NAUTICAL INQUIRY.

Auckland Star, Volume XXVIII, Issue 17, 21 January 1897, Page 7

NAUTICAL INQUIRY.

CAPTAIN SUSPENDED FOR THREE MONTHS.

CHIEF OFFICER EXONERATED.

The nautical inquiry into the occidenb to tho Ruapajiu began on January Bbh, Mr ffaid.ll, &M-. presiding. Capbains Allman and Maroiel were the Assessors. Mr Gully appeared for tho Customs, Mr Skerrett for Captain Stuarb, Mr Brown for {ho chief officer Coogan, Mr Dean for bhe fourth offioer Forsyth. Captain Stuarb deposed thab he lefb Hobart on December 28. At noon on January 1 had excellent observations, the vessel then being in 40 degrees 20 minutes joutb, and 171 degrees 1 minute east. He then sob a Course which would carry the Teasel 8 miles north of Cape Farewell. The coarse wss north 8° degrees easb, standard compass, and sooth 88 easb, true. Tho coarse set would have taken them clear of Farewell Spit. Kept on the course until 4.30 p._ti He saw they were being set a little to the northward, and altered the course to east by standard compass, which ma sauth 8. degrees east, true. Ran on this altered course until 5.50 p.m. Then •fitness sat. he would be late in getting to the Spit Lighthouse, and the course was altered to south 80 degrees east, standard .compass, Which was south 63 degrees east, tiue. Ran oa that course until 6.35. Again altered course, after getting correcb posi-1 tion, to south 60 degrees easb, standard | compa.., south 52 degrees easb, true. Tho ! ship was then 14£ mile 9 from the light* house, with sandhills about 2 degrees on the starboard bow. Witness saw all the land at (bat timo that was capable of being seen, as the horizon wa_ very clear, Tho firsb and fourth officers were on the bridge when the last alteration was made ia the course. Witness albered the course himcalf. Tbi. was at 6.35. Tho ship waa steaming then aboub 13 knots. He remained on the deck two or three minutes after that- Did not return to the bridge until a little after te yon o'clock. W hen ho went below the ship waa aboub seven miles from Caps Farewell, bub a little closer to lbs Spit in a direct line. On learing the deck witsess gave instructions to the chief officer that if (he lighthouse did not come in light before the ship gob within four miles of tbe beach, she was to be hauled out mt, and witness to be sent for. The officer was also told to call witness on sighting the lighthouse or breakers. The last course he poinced oub to- the chief officer was directly to bho shore, and only a temporary one in order to pick up tbe Spit, and then be would travel parallel with it. Both the officers and himself were confident they would see breakers four miles from tbe shore. A moderate breeze from the westward was blowing nearly on the shore, bub not sufficient to raise a heavy sea, though there was heavy surf on the beach. Witness considered he would have eight miles to run before he got within the four-mile margin which he gave the officer in charge ot the deck, and quite ten or eleven before he could strike ground. The usasl dinner hour was 6.30 and witness entered tbe saloon aboub 6.40. A few minutes later he imagined he felt the engines slow and wenb to look oub ab one of the saloon portholes, bub could see nothing, as the glass was dimmed with salt spray. He went on deck at once ai he thought something was wrong in the engine-room, and ho saw iha ship was close to breakers and ashore. Tho firsb and fourth officers were on the bridge then, and the engines were going lull speed astern. The breakers were from an eighth to a quarter of a-mile from tho ship. Witness could nob say whether thore was any land strttched out on the por.t bow, bub ho could see it straight •head,- there might have been a little of •be Spit open'on'tho port bow when bho ♦waetstruck. Witness ordered sail to be Put bn the mizznri ringing and the kedge anchor t 0 bo cleared away. There was no immediate danger to the ship, though there wo. » considerable swell. In witness opinion evai-yihini? pos.iblo thab could "c done w». done to floab bho vessel, lb "as net, ho Raid, usual to use the lead when approaching New Zealand, that ia if we weather was clear. The lead, so far as He knew, was not u»ed until afiev she took pound. The first soundings «aye 12 feeb iorwarti and 25 loot, over bho stern. The wawlwas drawing 18 feet 11 inches for™u. and 22 feet 5 inches aft when leaving nooart, and there would be very little oufcrence when she struck. Did nob think navigation in the vicinity of Cape Farewell "qwred more than ordinary care in fine weather There was not the ("lightest sign "inebriety o„ board on the day when the Mai struck. Under witness' instructions neiourth officer wa. never allowed to take ™arge of the vessel unless the weather was »__v •' cxce Pb on special occasions, "men witness had defined in the General Jf ru **ion book. The chief officer a.ked him". 3 lI tnou. ''t it was necessary for fn_4w° lemttinI emttin on tho Md 8* with the ■W officer during dinner. Witness rejj«ea hewasi annoyed at such a question, him • 8 non ••armoni"ua terms with Was Ww-" eßs Bi,id lle di' l not think there _!__, S nbs* then inlended to bake his «__! be c,UBt cfficer» however, did nob ;J.*V nd,WMOnthftbridg« w,-en witBe« went to dinner. Tit; 6," -linßd by Mr Skorrotb : Had a witaw looJ c-°at bee» bapt, obedience to &»l_!_i °rd _r ? as sufficienb for the safe »phE °n 2- -tho Bhif>- Unf-<" the atmo. thab day the breakers «l___* I 6a"ly bo6n observed with V£kX -,rL bO fivo nii,eß- Whileab wa,L l" hear L . that bho cb-ef officer, who -W t__\ !_.' W __ called bya message -»?•____ ° _--.bh officer« bub wibn6B« wa" 891 called. Tho vessel struck ab 7.13 p.m.

! Witness asked the chief officer, ** How did you geb in here?" and he replied to the effocb that he was nob on bhe bridge ab bhe time. The chief officer added thab he had Jefb the deck 10 minutes after witness. The quartermaster was at the wheel, and witness asked if he had seen the breakers, receiving a reply in the affirmative. Cross-examined by Mr Brown: When witness told the chief officer that there was no necessity for bim to remain with the fourth officer during dinner, he ab the same time made up his mind to take the chief officer's place, bub did nob communicate bhab intention to him ; therefore there was justification for the chief officer leaving the deck. When leaving the deck witness gave the chief officer implicib instructions what to do if the lighthouse did nob come in view. The eun was setting south of Cape Farewell at the time when dinner was served, and ib waa impossible, in his opinion, thab this would have hid breakers from view until near them. Did nob remember telling the chief officer bhab ha was going down to dinner, nor say anything thab would load him bo believe thab permission to leave the deck had been withdrawn, beyond instructing him what to do.

Re-examined : Witness had in his mind the inset caused by tho tide when instructing the chief officer to call him when within four miles of tho breakers. The usual course witness took from Hobarb to Wellington was on the day previous to sighting land to set the course to point from five bo eight miles in latibude north of Cape Farewell, which would enable him to steer a clear course east if tbe weather waa line, or he could steer north if bad weather came on, and thus give tha Spit a wide berth. Mirage could not have affected tbe breakers being sighted. Captain Stuart described on the charb the various alterations mado in the course, and said he was certain he took bearings off Cape Farewell. Tho position ha took ab 6.35 by cross-bearings was the best position. The position was not shown to the chief officer, witness merely telling him that he was seven miles off.

Captain Sfcuarb recalled, said the charb showed that the distance from where he altered the course at 6.45 to the eastern end of the sandhill, which he could see when baking bearings, was 12£ miles, and under the atmospheric conditions he Could nob believe ib possible there was anything to obscure its view. Wibness allowed for bhe standard current of tide of 1£ to 2 miles, bub, after the stranding, he found ib was from 4to 5. It was spring tide when the steamer struck. Wibness' observations by cross bearings at 6min 35soc wero confirmed by bhe distance of the ship, and he had no doubb the position of the vessel was a correct one at that time.

Captain Wheeler, who knew Farewell Spit very well, said from bhe position shown witness on the chart where Stuart took cross bearings, he should think he could have seen the eastern sandhill on a clear day. From the point of stranding the eastern sandhill should have been visible. The sea migbb break half a mile from the shore in bad weather, bub ordinarily nob moro than a quarter of a mile. He had not seen a mirage along the Spib, but the conditions were such at the time as to mislead one as bo distance. He said be bad never known abmospheric conditions ab Farewell which make it excusable for a vessel grounding from i to } mile from the shore. He had occasionally experienced difficulty in picking up land in bad weabher. If bhe sun were setting he mighb Bee the coasb line and surf more easily.

John Cogan, chief officer, said he concurred with the captain's courses up to 6.35. Ab the latter hour tho course was nob given to witness, bub to the fourth officer. He knew what bhe course was. The capbain, in reply to a question, Baid ib would nob be necessary for witness bq remain on deck while the former was ab dinner. Witness said, " I am going to havo my dinner in my cabin.' He had nob been in the saloon for four or five days, being ill with dysentery. He wenb on. bhe bridge to bell the fourth officer that the captain bad given him permission to go to dinner, and this must have been heard by the quartermaster. The capbain came on the bridge ab this time, and they" had some conversation about the passengers seeing Mount Egmont, bub the capbain thouphb this could nob be so. The captain called "port" bo the helmsman, and witness saw land on the starboard bow. The course was altered to 60, leaving the Band hummocks 12 miles ahead. Before leaving the bridge tho capbain said to the fourth officer not to approach the shore nearer than four miles, bo report the Hghthouso to him when he saw it, and bake bearings. He never heard the captain say " Look oub for breakers." Witness considered tho course was safe with land five miles away on the sbarboard bow. Ho judged the position chiefly from sight. Witness' watch had been from . o'clock, but he had nob been on bhe bridge having bean engaged in ship's work, gebbing ready for port. Shortly after witness begaa eating dinner the quartermaster camo and said the fourth officer desired to report land on the starboard bow. He rußhed on deck, bub before he gob bhere the telegraph bad gone. He spoke to the fourth officer words to the effect, " Whab aro you about." Got. no reply. He corroborated the captain's evidence as to whab occurred after bhe vessel struck. There was a glare between tbe surface of the water and hammocks of sand. He noticed bbie when bhe coursa was altered at 6.35 o'clock. Did nob observe the lighthouse unbil some time after the vessel was stranded. He said it was nob usual to leave the fourth officer in charge of the bridge. He did not think his presence on the bridge would have prevented the accident if the appearance of the land changed as bhe foarbh had said it did. Could nob see any break or fiurf when he swepb tho horizon with his glasses. He know tho course waa sob in the direction of the lighthouse, leaving tho sand hummock 12 miles off, aboub ± point off starboard bow. Tho glare he saw obscured the base of the hummocks. With the exception of the haze ib was a brighb, clear day. He knew ib was againsb eeneral orders to leave the bridge witboub the express permission of the captain, and thab ib would'have been improper for him to do so. The custom of the ship was for the fourth offioer to relieve him for dinner, except under special conditions where tho captain's permission was desirable. The nresenb occasion was an occasion in which the latter had to be obbained. Tho reason was they were approaching land, and.ib was not proper tor the capbain or chief officer bo leave the fourth officer in charge under such circumstances. When witnoss asked the captain if he could go to dinner, ho was under bhe impression that the captain intended to stay on deck. He waa the last officer bo leave the bridge. Witness hoard nobhine about breakers, and was. only instructed to keep her off four miles, and report the'lighthouse. The course ahewaa steering up to 6.55, would have cleared the vessel, and brought bhe lighthouse in sight earlier. The usual practice of prudent captains was to remain aboub the bridge when a vessel was approaching land. When bhe capbain ordered the helm to porb and wibness drew his attention to land on bhe starboard bow. the former gave bhe order •'• Steady." The capbain never said he was going down to dinner, nor did he say anything which led witness to believe that he expected him to stay there. After the alteration of the course ab 6.35 the vessel ran five miles by tho log. He never heard tbe captain cay that the course altered at 6.35 was one direct y heading for tho land, and nothing was told him regarding the current. As to the capbain'a statement thab the officers and ho (the captain) had agreed thab breakers could bo seoa four miles off, witnoss had no I recollection of tho word breakers being I mentioned. Wttrnwa waa quite of opinion

thab the captain was in charge of the ship and thab hewas relieved of all rosponsibiliby. Witness read and signed a book containing general orders whon ho joined the ship twelve months ago. This was kept by the captain and he had nob seen ib since. He had no reason to suppose thab bhe fourbh officer while in charge of the bridge did nob follow the course set by the captain. From the time witness went below to coming on deck bhe whole aspect of the Spit had changed, as tho euu was then setting. When the course was changed witrffeaa believed that sho had quite seven miles to run on that course before she gob within a four-mile margin given by the captain, and his theory therefore was bhab she must have been set in unless the estimate of distance was incorrect. He saw no observation made about the time the vessel's course was changed at 6.35. Since the stranding, he found thab by dead reckoning tho position of the vessel was two miles closer to the nearesb land than shown by the cross bearing taken at 6.35. The former placed tbe ship 5J miles oh bhe nearest land. On stranding, rockets were sent up, deck flashes wero lighted, and he hoisted the signal " Disabled."

Captain Allman : Don'b you know the latter signal was very wrong ? Say, if the lonic or any large vessel came along and wenb to your assistance sho would have been piled up alongside, you. You should have hoisted tbe signal " Vessel ashore."

Wibness made no reply to this, bub added bhab signals were also hoisted during bhe day.

Edward Forsyth, fourth officer, holding a chief officer's certificate, handed ib in under protest. He said he was on duty on the afternoon tha vessel struck. The chief officer came on bhe bridge aboub 5.50 p.__, bub the captain had been up twice or bhrice before that. The chief officer was busy getting anchors ready for port, and when he finished he came bo the bridge, saying he had bhe captain's permission bo go to dinner, and was going, and would be handy if called. This was aboub tho time the couree was altered ab 6-35. Cogan was on the bridge then. When the captain came up the captain gave instructions nob to approach nearer than four miles, but he could not remember hearing a word aboub breakers. The captain was on bhe starboard side of the compass when giving orders. Cogan was also on bhab side, while witness was on the porb side. Wibness was nob prepared to pay whether the captain's orders wore addressed to the chief officer or to himself. The chief officer was slightly Dearer to the captain. The latter lefb the bridge two or three minutes labor, and was followed four minutes afterwards by the chief, officer. Witness k-pb on bhe course as given him at 6.35. Ab 7 o'clock he saw land and altered tha course to 70 eaab. and steered on thab for about five minutes, when he thought it was prudent to pull her oub a libble more and gave bhe course cant. The helm waa pub hard to starboard, and her head went round to 60u_h 85. Before sho reached thab ho found she was dragging through the sand, so ho reversed the engines and ordered full speod astern. The captain and chief officer came up almost together, the latter having boen sent for when he altered the couree. Soon after tho helm was pub to starboard ho saw breakers for the first time, and judged they were two and a-halt miles away. Ho found oub afterwards they were much closer than he had thoucho ab the time. He was using the glasses continually after the captain left the bridge, on the look oub for breakers and the lighthouse, bub saw neither. No mention was made to h[m by the quartomaster thab he had seen breakers. V. itneas thought tho heat of the sun from the sand had made tho land appear further off than it really was. He had never been in charge before when bhe vessel had been so close to land aa the Ruapehu was, There was no delay in sending for the chief officer when tho cour.«o was altered, bub no menage was sent to the captain. Wibness ab this time d:d nob anticipate thore was any danger. Witness had been on duty from 4.30 a.m., bub he was in no way incapacitated from duty by thab.

James 0. Peach, who was at tho helm, corroborated tho former witnesses as to the course steered. When the order was given * hard starboard ' he saw breakers on the Btarboard side, bat did nob report the fact bo the fourth officer, who was in a batter position to see them, as ho had glasses. Ib did strike witness thab tho ship was then running into danger. He believed bcUi officers heard the instructions given by tho captain at 6.35. N. O. Cornwall, second officer, confirmed tho observations taken by the captain at noon on January 1. Witness was oil duty and ab dinner when tho accident happened. Captain Sbuart was recalled as to who ordered the wrong signals to be hoisted, and said hehimself was altogether to blame.

Morrison, second engineer, gave unimportant evidence. R. Duncan. Governmenb Inspector of Machinery, said ho had made an examination of the Ruapehu, and found a slight; bulge in tho bulkheads, and two stanchions in the forward stokehole bent. A diver had examined the outside of the ship and found no damage, bub this could nob clearly bo ascerbained until the vessel was docked. The damage to the bulkheads and Btanchions may not have been the resulb of the presenb occasion. Colonel Stewart, a passenger, said he saw land on the port bow aboub 6.40 p.m., or over half-an-hour before she struck. All bis attention was directed to this land, and he took no notice of anything on the Btarboard side until sho was aground. He then saw breakers between tho ship and the shore, which were visible to the naked eye. Chae. A. Cooper, editor of the "Scotsman," who was also a passenger, said he was on dock until about 6.20 p.m. Before bhab, hia attention was particularly called to wbab was pointed oub as Cape Farewell looming up. He did nob notice any land on the port side. Captain Stuart produced the charb and showed the vessel'epositionon Jan. 1 by dead reckoning and observation. Ho stated thab before going below ab 6.35 o'clock on the day the vessel struck, a steamer passed between the Ruapehu and the shore. Mr Forsyth, fourth officer, deposed thab he saw a steamer pass aboub 6.30, about two miles inside the Ruapehu. The steamer was bhe Warabah. Mr Skerrebfc coufeeeded that bhe jurisdiction of tho Court to deal with bhe cerfei ficabea granted by the Beard of Trade was a delegated power, and the Courb muab deal with the certificates in bhe samo manner as would tho Board of Trade. He admitted the Courb here had power to inquire into the sorftnding of the Ruapehu. bub had no power to deal with the certificates except in accordance with Imperial statubes, and he quoted a case where, in Australia, a captain s certificate was cancelled, but on appeal the Supreme Court decidod tho Nautical Courb had no power to deal with a certificate issued by the Board of Trade. As the Ruapehu was not wrecked, and did nob sustain any damage, the Court could not suspend or cancel the certificate. Mr Skerrott cited an English calo in which a vessel wenb on a sandbank, and after jettisoning 50 tODs of cargo, gob off witboub sustaining any damage. The Nautical Courb suspended the certificate but the Higher Court held the former had no jurisdiction. ...... _ _r Mr Brown, for the chief officer, nnd Mr Dean for the fourth officer, said Mr Skerrctb had placed bheir views of the l*w fully before bhe Courb. Mr Gully, for the Customs Department., argued that bho Imperial Statute gives the Colonial Legislatures discretionary power bo deal wibh certificates, and as long as tho Colonial Courb has. discretionary powers given to it by its legislature, ib has a right to bring ft British vetsol within its juris*

diction. The intention of the Imperial Statute, ho said, was nob to give the colony legislation, but to allow it to legistate for itself.

Mr Wardell, S.M., said :—The data on which tho master fixed his position at 6.35 p.m. was, not, in my opinion, sufficiently reliable for an observation, one point observed, namely, sandhill, not being of a clearly - defined character. I am convinced that the bearing taken waa that of a hill near tho centre of tho Spit, and nob the most easterly one, as the ma&tor assumed. The etlecb of this mistake was to place the position of the ship on the chart farther oil the land than she really was. 1 am of opinion thab ib was a grave error, of judgmenb bo take bearings of such an illdefined .object as a, sandhill, when, by conbinuing a libblo longer on his then course, ha could have taken bearings of Capo Farewell and the lighthouse, and so fixed hi* position with accuracy. Having set the course of the ship ab 6.35 p.m. for bho shore, the master was wrong in leaving the bridge with instructions to the, chief and fourth officers, which lefb them to determine when to haul the ship off land by judging the distance from tho shore or by sighting breakers. Having set the ship's course directly on land when running at a rate of 13 kuobs an hour, ib was his duty to have personally controlled the navigation of tho vessel until danger was passed, and he ought nob to have loft the bridge ab such a bimo to go to the saloon to dinner. Ibis clear thab the chief officer bad taken no part in bhe navigation of the ship that day, and that on leaving the bridge the master did nob give him such information as bo the position of the ship as he should have done, bhe ship boing in proximity to land. Tho chief officor oughb to have been on the bridge performing hia duty as officer of tho watch, and so have known the position of bhe ship instead of attending with tho master's knowledge to affairs on deck which might with proprieby have been delegated to a junior officor. With regard bo the misunderstanding between bhe master and chief officer as to who would be in charge of the bridge during dinner. I am of opinion thab tho master understood bhab the chief officer would remain on tho bridge during bis absence ab dinner, and thab tho chief officer left tho bridge believing bhab the permission he had received to do 80 held good. This misunderstanding oughb nob to havo occurred. Clear and distinct terms should be used between tho commander and his officer on such an important matter, and tho commander should see there is no room for misunderstanding. I consider the fourth officer was placed in n false position in being left alone on the bridge when the vessel was in close proximity to land, bub when ho found tho course steered brought bhe ship near to land, and that she was running into danger, he should, on his own responsibility, have acted more promptly, and when ho did act, instead of changing the couree by ton degrees, ho oughb to have put hor directly off the land, or gone full speed astern at once. IF this had boen done ab bhat moment, I am of opinion that the ship would not havo stranded. I consider his lookout was not vigilant, or he would havo realised oarlier than he did that the ship was approaching danger. He devoted his attention too much in looking for tho lighthouse. In reference to tho contention that the fourth officer wan not a responsible officer, I hold thab no officer holding a certificate of competency is relieved from responsibility because of his grade in tho f.hip, and thab his certificate may be suspended or cancelled on sufficient grounds. lam of opinion that neither the currenb nor the atmospheric condiiiona wero importanb factois in the stranding of tho vessel. As to the contention of Mr Skerretr, on behalf of the captain, bhab thfr Court of Inquiry tins no jurisdiction to interfore with certificates of competency Liven by tho London Board of Trade, while I fuel thab there is ground for doubt on the subject I do not feol that I can in tho absence of any decision directly . ffecting our local legislation hold that this Court" has no power to doal with those cortificabes in bhe manner our colonial statutes direct. Tho ritriih of appeal is given and the onus of appeal must rest on the officer adectcd by our decision. The view I have taken of the facts leads mo to tho following findings :—l. I hold tho master mainly responsible for the stranding of tho ship which is due in the first place to hia error in judgmenb in trusting to tho crossboaring taken to the sand hill instead of n more clearly defined point, and secondly and chiefly to his leaving the bridge when running for land withoub giving full and sufficienb instructions to the officers of tho watch. 2. I hold that tho chief officer in free of responsibility for the stranding, as his nob keeping his full watch was concurred in by tho master. 3. I hold tho fourth officer censurable for not baking more prompt action ab bbo bime of danger, and for keeping an insufficient look - oub. 4. 1 therefore suspend the cerbificabe of tho master for bhree monbhs, and order him to pay the costs of the inquiry, less bhe sum of £5, which I direct to bo paid by the fourth officor. Mr Skerrett asked thab ono fact be added to the judgmont, viz., thab tho Bhip had sustained no seriouß damage.

Mr Wardell said there was no doubb as to this, and, after a little discussion, words to thab effecb were added to tho finding. The amount of costs wero lefb bo bo settled by Mr James, tho Clerk of bhe Courb.

In the Supromo Courb on Jan. 14th a rule nisi was granted to show c/iuso why the judgment of bhe Nautical Courb respecting the suspension of Capt. Stuart, of bhe Ru-ipehu, should, not bo quashed. The Roapehu was docked ab Christchurcli on the 14th. Ib was found thab tho hull was nob even marked, bub that a few rivets were gone from the stern-post. Ib is supposed they wore shaken oub when bho vessel was being towed.

The s.s. Manaia, from Wellington to Waitara and Mokau, has boon totally wrecked on tho old beach near Opanake. Tho crew wore paved. The voesel was a wooden one. of 62 tons net regietor and with engines of 30 horse power. Sho was built ab Auckland in 1874, and owned by the Mokau Coal Mine Syndicate, Limited, who purchased her from Mr J. S. Cross, of Wellington, a few months ago for £950. She was insured for £600, aud parb of her cargo was ulso insured.