The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo. WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1904. OUR INDIAN ARMY.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXV, Issue 88, 13 April 1904, Page 6

The Auckland Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News and The Echo.

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 18, 1904. OUR INDIAN ARMY.

, I; * For the cause that lacks assistance, ' For the tcrrong that needs resistance, For the future in the distance, And Vie uood that we can do.

j When Lord Kitchener was sent out to India to take over the command of j our Asiatic army it was generally anticipated that his restless energy would , find full scope in reorganising and reforming the Indian military system. The work of reconstruction has been naturally delayed by the unfortunate accident that lately incapacitated the Com-mander-in-Chief. But the order just issued by him indicates clearly that the conqueror of Khartoum and the organiser of victory in South Africa is taking his new responsibilities seriously to j heart. There are hints of the establishment of a stall college, the redistribution of troops and commands, the formation of a general staff, and other signs that the experiences of the South African war are to bear fruit in India. The report of the War Commission and of Lord Esher's Army Reform Committee has roused England to a sense of i the deficiencies of our existing military I system, and in India, where the best j part of our standing army is stationed,! it is especially necessary to avoid the faults and failings which went far to paralyse the energies of Empire during the great crisis through which it lately passed. Until 1899, the Indian army was divided into three separate corps, located under separate command in the three presidencies. There are still three separate commands, including the forces stationed in Bombay, Madras and Bengal, and a fourth corps known as the Punjab command. But the administration of the whole force is now centralised under the Coiumander-in-Chief. The I total strength of the Indian army, native and British, is about 335,000. Of these the British regulars number about 75,000; and there are over 30,000 British voiuuteers. The Indian regulars include 38 cavalry and 119 infantry regiments. These, with the Hyderabad contingent, the Central India Horse, and 10 regiments of Gurkhas, make up a total of more than 104,000 men. officered by Englishmen or by natives trained under them. The Imperial Service troops, raised and trained by feudatory princes, number about 20.000, and include some of the finest regiments in the -.ervicc.! Most of the northern races of India are fighters by instinct and heredity, and the crack cavalry regiments rank among the best light horse in the world. The discipline and courage of many of the native regiments have been well tried in the interminable wars along the North west Frontier; and the devotion of the men to their officers and their ilag is unquestionable. On the whole, it is fair to say that our Indian forced constitute probably the most eilicient part of our standing army; and if England were engaged in a struggle for national existence we could depend on I the valour a»d fidelity of Rajputs and Sikhs and Gurkhas as implicitly as upon the patriotism of the men of our own blood and name. The primary object of the Indian army is, of course, to maintain British predominance in India. But since the evil days of the Great Mutiny there has been no danger of any serious challenge to our supremacy from within the borders of our Indian Empire. It is true that the "forward policy" on the Northern Frontier has involved us in ceaseless struggles with Afridis and Pat nans and Other tribes of professional warriors, who have at least provided constant experience and invaluable military train ing to our troops. The Afghan wars, too, have given both British and native forces an insight into the theory and practice of warfare, which otherwise they could never have obtained. But in addition to the necessity for maintaining British prestige and keeping our border intact, the Imperial rulers of India have to face the danger that with the southward progress of Russia looms constantly nearer and nearer. It is open to question whether Russia could j ever even attempt a military invasion of India. The experience of expeditions to Lhitral and Thibet and Afghanistan does not encourage the belief that large armies could be provisioned or transported through the desolate and almost inaccessible regions that guard the northern boundary of Hindostan. The threat of Skobeleff to lead 30.00Q men through the passes, heading Tartars and Mongols and Afghans in a crusade against the English was never more than empty bravado. But no one can doubt that if the chance conies, Russia will bring pressure to bear upon India j so as to distract England's attention from her machinations elsewhere. The rulers of India must be prepared for even remote contingencies; and the necessity for maintaining our prestige among the warlike races that we govern is not the least important of the reasons that compel us to insist upon a high degree of efficiency for the Indian army. But, quite apart from the defence of India, the Indian army renders an inestimable service to the Empire. The I conditions of military life in India api proximate closely to those of actual warfare, and the endless "little wars" in the North have provided active train-

ing for many of the best fighting regi- j ments in the British army. Without 1 the experience gained in India it is diffi.- ■, cult to believe that our little army J would have ever done so effectively the ' miscellaneous work that it has been ' called upon to do in so many remote ( corners of the world. Nor is this advan- • tage confined to the rank and file of I our Indian forces. The name of Lord Roberts heads a long list of soldiers who . have gained in India not only the mili- i tary experience that enabled them to ' win victories elsewhere, but the adminis- ' trative capacity which has helped Kng- , lend to rule and civilise savage races i in. every quarter of the globe. India ' has long been the training ground for the British army, and if the Indian army's standard of efficiency were lowered, its decay would react speedily and inevitably upon the military strength of the whole Empire. Many distinguished public men have expressed the wish that Lord Kitchener may yet find greater scope for his abilities in the reconstruction of the Imperial army, but in the meantime he can do no better service for the Empire than by consolidating j the strength and perfecting the efficiency of our military forces in India.