of reconciling these divergent views. But if the majority of the party hold that tariff reform as understood by him is either mistaken or impracticable—if they resolve either to oppose it or to defer the whole question for the time^— then "the Tariff Reformers must reconsider the position." They may be driven to form a separate '"'Parliamentary Group," which, while acting generally under the leadership of Mr Balfour. would give to tariff reform that prominence which they feel rightly attaches to it. They cannot accept Mr Balfour's direction on this subject while he has not rejected the decision of the Unionist Free Fooders that on no account must a duty be imposed on corn, and they cannot believe that even the "retaliation" which Mr Balfour advocates is possible? unless a general tariff 3 partly preferential, partly protective, is imposed. Taking all these facts into account, Mr Chamberlain, beiiercng that the future of the party and the Empire is involTed in the accqrtaDce- oi tariff.

reform, indicates that he and his folr lowers are likely to assume a degree of independence that may ultimately lead to a further disruption of the Unionist party. There is even a touch of bitterness in the reference to "a policy of inaction and mystification" which at least suggests that in spite of his loyalty to Mr Balfour, Mr Chamberlain shares the general disappointment at Mr Balfours inability to rise to the full height that the occasion demands, and the ex-Premier may yet find that his unfortunate lack of "fixed, convictions" on this question, as on many others, has done him more irreparable harm than even the Liquor Bill or the Education Act, or the importation of the Chinese into the Transvaal.