From the Opposite Window.

Auckland Star, Volume XXVII, Issue 50, 29 February 1896, Page 1 (Supplement)

From the Opposite Window.

A Dutch View of the Transvaal Slaughter.

England's Luck,

(FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.)

London, January 10. One of the most interesting of the multitudinous comments upon the defeat of Dr. Jameson's force ab Krugersdorp ia the appended letter of a Dutchman who spent thirty years of his life in South Africa. The author, unfortunately, did not write with a view to publication, and certain names have been suppressed by the editor of the • Westminster Gazette' which the public would be interested to know. But minus namei, the Dutchman's communication ia of value, since it gives a glimpse of the situation from the opposite window to thab from which we view-the deplorable Transvaal affair. He opens thus:

You are in very great luck you English ! What I feared was that Jameson would have reached Johannesburg before he was attacked. Of course this would have been a nasty complication. Ido no think very highly of the fighting powers of these wonderful Johannesburg men. But if there had been fighting near the place or in ib yon never could have foretold what happened. As ib ia now they are not in the trouble, and co much the better. . . .

And now you can &co how true it is thab these foreigners know nothing whatever aboub the Boers. There ia Jameson, an educated man, a physician, having lived years in Kimberley, thinking that with SOO men and some cannon he can have hia way. Of course he could nob. Do not believe too much of the telegrams when they speak of surrounding Jameson. I mean, when they write in such a manner than ie looks as if he hud an overwhelming force against him. It may be, of course; but so many men of the Boers could not have come up in time. When these Boers were real ones, and thus good shots. Nob much to be done with Maxims if they shoot your men at 1,000 or 800 yards. They, of course, all are under the same impression thab the Boers are cowards, and that it is quite as easy to fight them as it was to fight Kaffirs^ But once more it is proven what an error this is, and it is even very remarkable that the fight took place before anything of a regular force could come up. The Boors, of course, know always what there is to be done in the field. Every single man knows, and there ia nob much need of command.

A end want of tact is bhafc telegram asking for generosity to the wounded. It should ba well known in England, and could be if Rider Haggard and euch fellows had not done what they could to poison your minds, that a Boer really is the meekest fellow in the world, that ho does nob like at all shooting a white man, and that in the former war thay treated their wounded and prisoners very well. So it is quito unnecessary to part from the supposition they would nob now.

If I was Kruger I would hani» , ——, and such mischief-makers. For they really are the henchmen of those that are ab-tho bottom of cho trouble, and they did all they could to promote tha difficulties. Of course, if I say hang, it ia by way of speaking. But I bate these men, and I saw already playing false when he was at that dinner of Joubort'a some years ago. . They are men who havß nothing to lose and everything to gain by disturbances, and without any conscience or sDruplcs. I cannot understand how it is that in some papers ko much confidence is put in Jameson. They meant be would be too wi«e to do foolish things, and that ho would feel responsibility. Well, geßcrally speaking, rhe temperature and atmosphere of Transvaal seems to make cool-he»ded Europeans jump over a lot of difficulties they would not treat so lightly in Europe. Bub the most of the men that go thither are already not quite cool-bea<ied ab mitio, and you have scon now how wise Jameson really was. He did not even know the consequences of his action; and, in any cuee, can have know almost nobhing of his adversaries. Well, do nob take it ill if I say these things a little abruptly. . You know I could put it better in Dutch. Bufe what I mean is that this may well be a turningpoinb in South African history. This move of Rhodes is quito apt to make an end of your power in South Africa. Be quite sure that there will not be a single farm in Capo Colony whero this is not clearly understood as the beginning of the end.

There could never have happened anything which mado it more clear to everybody to what kind of means unscrupulous politicians can reaorb to arerb what they are afraid of. Whab ia Raid or written in Capetown, whero mostly Englishmen speak, ia of 140 importance. Whab is important is whab is thought and said by the people who do not speak openly, and quietly eife in their farms awaiting coming events.

As ib is now, things may bo patched over. The men in Johannesburg were not concerned directly in the movement. They can throw all blaino upon Jameson's rash acting, and ho there may be an end of ib. But what will have been their gain is nob quite easy to fco.

I see the English papers speak of tho Uitlanders' * taxation without representation.' This is misleading. My son out there nover paid taxes—only one to hare a righb to take claims oub. But I should call this rather giving something to have something—a kind of contract. You pay so much to have the right of mining. The Truth About This Boer • Army.'

I do not. understand (ho says) how it ib that a news agency gives such particulars, when ib is ea«y to know the facts from the Transvaal Stare Almanac, which must be in London, if only ab tho Consul's. The facts are : All available men between six^ teen and fixty may bo commandeered, and, when necessary, all Kaffirs. Of course no Transvaalor would think of commandeering black men against white ones, unless in cases which almost are nob to be thought of. Ib is something elfo when there are inland troubles with Kuffirs*

For fche reab, there is the Land Police, who are horsed, and look after misdeeds in open country. Thon there is the State Artillery. This force, as far as I know, under Commander P. N. Preborius, has seven officers, four sergeants, eight corporals, and bnly 100 men. There are six light Krupps, six heavy Krupps, four light and two heavy Maxims, one muzzle-loader, and one French mitrailleuse. Then there is an organised force of field teleeraphy, one officer and fifteen men. Unless things are altered much, these are the only organised forces, according to the latest official Year-book. By order of the President, the Commander (General P. J. Joubert) calls out as many able men as is thought fit. There are seventeen districts, each having its commander, and to these commanders the orders go. They transfer them to the sixty-four field - cornets and forty - two assistant field-cornets of the sub-divisions.

When all the burghers are called there must be 13,503 able men between eighteen and thirfcy-four, 6,564 from thirty-four to fifty, 3,856 below eighteen and above fifty. Total, 23,923 men. (By theae numbers you see, by the way, that the Boer population, for argument's sake, is always mucb underestimated.) The district Potchefstroom can yield 3,371 men, and Pretoria 3,207. As it was, I think only the Pretoria men could have been out againab Jameson, and as it is not probable all ages were called out, and the district is very extended, ao that many could not have been in bime,

I presume the number of 1,500 given in the telegram is too high. But, of course, some Boers of other districts may have ridden up, and during the fight newcomers may have taken part in it. From about 400.000 Kaffirs, about 60,000, under thirty-one captains, could have been called oub ; bub of couree there could be no question of this unless ib would be to oppose other Kaffirs.

That the Boers were co quick cannofc be wondered at. Even if they knew nothing beforehand (and I am not quite sure nothing was suspected) they could be smart enough.

In 1889 or 1890 (I do nob quite remember which year) you remember what happsned with a Transvaal flag in Johannesburg. Then, at six o'clock p.m., an order was sent to three districts, and at five o'clock a.m. the following day 800 farmers, under their field cornets, rode into Johannesburg.

They go { D their ordinary jackets, take their cartridges and ' rifle, mount their thoroughly good steeds, and ride away at a canter. Bleeping in the saddle when they feel inclined.

General Jouberfc told me thab once, after Borne two or three days' riding, he had a very good sleep in a dark nigbb whilst his horse wend on. He awoke when he was upon the point of falling, or was mostly kept in the saddle by hva neighbours, who slept juat aa well as he did. Of course they take something to eak. I cannot understand how the men of Jamesson's were so careless aa not to do that. And even if the/ did nob, there are plenty of stores upon their way, and they Quite easily could have taken a dozen of oxen, as the^e only are guarded mostly by one eingle Kaffir.

When the Boors came into Johannesburg in 1889 they of course "emptied the stores, and the man was indemnified afterwards. If Jameson took the slightest precautions he must have done the same thing.