SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1892.

Auckland Star, Volume XXIII, Issue 90, 16 April 1892, Page 4

SATURDAY, APRIL 16, 1892.

The judicial vagaries of "the great unpaid " army of magistrates have long formed the subject of satire both here and in England, and it would seem as though at last a serious effurt were about to be made to secure reformation. The evils of amateur administration of the law have of late years been largely reduced by the increase of stipendiary magistrates, possessing the necessary legal knowledge and training to understand and apply the laws of evidence, interpret statutes, and impose penalties with impartiality; but the exigencies of the case still require that in many cases the adjudication of petty offences and disputes should be left to the honorary magistrates tvho hold Her Majesty's Commission of the Peace. That being so, the question is—how shall that body of men be selected so as to make sure of obtaining the most fit ? Let the peopleelectthe Justices of the Peace, say some. This seems a sound democratic proposal. Justices are practically arbitrators in disputes arising between their fellow citizens, and the parties to adjudicate are always accorded the right to choose their arbitrators. It would therefore add immensely to popular confidence in the administration of justice in the inferior courts if the public had a voice in the choosing of the honorary magistrates ; but it would still remain an open question whether the substitution of popular vote for nomination of the Government of the day would lead to an improvement in the status, intelligence, education, and general fitness of the gentlemen appointed Justices of the Peace. There is, indeed, a danger that in some communities the result would be exactly the opposite, and that men of the " bush lawyer " type would be preferred for the office over the heads of settlers of sound judgment and good social standing. Still, the trend of Anglo-Saxon opinion is in the direction of elective justices, and if the system should be adopted it would almost certainly be allied with the principles of the ballot and one-man one-vote. In the English House of Commons recently a measure to make Justices of the Peace elective was so largely supported that it narrowly escaped becoming law, and it is understood that the Government of New Zealand are contemplating the introduction of a similar measure in the coming session of Parliament. We see no valid reason why the people should not displace the Crown as the fountain of honour in relation to the unpaid magistracy. But, as a safeguard against improper nominations and mob rule, the Crown should still retain the initiative of nominating, leaving the public to choose by vote from a list submitted to them. This system would place a check upon Government appointments for political services. The appointments of justices should not be for life. As soon as a man ceases to possess public confidence and esteem, he should be relieved of his magisterial functions. It would be inadvisable to have periodical elections of justices, but it woulcl be advantageous if there were a triennial vote of confirmation or rejection of existing justices, fresh nominations being made by the Government of the day as required. Under such a system as we have sketched, the electors of a district would have full power to veto Government nominations to the ranks of the unpaid magistracy, and the coordinate power of choice could not fail to result in effecting a marked improvement in the personnel of Justices of the Peace. JS'or would the introduction of this or any other system of election of Justices of the Peace necessarily involve the adoption of the American principle of electing all magistrates and judges. Stipendary magistrates and high judicial functionaries are on an entirely different footing. They are chosen with great care and deliberation ; their powers and emoluments being considerable, their character and qualifications are carefully considered, and it is a very rare thing indeed to find unsuitable appointments made in this class of public servants. Exactly the reverse is, however, true with regard to Justices of the Peace. They are appointed in the most haphazard way imaginable, most frequently as a reward for political services, and in many cases through the personal application or wire-pulling of the appointee himself. In this way, men who are a scandal to the magistracy are elevated to office, and the

sacred name of Justice is no less by their official tergivesations than by their loose morals in business and private life. Any system that would weed out such men from the roll of Justices, and prevent their appointment in future, ought to be warmly welcomed. We fear that popular election pure and simple would not produce the desired result, but nomination by the Government and election by the people might reasonably be expected to produce a vast improvement. It is, however, too much to hope that improving the personnel of the J. P. roll would lead to greater consistency in dealing with offences and in apportioning punishments. Legal knowledge and the judicial faculty are not conferred by the popular vote. A more careful selectionof clerks of Court, and perhaps, an extension of their advisory powers would be productive of good. These functionaries ought all to have legal knowledge sufficient to guide the Justices on the law of evidence, and to protect them from the misrepresentations of bullying or pettifogging lawyers. Even then, magisterial vagaries would occur, for queer decisions and unequal sentences are frequently given and imposed in the highest courts in the land. The true remedy for these inconsistencies is to have the different offences and their punishments more strictly defined by statute. As we have attempted to show, the chief points to be. gained by an alteration in the system of choosing Justices of the Peace are (i) maintaining public confidence, and (2) securing an improvement in the personnel of Justices. We need hardiy say that we have no knowledge of what the present Government of New Zealand propose in the shape of legislation on this important subject. We have no doubt, however, that they will approach the question with due caution and deliberation, and that whatever changes they may introduce will be designed to elevate the state of a most useful and indispensable body of citizens, and, at the same time to raise the public respect for the administration of justice in the inferior Courts of the colony.