OCEANIA: WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT?

Korero (AEWS), Volume 2, Issue 8, 24 April 1944, Page 27

OCEANIA: WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT?

An American Opinion

By

in Asia and the Americas, December, 1943

Gilbert Cant, was editor of the New York Post, toured the Pacific war area for several months on an assignment for Asia and the Americas and the New York Post.

War in the Pacific has created a new continent of Oceania, which is destined to play an important part, when peace is restored, in the lives of the peoples of four other continents — Australasia, Asia, and the two Americas.

It may be argued that Oceania has always existed. But in the past it has been so unorganized as to remind one of the schoolboys’ definition of a net: ‘ A lot of holes tied together with pieces of string.” If anything, Oceania was even less coherent. It consisted of a myriad pinpoints of land, separated by water. An island might lie within a few miles of one of the world’s great trade routes, and yet be as remote from commercial or social intercourse with civilization as though it had been on another planet.

It was natural, indeed almost inevitable, that Oceania should be the Cinderella of the continents. It differs from all other continents in the extreme diffusion of its habitable areas. Many thousand of its islands are so small that they cannot be considered land masses ; they have position, but only negligible length and breadth. Even in* the aggregate, their area is less than that of Borneo or New Guinea.

On such minute specks of land, lacking mineral resources, major commercial enterprise was impossible. And Oceania differed from all other continents, except Australasia, in another vital respect: labour was either absent or, in most sections, so reluctant that it might as well have been absent.

As late as 1940 and 1941 it was found necessary to import Gilbertese and ElliceIslanders to work coconut plantations and guano diggings in the Phoenix Islands. In a few decades it has been deemed necessary to import cotton and sugar plantation workers from India to

the Fijis in such profusion that they now total about 100,000, approximately equal in number to the natives of the islands.

If the vast, heterogeneous area of Oceania had been under a single political administration the physical handicaps might have been overcome, and it might have been developed economically and socially at about the same rate as other remote areas of the world. But the political map of Oceania is a crazy-quilt. My definition of Oceania excludes all those islands or groups of islands which are natural extensions of other continental land masses (the Aleutians, the Kuriles, Formosa), and those which are large enough to constitute reasonably selfsustaining political and economic sovereignties (Indonesia, New Guinea, and the Philippines). There remains a huge area, the water boundaries of which form a parallelogram with a jagged western side (see map, page 29). The northern limit is 30 degrees North Latitude; the southern limit is 30 degrees South Latitude ; the eastern limit is a line drawn between these parallels of latitude, from 140 to 100 degrees West longitude. The western limit begins in the East China Sea, at 126 degrees 30 minutes east longitude (30 degrees N. Lat.) and runs south-east to 160 degrees East Longitude (30 degrees S. Lat.) The straight line (as it would appear on Mercator’s projection) is broken by a western salient to include Yap and the Palau Group, and by an easterly salient to exclude the capes of New Guinea. Within the parallelogram lie the Ryukyu or Luchu Islands (except those nearest to Formosa), Japanese since 1879 ; the Bonins, Japanese since 1873 the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls, which have been under four sovereignties in little more, than forty years, including

the present de facto Japanese possession ; America’s Guam, Wake, and Hawaiian ’lslands; the Australian-man dated Bismarck group, with two islands of the Solomon chain ; the British protectorate covering the rest of the Solomons ; the New Hebrides Condominium, which perpetuates the vices of both the British and French colonial systems t and the virtues of neither, and the whole of Polynesia.

The catalogue of the islands’ sovereignties is almost endless; in addition to those just mentioned, there are : French possessions; Australian and New Zealand possessions ; New Zealand mandate ; British mandate ; American possessions (Johnston, Howland, Baker, Kingman Reef, Palmyra and Jarvis) ; Anglo-American joint occupations, such as Christmas Island ; and, finally, in the extreme south-eastern angle of the parallelogram, the Chilean Rapa Nui (Easter Island) and Sala-y-Gomez.

At the end of the last war the Marianas, Caroline, and Marshall Islands were handed to Japan on a platter. The undemocratic statesmen of Japan appreciated the value of the gift. Long before Japan withdrew from the League of Nations preparations had been completed for fortifying the islands and preliminary work had begun, in violation of the terms of the mandate.

It was not until the middle 1930’s that the democracies recognized the importance of fixed positions in the Pacific's great “ land of water.” Then, to provide staging points for transoceanic flying-boat routes, the United States and Britain entered into competition for islets which they had spurned or neglected for half a century.

The democracies’ intentions with regard to these islands were entirely peaceful. True, Oahu was being fortified to protect the growing naval base at Pearl Harbour. But positions which obviously would be of key importance in any Pacific war were neglected ; Guam, Manila (outside the parallelogram) ; Rabaul ; Noumea ; Suva.

Before war broke out in the Pacific all argument as to the value of Oceania’s islands as stepping-stones for aircraft

plying between the Americas on one hand and Asia and Australasia on the other hand had ended. The routes were in operation, with Pan-American waystations at Manila, Guam, Wake, Midway, and Oahu ; at Palmyra, Canton, Samoa, and Fiji.

There can be no argument, after the war, as to whether these and other points are essential to trans-Paciflc communication. But there will be plenty of room for argument as to how they shall be administered. And it must be remembered that the number of staging points has greatly increased under the exigencies of war. Throughout Oceania these facilities have been installed for the most part by American initiative, with American material and American labour. Local administrations have co-operated in varying degrees —not necessarily in proportion to the potentialities. After the war these air routes and their staging facilities will be used not so much by the residents of the islands wherein they 7 are situated, as by the travelling public of the Americas, eastern Asia, Australia, and New Zealand.

Ignoring the commercial rivalry between American and British (including Dominion) airways, which probably will be bitter, I believe that sound statesmanship requires the placing of all the key points in Oceania under a trustee form of United Nations government .

Military considerations provide a more compelling reason than the problems of civilian aviation for evolving a United Nations government for Oceania —and for doing it now, while co-operation in the area in question is at its best, and before bickering breaks out around a peace table.

The shop-worn, shoddy answer, “ Let’s get on with the war and worry about the peace afterwards,” has no validity at this juncture. For the first time in history Americans, British, Australians, New-Zealanders, and Fighting Frenchmen, alongside the indigenous populations are working toward a common goal in Oceania : to defeat a common enemy. When that object has been achieved,' community of purpose will vanish. And we shall not revert to the status quo

ante ; we shall find ourselves in a worse situation, because the extent of American participation in the government of an area which has been saved or reconquered from the Japanese by the force of preponderantly American arms will be bitterly contested. Americans are apt to forget that Guadalcanal and Vella Lavella are in the British Solomon Islands Protectorate, theoretically administered by the British High Commissioner for the Western Pacific. Americans on Guadalcanal invariably are surprised to see the jeep {lease-lend, no doubt) marked “ British Resident Commissioner.”

A favourite story, which recurs with minor variations throughout the South Pacific, concerns the true-blue Briton who happened to be ashore near Henderson Field on the night of November 13-14, 1942. The land was held by American Marines and American Army forces. American ships were in the roadstead. During the day, American aircraft had demolished Japanese transports. A few hours before that American cruisers and destroyers, at heavy cost, had routed a superior Japanese squadron. American battleships were on the way. Japanese forces were bombing and bombarding the American positions. “ I say,” exclaimed the Briton, as he made for an American foxhole, or so the story goes: “ This must be the hottest spot in the whole British Empire.”

Henderson field is now hallowed ground to Americans, as is Chateau Thierry, Gettysburg, or the Alamo.

If we drift along to the end of the war, with no comprehensive United Nations plan for Oceania, and then permit it to be Balkanized again, it is not only Oceania that will suffer. The very peace of the Pacific will be insecure. We must make proper provision for the administration of islands taken from Japan. We must remember that the emergent great powers of south-eastern Asia, China and India, have substantial minority populations in several of the islands of Oceania. Always there is the question of trans-Pacific communications and the policing of approximately 24,000,000 square miles of island-studded water.

If the people of Oceania and of the four other continents surrounding the Pacific are to derive full benefit from the wartime emergency development of countless islands, from Oahu to Funafuti and Vella Lavella, plans must be made now for the post-war government of this vast and long-neglected area. There are three main objectives—(l) To secure the peace of the Pacific ; (2) To insure the ordered development, both social and economic, of the islands of Oceania, for the benefit of the peoples resident in the islands ; and (3) To assure the most effective use of the islands in an internationalized trans - Pacific communications system, for the benefit not only of the peoples of Oceania, but of Asia, Australasia, and the two Americas. Clearly the obstacles in the way of establishment of an international government for Oceania are great. Just as clearly, the prize to be achieved is of inestimable value. Before attempting to suggest the form that such an international government might take it will be well to enumerate the most powerful political forces, the resultant of which will determine the issue. The most potent factor in the Pacific situation for years to come is going to be the fact that the United States is, in the last analysis, responsible for the maintenance of peace in the entire area, possibly excepting a small Russian sphere of influence in the extreme north-west. China, the Philippines, Australia, New Zealand, and Canada theoretically have equal rights and responsibilities in this matter. They already have given earnest of their desire to assume both their rights and their responsibilities. But the events of this war have shown all too clearly that the only military power capable of guaranteeing peace in the Pacific is that of the United States.

. However, it would be fatal to assume that these considerations give the United States the right to impose a Pax Americana on the Pacific. There must be no American imperialism.

America might be able to impose its own peace upon Japan and upon areas which must be removed from Japanese domination, such as the mandated islands. But America cannot impose peace upon its Allies. To do so would result in a fatal process which Walter Lippman has described: “A realignment of the powers, with former allies seeking alliances with former foes.” Within the United States there will be isolationist opposition in the assumption of responsibilities extending to the East China Sea and to Vitiaz Strait. There will be sour comments in Congress about “ making Funafuti safe for democracy ” or ‘‘a quart of milk a day for every Solomon-Islander. ’ ’ Outside the United States, in the countries of the British Commonwealth and in whatever French government may emerge, there will be reluctance to make concessions in national sovereignty even over the remotest and most neglected territories. Both of these divisive and obstructive elements will be given free rein the moment peace is restored, while neither can exert much influence during hostilities. A great source from which bitter opposition may be expected is the civilian population of Hawaii. The five largest islands of this group, concentrated at the south-eastern extremity of the chain, have achieved a degree of economic and social development unequalled elsewhere in Oceania. For years before war came to the islands there was agitation for statehood. The politically conscious sections of the populations of Hawaii are oriented toward the north-east, toward the United States, rather than to the south. But the island of Oahu must always be the nexus of any system of maintaining peace in the Pacific.

If Hawaii were included in a Confederation of Oceania, there is no question that it would quickly assume a position of leadership in the affairs of the entire area. Geographically, Hawaii is the narrow end of the funnel through which all traffic to the North American continent must pass. Commercially and

economically, Hawaii is so much more highly developed than any other island group that it would instantly become the natural middleman between North America and the rest of Oceania. Militarily, Hawaii is certain to be the strongest position between California and Singapore, so long as the United States bases a major portion of its fleet there for the dual purpose of policing the Pacific and defending the West Coast. Constitutionally, the inclusion of Hawaii in a Confederation of Oceania would pose many problems, and a final detailed solution cannot even be outlined until it is clear what form of United Nations organization will emerge from the war, or rather from the peace. But a provisional settlement can be made, and in my opinion it must be made without delay if an ocean-wide system of military and political co-operation is to become effective as soon as hostilities cease, and is to have a chance of spontaneous growth in the years immediately following. On the military side, the “ articles of confederation ” must provide for a commander-in-chief of all armed forces in Oceania. If any critic, civil or military, should argue that there will be plenty of time after the war to worry about military establishments in Oceania, since Japan will be supine and we shall have all the installations and material we need, the answer must be : there is not a moment to lose. For every moment that we lose in instituting a permanent system we lose some of the value of the temporary system we have now established at such great cost.- The base facilities which have been constructed, under the impetus of war, have been constructed for the express purpose of winning that war. They were not designed to stand forever, as monuments to the democracies’ preparedness as were Pearl Harbour and (ironically) Singapore. These base facilities in Samoa, the Fijis, New Caledonia, the New Hebrides, and the Solomons must be taken in hand as soon as war ends, and must be re-equipped for a long-term, peacetime service. Not only these, but others which cannot now be named.

On the political side there could not be a better time than the present for each power represented on the Pacific War Council, plus the French Committee of National Liberation, to nominate one member each to a new Council of Oceania. And the United Nations concerned should, by convention, delegate to this Council supreme governmental power in a confederation to embrace Hawaii and other American islands in Polynesia ; all British, Australian, and New Zealand possessions, protectorates and mandates ; the Anglo-French Condominium of the New Hebrides ; the several islands jointly held by the United States and Britain. Of course, if the governments of the United Nations should see fit to take a bolder course, and establish a federation rather than the looser confederation, so much the better. In either case, the local government should cede to the Council of Oceania, or to the Commander-in-Chief of Oceania, all rights necessary to insure the maintenance of defensive installations in time of peace. They should surrender to the Council all authority over communications between Oceania and other continents. They should surrender substantial control over most intra-Oceania communications, excepting only those of a purely local nature. They should surrender the power to issue currency, and should establish a postal union. They should surrender their authority over customs duties in sufficient degree to permit the setting-up of a modified Customs Union. It is unlikely that there could be free trade with Oceania for a long time to come ; there would be conflicts with British imperial preference and with the United States Customs laws, because of the preferred position of Hawaii-. But a start —indeed, more than a start, substantial progress — be made.

To invest the Council of Oceania with the dignity which is associated with the .execution of an urgent task it should be endowed with the powers of the Allied Military Government of Occupied Territory and should be charged with the administration of the Marshall, Caroline, Marianas, Bonin, and Ryukyu islands as soon as those groups are secured by the United Nations forces.

If such steps as these are taken it is likely that the vast expenditures of sweat, blood and treasure which the United Nations, and especially the United States, have made in Oceania under the lash of war emergency may bear lasting fruit. If no such steps are taken not only will those great exertions have been made for an ephemeral purpose, but the great democracies will have frittered away another opportunity to make regional progress toward world-wide federation or confederation. The only alternatives to federation are : outright American imperialism, which would be bad enough ; British imperialism, which probably would be no better ; or a return to chaos, possibly ending in a resurgent Japanese imperialism—a prospect so repugnant that .it needs no characterization. The suggestions which I have made for the surrender of sovereign rights in certain spheres are minimal. The whole programme, as I have outlined it, is cautious and conservative, because it is designed to appeal to that corps of opinion which styles itself realistic and practical. But the leaders of the United Nations can confer proportionately greater benefits upon their peoples, and especially upon the peoples whose lands look out upon the Pacific, in the same measure as they advance towards the essentially practical vision of a United Oceania.