FEDERATION:

Auckland Star, Volume XXX, Issue 210, 5 September 1899, Page 2

FEDERATION:

ITS EFFECT ON NEW ZEALAND.

(Special to the "Star.")

(BY TELEGRAPH.)

THE COMMONWEALTH BILL EXPLAINED,

POWERS OF THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT

THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS PRESERVED,

PROVISION FOR DEFENCE

THE FISCAL ARRANGEMENTS

WORKING OF THE BRADDON CLAUSE

EFFECT ON PUBLIC DEBTS.

INTER-STATE COMMERCE LAW

CHIUSTCHURCH, this Say. The Lyttelton "Times" this morning published a signed article by Mr Edmund Barton, leader of the Federation party in New South Wales, on "Federation an its Application to New Zealand," of which the following is the text:— PThe editor of the Lyttelton "Times" has courteously asked me to give an outline of the provisions of the Bill to constitute the Commonwealth of 'Australia. At the time of writing the Bill has not only been affirmed by the popular votes of New South Wales, [Victoria, South Australia and Tasmania, but in each of those colonies the Houses of Parliament have voted the address to the Queen praying that, the constitution may be submitted to the Imperial Parliament for enactment, so that it may be made applicable to all the colonies which may liave accepted it before its submission ,to the Parliament of the United Kingdom. On September 2nd next the electors of Queensland will cast their votes and there is littift reason to 'doubt that in that colony too the decision will be in the affirmative. The imminence of the aggregation of a powerful Commonwealth is, I am glad to know, exercising an undoubted influence in New Zealand, and the minds of the representatives and people alike are turning toward the practical disieussion of the great problem as it affects your splendid colony. It is natural that in the absence of definite knowledge on the subject of a great impending1 change your people should be apprehensive as to its probable teffects, and when the question passes, as it soon will, from the stage of contemplation into that of active controversy, it will be found that misrepresentation will be tireless, as it has teen throrghout Australia. This has "been an incident o? every struggle for federation and the experience has been curious in this respect that the fears and the misapprehensions have been largely the same whether the field has been in the United States, in Canada or in Australia. It is reasonable then to assume that the proposed constitution will be misrepresented and misdescribed by its enemies in New Zealand, as it has been elsewhere. I welcome therefore th» Opportunity of stating what +Le constitution is in its principal features, and trust a brief exposition of it wili be considered the more authentic since it comes from one who was an active member of the Convention of 1891, as well as that of 1897-8, and who in addition to his share in Convention debates and in platform discussion has been one of the actual draftsmen of the measure on both occasions, and may fairly be taken io held a clearer grasp of its provisions than is possible to those who derive their knowledge only from discussions among men who, however honest and sincere, have not had the same opportunities of watching and influencing every turn of the movement and of the measure. OBJECT OF THE CONSTITUTION. The object of the constitution is to create a federal union <is distinguished from a loose confederation on the one hand and an all swallowing amalgamation on the other. Of the loose form of confederation, which practically makes each individual States greater than the union itself, a lit example is to be found in the loose articles of confederation of the United States; framed in 1776, and so ineffective, indeed feeble in their working, that the Americans had to supplant them by their present strong and stately constitution in 1787. It has a further example in the Federal Council of Australasia, which celebrated its own obsequies in Melbourne last year. That kind of union has long since been condemned by the common sense of Australia as a totally inadequate union. In the other extreme, called variously amalgamation, unification and legislative union, is a plan to ■which the free self governing colonies of Australasia are quite unlikely to assent. It was found too cumbrous, too unwieldly, and too provocative of friction in Canada, where the legislative union of Upper and Lower Canada, framed about 1841, had to give ■way to the larger federal union of 18C7, in which Upper and Lower Canada each resumed their old status of autonomy, preserving like all other provinces of the union, their former Independence in all legislative matters which did not assert themselves as being of national concern. The Australian constitution then provides for that middle form of union which is called federation. It

is a form which avoids the national weakness of a loose confederation and at the same time avoids the destruction of the individual capacity of its component parts to deul with affairs which are provincial and not national. CONSTITUTION OF THE GOVERNMENT AND CABINET. The federation is of course to be "under the Crown," and it increases the self-governing- power of each citizen whom it includes, for it adds to the power which he retains in influencing- the destinies of his own colony (or "state"), the further power of sharing- in the Government of a nation by no means insignificant in its beginnings, and unquestionably destined to become populous and mighty; but however populous and however mighty it is intended that it shall remain a part of the British Empire and the constitutional ruler within the Commonwealth will be a Governor-General appointed by the Crown. He will govern with, the advice of his Ministers of State not more than seven in number (unless provision is made to increase them), and curiously enough we have here the number of the States of the Union, if New Zealand and Western Australia become two of its members. These Ministers will in their turn, be responsible to the people whether directly at general elections or intermediately through the votes of the House of Representatives; and it is clear that the House of Representatives while in session can alone determine the fate of any Ministry.l say clear because notwithstanding the fact that the Senate will be a House of popular origin it is the House of Representatives alone which will hold the purse strings. The Senate and the House of Representatives are to be chosen by the same electors acting in each colony (or state) upon the same suffrage. THE LEGISLATURE. That suffrage is, until the Federal Parliament otherwise provides, to be that upon which the Lower House in each colony is at the time elected. In N.S.W. that means manhood suffrage, so it is to be in Victoria, where the Legislative Council Jias at last accepted the Plural Voting Abolition Bill. No doubt it will soon be so both in Queensland and in Tasmania, and nothing can be surer^than that the large mining population of Western Australia will soon have its way in that respect. You in New Zealand have followed the example of South Australia, and your women vote equally with your men. A move has been made in this direction by the Government of Western Australia, but there is some reason to fear that the object of the move is to outweigh the federal vote of the miners of the west, among whom the great bulk of the married have not brought their wives with them, while the majority are probably single men. We need not discuss here whether the move is dictated by the liberalism of a Grey or the astuteness of a Kruger. The cases of adult suffrage will not create considerable difficulty in the election of the Senate, because each State will choose its senators as one electorate. There would be difficulty as to the election of the House of Representatives if the Bill provided that the* number of representatives were to be determined by the number of electors, in which case States possessing adult suffrage would have a practically double representation. That is avoided by providing that in elections for the House of Representatives the number of members for the several States shall be in proportion to the respective numbers of their people, and not merely to the numbers of the electors. It is ordained that the electors, whether choosing a senator or a member of the House of Representatives, shall vote. Only one exception to the rule that each State must be one great electorate for choosing Senators has been made, in the case of Queensland, whose legislature, if she become an original State, may carve her into divisions and determine the distribution of her six senators among those divisions. On the other hand the House of Representatives will be elected by divisions to be marked out in each State by its own legislature unless indeed the legislature delays or refuses, in -which, case the State will vote as one electorate even for its representatives in that-chamber. This, however, is most unlikely and merely the possible result of a proviso framed for the purpose of preventing a State from losing its representatives in case of a delay or deadlock on the part of its own legislature. EQUAL STATE REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE. In contradistinction to the representation according to numbers in

Important Article by Mr. Edmund Barton.

A UNION SECURING PERFECT SELF-GOVERNMENT

A GOVERNOR-GENERAL AND .SEVEN MINISTERS

EACH STATE RETAINS ITS OWN ELECTORAL SYSTEM

EQUAL STATE REPRESENTATION IN THE SENATE

ONLY ORIGINAL COLONIES ENTITLED TO THIS

SERVICES TAKEN OVER BY THE COMMONWEALTH,

EVERY STATE CREDITED WITH GOODS IT CONSUMES

EFFECT OF FEDERATION ON NEW ZEALAND

amendments, if affirmed by an abso-j lute majority of the collective strength of the two Houses, must be taken as carried. The Bill, with any, amendments so carried, is then to, be put to the vote, and if affirmed by an absolute majority; it is to L>e| presented for the, Koya] assent, as if passed in the ordinary course by both Houses of Parliament. POWERS OF THE FEDERAL PARLIAMENT. What are the legislative powers of the Federal Parliament? They are thirty-nine in number, and it may be said o£ them generally that they include such powers as cannot be exercised at. present by any colony standling alone, together with such other ! powers as cannot be so effectively ' exercised by any one colony as by a Federal Parliament acting for the whole group. It will be observed that it is not proposed to touch the territorial powers of any existing State, ; its land and its mines, its laws as to "■ property and civil rights, its educational system, its powers of taxation, i except as to Customs and Excise, its ■borrowing powers, its appointment iand removal of its own Civil servants, its management of its prisons, hospitals, asylums and charities, its municipal institutions, its control of the I licensing laws, its system of public works, its railways, its administration of criminal justice, and, indeed, of Civil justice in all internal concerns, and generally its control of all matters of a merely local or private nature within the State—all these are left to it to deal with as at present. The principal powers of legislation entrusted to the Federal Parliament include such matters as the follow-ing:-—lnter-State nnd Foreign trade and commerce, taxation, which must not discriminate between States or parts of States, bounties on the production of exports of goods, which must be uniform throughout _ the Commonwealth, loans on the credit, of the Commonwealth, posts, telegraphs and telephone:-, naval and military defence, lighthouses, light ships, ; beacons and buoys, quarantine, banking (other than State Banks), cur- , reney, coinage, legal tender, the issues of paper money, bills of exchange and promissory notes, weights and measures, statistics, patents, copyrights and trade marks, the law of corporations, insurance (other than State), invalid and old age pensions, marriage, divorce and matrimonial causes, naturalisation and aliens, emigration and immigration, the influx of criminals, or the people of any race other than the aboriginal race in any State for whom it is deemed neees sary to make special laws. All these are among the powers of the Federal Commonwealth; so are external affairs generally, and the relations of the Commonwealth with the islands of the Pacific. The Federal Parliament may also make laws for conciliation and arbitration to prevent or settle industrial disputes reaching beyond the limits of any one State, for the acquisition of State railways, provided the State consents, on terms arranged between the Commonwealth and the States, and for railway construction and the extension of any State, but only with the consent of that Stale. There is also the important power to provide for the service and extension throughout the Commonwealth of the Civil "and criminal process and the judgments o* State Courts, nnd^ for the recognition throughout the Commonwealth of the laws, public Acts, records, and judicial proceedings of the several States. Strict provision is made to ensure that every power of the Legislature of a colony which becomes a State shall, unless exclusively vested in the Parliament of the Commonwealth, or withdrawn from the Legislature of a State by the Constitution, continue in force, and when I say that the powers which I have enumerated are not exclusively Tested in the Federal Parliament it will be seen that every care has been taken to preserve the legislative powers of the various States except as far as is necessary for the effective working of a Federal Constitution. The only exclusive powers of the Federal Parliament relate to (a) Customs and excise duties and bounties from the time of the enactment of a federal tariff; (b) matters relating to any public Department transferred by the Constitution to the Government of the Commonwealth; (c) the seat of Government of the Commonwealth and plans acquired by the Commonwealth for public purposes. STATE CONSTITUTIONS PRESERVED. The Constitution of each State of the Commonwealth is preserved, except so far as the Federal Constitution necessarily alters it, but it is of course still subject to alteration by the State itself. If any State law is inconsistent with the laws of the Commonwealth, in such cases it is necessarily provided that the Federal law shall prevail over the State law to the extent of the inconsistency between them. PROVISION FOR DEFENCE. The Commonwealth is bound to protect every State against invasion, and on the application of its Executive Government against domestic violence. SERVICES TAKEN OVER BY THE COMMONWEALTH. The Departments of Customs and Excise in the several States become transferred to the Commonwealth on its establishment, and thenceforth the Commonwealth will have the collection and control of the duties of excise and Customs, and of the payment of bounties, but until the Federal Parliament has enacted a uniform tariff, which it must do within two years from the beginning of the Constitution, no attempt is of course to be made to interfere with the right of various colonies to alter their tariffs. In addition to the Customs the following Departments are to be taken over by the Commonwealth on a date, or dates, to be proclaimed by the Governor-General, tlz.: (a) Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones; (b) Naval and Military, Defence; (c) Lighthouses,, lightships, beacons and buoys; (d) Quarantine. THE FINANCIAL ARRANGEMENTS.! The financial provisions of the Bill have been the subject of bitter controversy, especially in New South Wales and Queensland, and they are now engaging the attention of a committee of the Legislature of Western Australia; but I think your readers | will agree with me that these classes [ are in the main just until the period ! arrives at which the Commonwealth ! may be expected to have collected I sufficient data on which to base new ! legislation which will be fair. The j principal is that each State is to receive back all the revenue collected by the Commonwealth within its bounds, less the fair share of the State in the expenditure of the Commonwealth. The Bill deals separately with (1) the period between the establishment of the constitution and the. I

the House of Representatives, it is provided that original States—that is to say, the States which are part of the Commgmvealth at its establishment—shall each have 6 members in the Senate. This is the equal State representation around which controversy has been so bitter in the two most populous colonies, namely, New South Wales and Victoria. I shall not here revive that controversy, becausel believe the provision will, without much argument on my part, commend itself to the. people of New Zealand, but there is an important provision which ought to be mentioned at this stage." Jf a colony fails to become an original, that is to say if it delays its decision until after the establishment of the Commonwealth, the constitution does not continue to it the absolute right of equal representation. If it comes in after the Commonwealth is established it can only do so with the consent of the Federal Parliament, which may upon its admission "impose such terms and conditions " including the extent of representation in either House to the parliament as it thinks fit. It will be seen that he provision, while it must necessarily occupy a place in any just constitution, is one which becomes daily more important and more interesting to the people of yoiiir colony. FEDERAL CONTROL OVER THE SUFFRAGE. One word more as to the suffrage. The Federal Parliament is empowered to make at any time a uniform suffrage for the elections to both Houses of that parliament, but in exercising that power it has one stern condition imposed upon it—it cannot prevent any adult person who has or acquires the right to vote at elections for the Legislative Assembly or House of Representatives of a State from voting while that right continues at elections for either House of the Federal Parliament. Consequently a uniform Federal franchise cannot be so framed as to destroy the aduilt suffrage of New Zealand or of South Australia, and this entails the necessity that a uniform suffrage for the Commonwealth means the granting of adult suffrage to all the other btates of the Union at Federal elections. RIGHTS OF THE TWO HOUSES. Of the rights of the two Houses it is enough to say that Appropriation Bills or Tax Bills must originate in the House of Representatives; that the Senate must not amend Tax Bills or the ordinary Appropriation Act of the year; that the Senate must not amend any Bill whatsoever so as to subject the people to any increased charge or burden; and that the annual appropriations to the ordinary annual services of the Federal government, that is to say, there must be no "talking"; that tax Bills must deal only with the imposition of taxation, and that unless they deal with Customs or Excise they must deal with one subject or taxation only, while Bills imposing Customs duties must deal only with Customs duties, and Bills imposing Excise duties must deal only with Excise duties. While tjhe Senate cannot amend money Bills it may by message suggest amendments to the House of Representatives, but the House of Representatives can deal with these suggestions as it pleases, and if the result is an amendment it can be made only by the House of Representatives of its own free will. PROVISION FOU DEADLOCKS. "What is to be done in the case of deadlocks?" Well, this is the only Federal Constitution which makes any practical provision in case of deadlocks in ordinary legislation, and the provision is likely to be particularly effectual. It operates only on measures originated in the House of Representatives. If that House passes a Bill which the Senate rejects, or otherwise fails to pass, or passes with unacceptable amendments, then after three months the House of Representatives may pass the Bill again with or without any amendment previously made, suggested, or agreed to by the Senate. If the Senate again fail to pass it, or inserts obnoxious amendments, the Governor-General may dissolve | both the Federal Houses at one stroke. The very prospect of _ a "double dissolution" will, I take it, generally lead to an agreement, but let us suppose that a double disso-. lution has taken place. If after that the difficulty recurs the Governor-1 General may convene a joint sitting j of the members of both Houses. Of | course any such powers as these i will, like other powers, be exercised' by the Governor-General with the j advice of his responsible Ministers, j At a joint sitting members may j deliberate, and must vote collectively I on the Bill as last proposed by the House of Representatives, or on any amendment made by one House, and not agreed to by the other, any such j

lishment of the Commonwealth and afterwards till the Parliament otherwise provides. It prescribes that no more than one-fourth of the nett revenue of the Commonwealth from. Customs and excise duties shall be applied m any year by the Commonwealth to wards its own expenditure. The Com monwealth may lake less than onefourth, but it cannot take more, and the sum out of which it can take its one-fonrth is ascertained by deducting the entire expense of collection from the gross "proceeds of Customs and Ecisee duties. After the deduction of the one-fourth, if so much has been spent, the balance, that is to say, three-fourths or more of the net amount is to be paid to the several States, unless indeed under another clause of the Constitution the Commonwealth has proceeded to take over all or some of the public debts of the States, in which case the balance may 'so far as necessary be applied to the ■.payment of interest of those debts. ; WORKING OF THE BRADDON 1 CLAUSE. ! Your readers will now see how much '.'' truth there is in the oft-repeated state i ment that the Braddon clause compels . the Commonwealth to raise £4 of re- ,' venue for every £1 that it wants 'iThe clause deals with Customs and I Excise alone. There is no proportion ,'of one-furth and three-fourths en- . acted with regard to any other sort o± I taxation. The needs of the Common- . wealth are not likely to amount to i one-fourth of any tariff that is likely ' to be raised with any fair regard to t the financial position of the various States. If the Commonwealth were > obliged by this Constitution to incur ■ some enormous expenditure, and if it ! were forced to raise its revenue from t Customs and Excise alone, the nett , revenue would have to be four times ! as- much as the extravagant sumsup- , posed, but the whole proposition is an . absurdity for two reasons: First, the . Commonwealth is not restricted to 1 Customs and Excise revenue, to which - alone the Braddon clause applies; . secondly, the total expenditure of the i Commonwealth Would be limited to t the expense of carrying on a few dei partme'nts which I have mentioned as 3 directed to be transferred to it, and i the new expenditure entailed by the i carrying on of a Federal Government. - Now. apart from the fairy tales of i which our provincialista on this side -. of the water are so fond, the position •is a very simple one. In respect to - New South Wales, Victoria, Queens- ; land, South Australia and Tasmania, : the nett annual expense of the trans- ■ ferred departments is not likely to l o^oed £1,400.000, while the new [ Federal expenditure is not likely to ) exceed £400,000 a year. If the Comi monwealth confined itself to Customs •. and Excise taxation it would thus need under the Braddon clause a tariff i which, including Excise, would nett I something like £200.000, a £7,400,000 •\s th» expense of collection would be ~, P omcthino- like £500.000, a £7,200,000 1 tnriff would meet all requirements. nnd vet the five polonies mentioned rvre even now raising from these sourcps an income apnroaching •£ 7.500.000 a year and increasing ' mrtidly. T have not by me at this moment ■ the figures relating- to ISTew Zealand. i but T have said enough to show that •if the position of New Zealand is also i taken into account the alarm sought •to be raised is n mere scare. ! PUBLIC DEBTS. '' 1 ought to say; in connection with ' the question of iinance, that the Par- ! liament is empowered to take over • from the States their public debts as ' they stand when the Constitution f comes into force, or a' proportion of [ the debts, according to population. It may convert, renew, or consolidate the : Departments taken over, or any part lof them, and the States must, of ! course, indemnify the Commonwealth in respect of any debts taken over. : The interest payable on any such debts will be deducted from the share of each State in the Federal surplus. If the surplus is insufficient, then the particular State will be liable to the extent of the deficiency. It is clear that this power renders it possible to : employ the superior credit of the Commonwealth so as to effect a large saving on the present burdens of the : groups by way of interest on public Toans. Thus we have the prospect that the cost of federation will show a great reduction on the estimates at present forecasted when the Commonwealth is able to apply its powers of renewal, etc., to a large proportion of the loans as they fall due. This is a prospect which is not without attraction for New Zealand, for she stands third among the seven colonies in respect of the amount per head of interest and charges on the public debt, and second in the average percentage of interest payable on the aggregate debt. INTER-STATE FREE TRADE. There are some provisions in respect of finance and trade which I shall not trouble your readers with in this ar- , tide, because they seem to me to deal more with the relations, inter se, of the colonies on the mainland than ■ with any contingencies probable in New Zealand, but I should mention : that inter-State free trade will be , guarded by an Inter-State Commission . charged with the exercise of such powers as the Parliament deems necessary .to execute and maintain the provis- , ions relating to trade arid commerce, and any laws made by virtue of them. ■ The Parliament may forbid a preference and discrimination on State- , owned railways, but regard must be ' paid to the financial responsibility of i a State in the construction and maintenance of its railways. This power is not to operate unless the preference of discrimination is adjudged by the , Inter-State Commission to be undue and unreasonable, or unjust to any , State. At the same time purely developmental rates are safeguarded subject to their bona fides commending themselves to the Inter-State , Commission. FEDERAL HIGH COURT. The Constitution makes important provision for the establishment of a 1 Federal High Court, which will be necessary as the arbiter of questions which must arise as to the respective validity of laws passed by the Commonwealth and by the several States, and it will determine the extent to which such laws conform to the Constitution. The High Court will have original jurisdiction in cases arising under any treaty or affectng Consular or other representatives of foreign countries, or in which the Commonwealth is engaged, or between States or residents of different States, or be-1 tweeu a State and a resident of another State. It may also have conferred on it by future laws original jurisdiction in certain other cases. The Parliament may create other Federal Courts and may invest any other Court with Federal jurisdiction. The High Court is also invested with wide appellate jurisdiction. The right of appeal to the Privy Council is not

enactment: of the Federal tariff; (2) a period of five years following the enactment of the Federal tariff; (3) the subsequent treatment of Federal •surpluses. It is particularly to be remembered that inter-State free trade is not to begin until the first Federal tariff has been passed into law, and from that date, to use the words of the Constitution, trade, commerce, and intercourse among the States, whether by means of internal carriage or ocean navigation, shall be absolutely free. Now the process to be adopted from the establishment of the Commonwealth until the passage of the Federal tariff is as follows:— First, the Commonwealth is to credit to each State all revenue which the Commonwealth collects in that State. Then the Commonwealth is to make two debits against each State—the first debit consists of any expenditure incurred in the particular State by the Commonwealth in the maintenance or continuance of any department transferred to the Commonwealth; the second debit is the proportion of the State according to the number of its people in other expenditure of the Commonwealth—that is to say, in any increased expense of the transferred departments, and in any new expense arising out of the exercise of the, powers conferred on the Common-1 wealth by the Constitution. When] these two debits have been made, thej^ are to be deducted from the revenue) collected by the Commonwealth in the particular State, and the balance, after such deduction, is to be paid to the State month by month. Such, then, is the process which will obtain until the Federal tariff. First, as we know, trade among the States is to be absolutely free._ This fact necessitates an alteration in the system of debits and credits, but there is only one alteration. It is plain that as' the demands of the consumer is the cause of importation, so the State in which the consumer resides is entitled to nave its revenue credited with the duty on the importation, and the same principle is extended to the excise upon goods manufactured in one State and consumed in another. Therefore it is provided that during the first five years after the making of the Federal tariff Customs duties chargeable under that tariff on goods imported from abroad into a State afterwards passing into another State for consumption shall be taken to have been collected, not in the. former, but in the latter State, in other words, the consuming State, if I may use the expression, will get the credit of the Federal duty, and not the State of first importation, and similarly where excise duties have been paid on goods produced or manufactured in one State and afterwards passing into another State for consumption, it is the consuming State that gets the credit of the duty. As an illustration, suppose that goods are imported from England into New South Wales and thence sent into New Zealand for consumption. It is clear that it is the demand of the New Zealand consumer which has caused the goods to reach their destination, accordingly in such a case, although the Federal duty mr f y have been collected at the New South Wales port, the goods will be tallied at the New Zealand port and the duty on them will be credited to New Zealand and debited back to New South Wales. With the exception of the modification I have described, which arises solely from the incoming of flo-ter-State free trade, the process of debit, credit, and payment of balances as between the States and the Commonwealth will be precisely the same .during the second or first year period, covering possibly two years immediately preceding the making of the Federal tariff. So much for period number two. Now, during this period it may be expected that the Federal Parliament will have gained sufficient knowledge of the operation of a uniform tariff, free of intercolonial duties, to enable it to judge to what extent the conditions of production and consumption in each colony have been and are likely to be affected. The Constitution, therefore, empowers the Parliament to deal with the Federal surplus either by continuing or by amending the system I have described or by making entirely fresh adjustments. It is empowered to provide "on such basis as it deems fair for the monthly payments to the several States of all surplus revenue of the Commonwealth." It will be seen that one important feature of these provisions is that the Commonwealth is not allowed to retain the surplus in its own hands if any revenue is not distinctly applicable to the exercise of one or another of the legiclative powers given to it by the Constitution. The Commonwealth is directed to give that revenue back to the State which is the cause oil it, and whether the time of its distribution airises before the Federal tariff or during the five following years or at any time afterwards it is expressly bound to hand over to each of the States, month by month, its own proportion of the surphis, determined either under the clauses which-1 have described or according to any new system which the Commonwealth may devise after the five years' period. Now, these provisions deal with the quantity of the revenues collected by the Commonwealth, which each State is entitled to have refunded to it, but they do not deal with the question of the proportion of revenue which the Commonwealth itself is entitled to retain for Federal purposes; nor do they afford any guarantee of a minimum aggregate proportion to which the States collectively are to be entitled. I may say that so far as the proceeds of Federal direct taxation are concerned, supposing the Commonwealth to resort to direct taxation, the Constitution contains no provision restricting the Commonwealth in the use of those proceeds except, of course, that, like any other Federal revenue, they cannot be expended on any but Federal purposes, and so far as they are not so expended they must go back to the several States under the provisions already explained; but there is an important clause which limits the Commonwealth and protects the States in respect of one source of revenue 1 and one alone. I mean the Customs and excise duties, and here I come to the famous clause so volubly denounced under the name of the "Braddon Blot." The only clause (in the Bill which restricts the Commonwealth in the expenditure of any Federal revenue, so as to guarantee a solid return to the estates, but we know that the bulk of the Federal revenue will always be drawn from the Customs and Excise, and so we know that thia clause will be an effective guarantee, if guarantee were needed, against extravagance on the part of the Commonwealth, which, be it marked, will be controlled by the same persons who are the electors of the several States. The Braddon clause is to operate (unless the Constitution is in the mea.utime amended) during a period of ten years from the estab-

entirely taken away, but it is practi- j by which Canadian appeals ar: now regulated, hut there is one exception, which is that where the case involves the interpretation of this j Constitution, or of the Constitution of a State, no appeal to the , , ; r Council is to be permitted unless the public interests of some other part oi the Queen's dominions are mvolvea. THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT. The provision as to the seat of Gov- j ernment will no doubt be of some interest inasmuch as it is of importance to New Zealand that the capital should not be at any undue distance from the Eastern seaboard ot Australia, in view of the stretch of ocean which separates your colony irom the Continent. It is provided Uiat the capital shall be in New South Wales, and the effect of this concession is certainly not unfair to New Zealand when we consider that steamships traverse the intervening sea m less than four days, while with the utmost expedition the traveller from West Australia cannot generally reach us in less than six days. The position ot the seat of Government is to be determined by the Federal Parliament, and its area is not to be less than 100 square miles. So much of it as will consist of Crown lands is to be made over by New South Wales to the Commonwealth without any payment. The area is to be entirely Federal—that is to say it is to be removed from the jurisdiction of New South Wales and will be under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commonwealth. It must, be situated not less than 100 miles from Sydney, and it is conceded to Victoria in return for the surrender of any claims of her own to the position of the permanent capital that the Parliament shall sit at Melbourne until it meets at the seat of Government. This provision, I take it, will not be objectionable to your colonists. AMENDING THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. This article is already very long, 1 and I am obliged to forego the privilege of discussing many other interesting features of tho constitution. Though I have striven to confine myself to those which are of the greatest moment I cannot end the description -without noticing the means provided for dealing with proposed amendments. It may not be widely known that the constitution of Canada contains no provision whatever by which the Canadians may amend. It has no power but the Imperial Parliament can make alterations. The provisions of the Commonwealth constitution as to proposed amendments are somewhat simpler and easier than those of the Swiss, and they are undoubtedly more Liberal and less cumbrous than those of either the German or the American Federal constitutions. A Bill to amend the constitution will ordinarily require to be passed by an absolute majority pf each of the Federal houses and will then be submitted by each State to the electors for the House of Representatives, but there is here again provision to meet the case of deadlocks. If the Amendment Bill is passed by one House with an absolute majority and a disagreement ensues with the other House, then the Bill may again be broiig-ht forward, after .three months, and if the House which was its first sponsor passes it again and the other House is again recalcitrant the amending Bill in the shape in which it has left the House of its origin may be submitted to the electors over the head of the objecting House. When the referendum on a proposed amendment is taken' it is requisite (1) that it be approved by a majority of the electors in a majority of the States; (2) that upon a count of the collective voting in all the States a majority of the votes shall be in its favour. There is here preserved the principle that as it takes the consent of every State to make the constitution, so that instrument shall not be altered without the consent at the least of a majority of the contracting States. s THE POSITION OF NEW ZEALAND. I hope that I have succeeded in making this new Act of Government intelligible in its main features. The question which is beginning to press itself upon the attention of New Zealanders is no light one. A short telegram appears in the "Sydney Morning Herald" of to-day (August 18) reporting an answer made by the Premier of New Zealand to a question in Parliament. No doubt the answer has been rigidly compressed for transmission by cable, but as it stands we are told that Mr Seddon said that "as regards reciprocity an Act was' already on the statute book empowering the Government to enter into • a commercial agreement with Australia." Permit me to say that such an Act cannot empower the entry into a commercial agreement with Australia, inasmuch as at the time of its enactment Australia as a political entity did not exist. The power given can only authorise reciprocal relations with individual colonies. After this constitution becomes law New Zealand, if she has not joined the Federation, can derive no advantage from such an Act, because it will not be within the power of any of the federated colonies to negotiate separately" with any external Government for any such alteration of trade relations as would impair the rights of the Federal Government in matters of trade and commerce. What then will be the position of New Zealand if the powers given to her by the Act in question are no longer exercisable, seeing that she will not then have any power given to her by statute to deal on such subjects with Federated Australia? It is true that she may obtain a fresh authority for this purpose, but there must still be considered the fact that "reciprocity" .between two populations of which one would amount to nearly four millions and the other to about 800,000 would be somewhat too unequal to be properly described by that name. Equal trade relations with all parts of a Federal Commonwealth are accompanied with equality invarious other matters, such for instances as defence by v sea and land. The reciprocity at which Mr Seddon hints would have none of these accompaniments, and it is but natural to expect that on that account it would not be accepted without hesitation by a Commonwealth of which New Zealand was not a member. But surely it is important for New Zealand to consider whether she will accept the early certainty of equal trade relations with Australia by federating or whether she prefers to add to her isolation a distant and very problematical prospect of the reciprocity which Mr Seddon foreshadows. . I

The position, again, with regard to

defence is one of considerable gr^. vity. New Zealand possesses impor. tant harbours and good coal nieasures. Assuming her isolation to continue, if an attacking force could seize the coal-fields and maintain a I lodgment clearly the safety of Aug. traJia would be menaced and that of New Zealand effaced. Therefore, the inclusion of New Zealand in the Union would be of great advantage not only to Australia but to herself' Of course the disaster of invasion might befall Australia, but a proper mobilisation oi her much larger forces would make the risk of hostile occupation in her case much less than in that of New Zealand. This portion of the problem must be examined in all its bearings, and it will, ' then be seen that on the ground of j defence alone Federation presents to N.Z. marked advantages which will not be discouaiud by the-fact that it will -also tend to the greater safety of Australia. Mr Seddon seems somewhat inj. pressed with a fear that New Zealand may, if she becomes a State of the Union, be treated by her neighbours with some want of consideration. If any friction has arisen with regard to the representation of the colonies on the Board to deal with the Paciic cable question it must be remembered that cases of friction between the various colonies have recurred through their separate existence, but it would be tmwise to assume that I these causes would remain after the institution of a Government and Parliament representing evejry one of the colonies. That is the easiest way by | which the causes of friction can be k removed, and the most effective method for thir perpetration,- that i we should remain apart. If Federa- § tion has in other instances not 1 removed all frictions it is clear that a it has minimised them, and that ifc has bound together on terms of reasonable amity those who would other-, wise have been asking from ea-ca other not friendlj- commerce but fraternal blood. My belief is that if New Zealand joined the Union there is a. prospect of her being regarded with greater consideration instead of the reverse. No doubt there can only be one correct interpretation of any written constitution which must apply equally to every State which is a-member of it, but within the terms of the Constitution it is, possible for a wise and liberal Parliament to pay special regard to cuV cumstances which while they do not' rob the Union of its manifest advan*.-, tages still appeal to considerations:! of common-sense and patriotism^ alike. Such consideration will notfail to induce such a dealing with am exceptional position as will tend tgl the greater strength and prosperity;'! of the Union.