AN ECHO OF FASHODA.

Auckland Star, Volume XXXIII, Issue 242, 11 October 1902, Page 1 (Supplement)

AN ECHO OF FASHODA.

How many Britishers took I •Taffaire Tashoda'' seriously? One in ! a thousand, if so many. Certainly an extremely low proportion of the newspaper readers of the Old Country ever imagined that a war with France was within the range of probability. Over the water, however, they seem to have taken Fashoda very seriously indeed, and to have believed, that the danger of hostilities with Great Britain was imminent. l?7e knew long ago that the

country dwellers in France were verj) uneasy as to the ultimate outcome of the Fashoda squabble, and that petitions to the President to use his utmost influence to prevent a trial alarms between the two nations choked the letter-box of Ms official residence, but throughout the average Britisher smiled almost contemptuously—not because he despised French: power by sea or land, but because, he could not conceive statesmen; flinging away thousands of lives and millions of money over a matter thafe appealed to him as being very suifcabla of settlement by the spin of ;s coin. The potential value of Fashodx. may be immense, but at the time ot the trouble it was more national vanity than the commercial or s.rategia importance of the post .nat gave Fashoda importance in the eyes of tha' British public, and anyone seriously] suggesting that we should at onco forsake the virtuous road of diplomacy for the war-path would have been branded for a hot-headed fool. In France, however, not only the common people, but the heads of tha nation, took it for granted apparently that England was spoiling fori a fight, and needed but small provocation to precipitate "War!—bloody: war, north, east, south an' west.^ four years ago. This much is madei clear by passages hidden away in al Yellow Book recently issued by thej French Health Department

This shows thajt our neighbours were so far convinced of the serious nature of the situation that they poured troops into all the coasti towns, and took active measures for) offence and defence-

In a report on an epidemic of eiw teric fever which occurred at Cher* bourg in the autumn of 1898, we are! told that "at this moment came tha political tension which threatened to! end in a conflict with England. Measures were adopted in order to pro* tect our coast from insult. Cherbourg was expecting a sudden attack^ preparations for defence were energetically carried out at the cost of much hard work to the soldiers, and towards the end of October the military strength of this great fortress! was reinforced in accordance with the necessities of the case by numerous contingents derived from various garrisons." And the number of meanconcentrated there is stated as thirty thousand.

The official writer representing tM straits to which the augmented population was reduced by fever—from which there were dYer a thousand attacks, with a hundred and twenty,, deaths—declares that the British Admiral need not have undertaken an assault. His orders to his captains would have been: "Remain on the defensive." The Divette (a stream supplying the water to which the outbreak was ascribed) and typhoid fever will fight for you; soon the batteries will have no defenders, and the port will have to open to your, ships." Whether this anticipation would have been realised may be doubted, though within the past three years we have elsewhere had soma striking examples of the fact that fever may be more fatal than pompoms. But it is clear that in October, 1898, France was making substantial preparations for war with Great Britain, and of these measures the British public heard nothing so definite as has now been published. - Possibly the proneness of the* French people to scent war afar off * is only the natural outcome of the military system common to all Continental Powers. They are always thinking of war, and in the piping, times of peace, when there is not ao' much as a clpueLno. bigger than a man's hand bnv^l^« ; political horizon our worthy neighbours are for ever planning how to * circumvent each other and Great Britain should a trial of strength become necessary. New plans for offensive and defensive actions against all possible adversaries are always ready and constantly revised up to date. A diplomatici strain leads to the completion of those preliminaries the postponement of which would in case of hostilities involve delay or lead to a temporary disadvantage. It is known to some that in 1896, at the time of the German Emperor's telegram to Mr T&ager, the German Government mads some of the •preparations indispensable in case of war. The signi_ic___c« of these facts is» easily appreciated contrasted with the official deilaraf tion of our own Government, tha* the "intellectual equipment" for th* direction of our own forces is ___- satisfactory. Tflie thinking depart* ments are not so strong as they should be, and that being the case what likelihood is there that Government, in case of a fresh friction wit__ a foreign Power, will be ready or abla to make its military or naval preparations keep pace with its diplomacy? It is true that at the time of t_vc. Fashoda trouble certain extra British ships were put into com_nis_io_ty but if report speaks truly neither they nor the fleet in being in either the Channel or the Mediterranean were really in a position to put forth their full powers in battle at twentyfour hours' notice. And as the opening phases of the Transvaal War showed as most clearly, our military preparations were wholly inadequate to our needs in case of war with^* near neighbour.

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