Can the Japanese Get to Pekin.

Auckland Star, Volume XXVI, Issue 10, 12 January 1895, Page 2

Can the Japanese Get to Pekin.

An Interview With Admibal Sib

George Willes, G.C.B.

The evident demoralisation of the Chinese forces has naturally suggested to outside critics of the war (says the * London Daily Graphic ') the possibility of a Japanese march on Pekin; and to Englishmen with only vague recollections of the military promenade of 1860 the idea seems simple enough. Why should riot the victorious Japanese, with their command of the sea, be able to land' a large army at the mouth of the Peiho and march straight for Pekin ? The best answer to that question can be given by British officers who took part in the expedition of 1860, and who know what the essential difficulties of the enterprise are. Prominent among naval officers whose record runs back so far is Admiral Sir George Willes, who has courteously allowed himself to be interviewed for the benefit of the readers of the ' Daily Graphic' > :

With a sailor's directness, writes our representative, Sir George Willes went I straight) to the point. S 'You want to know whether I think the Japanese will be able to march on Pekin? I (don't. I know a good deal about China anal a good deal about Chinamen. I have served in the China seas as midshipman, as capttain, and as admiral, and I don't beHevel, it is possible tor the Japanese to re; peat.^ur ljttjle ptomenade'of 1860.' • By\ the way,' 1 interrupted, ' you were present at the disaster of i 859 ?'•■ ' I w,as flag-captain, and I was the only senior officer who was unhurt. After that, we set ten. work to organise another expedition for trie next year. But it was a business of Xuonths. Troops were sent onb from England and from India, and we had to take possession of the peninsula Kowloon, opposite Hongkong, because there was not clamping space enough on the island itself^ We started in August, and as we had fovhnd out to our cost that we could not poasibly land in the Peiho in face of the Taku Notts, we went 10 miles north to Pehtang, amd took the forts in the rear, 1 ' And could \not the Japanese repeat tha manoeuvre V I

* They could (land at Pehtang all right), because they h.uve tbe command of the sea, and the mouth W tbe Pehbang River is undefended, or w|as in 1883. Bub I don'b think the forts] would fall so easily a second time. I wenb over the old ground in that year, an d though tbe guns in the fortß were nob t hen as good as they ought to have been, whey were good enough to make it awkwarm for an enemy.' ' Supposing, hijwever, the Japanese did bake the forts alnd pulled up the booms across the river, an there anything serious to £ top them on tb c road to Pekin ?' • Well, the wor i " road " itself ib delusive. There are 110 roads in China in our sense of the word, only unmetalled tracks which a heavy rait] makes impassable. And it can rain in Chinsi.' 'Bub our expedi\ on seemed to get over the ground pretty c'< asily.' ' Certainly we diet; but thab was a different] affair to this. From the moment the forts fell all real op position to us ceased. The Chinese began to breab ab once, and allowed us to advance to Pekin with almost as much ease asif we > had been in a friendly country. We were t ible bo leave our rear quite unprotecbed, ai id could geb as many Chinese "coolies and Chinese boabs as we wanted for transpor V of shores and provisions. Bub if bhe J panese try bo repeat bhe same game bhey op-ill probably find the counbry swepb bare biyjfore them,' ■And supposing, ths is rumoured, their generals mean to try a>nd get at Pekin, how soon could they make'{the attempt 7*

•Certainly not till* after the winter. £ Special preparations wfould have to be made | for the advance up tht'p Peiho. Only low- ; draught vessels can g\et over the bar, and the river winds so {sharply that) only short vessels can wo.lrk their way up. Above Tientsin the stream becomes very shallow, and still lighted vessels would have j to be used. All these preparations take :'S time, bub even if the Japanese were ready at this moment, the season is too far advanced. In a few weekt* the river will ."j, beerin to freeze over, and an expedition which had worked its way/ up to .Tientsin would be cub off from ibia communication , with the sea.' ■! •Then we can safely reckon on the Empire of China surviving, thie winter ?' 'And many winters more. Even if the Japanese got to Pekin, \whab could they do ? The Chinese Government would probably move off inland', and refuse to '% treat; and if they take thtib line, you can't do anybhing with them. ' Bub my own , opinion ip,' addeiiv'Sir Geiorge, 'that the European Powers won't all ow this war to go . on much longer. The whc'jle quarrel is ab- '* surd. Corea is absolutely wtirthleßß, and it is • [\ ridiculous thab the trade of tbhe world should be interrupted because the Japanese and the ~| Chinamen want to fight it c™b to the bitter " | end. A strong and powerful Government in China is most important SJn the interests ~ of England. The late eventfcs will, I trust, cause the Chinese at last to\eßtablish railways and other European custjbms ;in facb, ~ imitate in this respect tjßeir present enemies. The downfall of LiFnung Chang , would be a misfortune, for^^i iB an en* lightened, able man—unforbuHandV getting very old. F"s*^ m

12, mk ... "When I grow up.'Veaiol Bir M .year-old philosopher v j".Bhan!|f fftDSft. I