The Evening Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, and Echo. SATURDAY, APRIL 30, 1898. A STRATEGIC DIVERSION.

Auckland Star, Volume XXIX, Issue 101, 30 April 1898, Page 4

The Evening Star: WITH WHICH ARE INCORPORATED The Evening News, Morning News, and Echo.

SATURDAY, APRIL 30, 1898. A STRATEGIC DIVERSION.

Pot tio oanse that lacks iissisUncs, For the ttcohs that noedß resißtancß, For the Mure in tho distance, And tho cnod-that va can do. m;

As the news of'a'great naval battle impending1 be.tween America arid Spain ;in the. neighbourhood ol the/ Philippine' Islands diverts our at ten* tion J'fom the' operations in: Cuba; so there pan be little question that the chieC object of the United States in menacing Spain in the China Sea was to prevent a concentration of the Spanish power in the West Indies and on the American coast. Suck a concentration could hardly be but disadvantageous to the Americans. . It would imperil their coastal commerce, expose their less strongly defended sea ■ board cities to the constant fear of attack, if not to attack itself, and greatly interfere with communication between ' the sources of supply and the base of operations. Of course, in the event of the full Spanish naval power being centred in American waters there would be the full naval power of the States to' withstand, it; but for the reasons we have, just stated such a disposition of Spain's navy is not what the Americans desire. Their aim is to keep' the naval war as far away from their own shores as possible, leaving them comparatively free to break the Spanish power in Cuba by- swift and well-delivered blows. Their proximity to the island puts them in an admirable position to do this effectively. As a workman can get through more work in a day if he has his tools, close to his hands and has not to go in search of provisions, s,d the Americans, with a continent teeming with resources within arm's length of them, so to speak, may from their base at Key West' do infinite execution if they can keep Spain from hurling her full force at them. The descent of the American squadron on the Philippines having attracted, the Spanish, squadron to the same quarter, as it was intended^ to do leaves a comparatively free field for American operations against Cuba: and .judging by the present activity thei'e, the opportunity is likely to be embraced.

It appears somewhat strange to us here that Spain has delayed so long in sending1 a squadron to Cuba sufficient to cope with the war vessels of the United States- now there. One would have naturally concluded that the safety of that part of her dominions was of more consequence than the Philippines; and it is not n little surprising to find her sending n squadron to the latter place before she has sent one to Cuba. It is Cuba that is in the more dangerous predicament by a long way. Rebel Ikm within and invasion ' from without threaten to over turn the whole fabric of. Spanish authority in the place. There is certainly rebellion in the Philippines too, but; it- is rebellion of quite another kind: The Tagales or Malay immigrants' to the islands have never acknowledged the rule of Spain; they are governed by their own Sultans. For that reason and as they only constitute a, comparatively small proportion of the population of the islands, their disaffection is in no sense so sig-nifi-cant or so dangerous as the outbreak of the Spanish colonists in Cuba. It is unlikely that any help they coxild afford the Americans would be of much value in the case of an invasion. The situation in Cuba still more demands the first; attention of the .Spaniards if we consider the value of the place as compared with the Philippines. Cuba is the most important of all Spain's colonial possessions. In parting with it she loses territory and wealth and prestige which no development in any of her remaining colonial possessions can restore.

If the Spaniards are not utterly incapable, one cannot understand their despatching a squadron to the Philippines to meet the Americans, and not sending' a ship to Cuba unless they had some good reason for their action. The only reason one can^suppose is that they consider Cuba able to defend herself,' and are confident Of defeating the American squadron in the China Sea. ,Y.et even that reason does not account for the extraordinary delay in making use of the squadron that has for clays now been stationed at Cape de Verde ready to proceed in ;■■ any direqtion where- its services may be required. Our cablegrams "to-day intimate '' that :) that squadron has at last set out, but the southward ■ course it. is reported, to be talcing leaves us as nmch in the dark as ever as to what its j)ossible intentions may be. It' does not appear to be making in the direction of Cuba,'and the Philippines are too far off to be its objective point at this junctiire.

The action of the Spaniards is indeed a mystery to us, and although it is not impossible they may have some deep laid scheme" We confess Aye are. inclined to think that they have really none, and that the Carlists and. liepublicans haye /more grounds than .party animosity for their, charges of '. inactivity .on the part of the Government. The people of Spain are in a dangerous temper just now. .They seem to share in the feeling entertrdned by outsiders that the war,, is not being" prosecuted with the ' zeal and energy so absolutely necessary; and we should not be in the least surprised to hear of incipient revoTu-; tion in the Peninsula unless the prospect for:>, Spain grows brighter than it now is. Much, will depend on the result of the naval battle now impend-

ing. If America; is beaten there will be a temporary '.'revival of cohfideuce hi Spain, but iif the engagement-should prove disastrous to the Spanish, fleet it is likely to have a disquieting aiid disturbing;1 effect; perhaps disproportionate, to the actual importance of the battle in the war.

Other, not less momentous, effects may not. improbably result from a Spanish defeat. .A growing-sympathy is being- .manifested in the Spanish cause in more than one quarter. The Spaniards in Mexico are offering to send provisions to their compatriots in Cuba, and perhaps more important still is the announcement; that the Emperor of Austria has contributed £20,000 to the War Fund and has given permission to his officers to fight on the Spanish, side. The. Austrian Archduke Eugene, brother of Queen Christina and head of the Order of -German,'. Knights, is also endeavouring to aid the Queen-Regent. The reason of this help lies no doubt in the fact of the relationship between;.the twb ;.roy.al'_ houses, the Queenvltegeflt being .. a '.daughter:,':' of", the ' "lateKarl Frederick; .!i)nke, of Austria.?. Eyt that circumstaiiee. :does mot lessen i.fs efficiency, or ..preclude thepossibility, of. Austria tendering .a.;, still more 'substantial assistance, to ■§ painl if.,the,'.hee.d.'sh6uld arise. Jhei prospect of Spain being .-'worsted', in the war, which the defeat of her navy—if itis defeated—in Ihe China Sea might seem to presage, is not altogether unlifcely to precipitate interference on the part of Austria; and once one Power starts, to take up Spain's quarrel, there is no saying , what others may not feel called lipon to take a hand in the game. .