SUEZ Sea link of Empire.

Cue (NZERS), Issue 22, 30 April 1945, Page 1

SUEZ Sea link of Empire.

— By

r?OR Britain, naval (supremacy lias f always been a necessary condition of survival as a first-class power. The sea links her with world-wide empire, and for the carriage of goods and troops is not likely to be quickly (superseded. Sea carriage of goods is more economical than any other form of transport, and the quicker and shorter, the better. But even a single transhipment increases enormously the cost of every ton of merchandise. For that reason, in the early days before the Suez Canal, it was cheaper to send the products of the Fast round the Cape of Good Hope in the same bottoms than to ferry them over the narrow isthmus of Suez from ship to ship, even though such a ,process shortened the journey by 4,000 miles.

This great shortening of tin* India route was of immense interest to Britain, greatest sea-carrier in the world. it reduced the sea journey to the East by nearly three weeks and. besides the benefit to commerce, enormously facilitated the swift movement of troops and warships to threatened points.

It would appear natural that, with such obvious benefits, Britain would have been foremost tin encouraging s uch a project. It is surprising to Hud not only that the construction was due .almost entirely to the energy and enthusiasm cf a Frenchman, but that it 'Vent on in the face of the utmost attain could do, by diplomatic presto block it, and that originally utish interests subscribed only a tiny

part of the capital. The British Government’s later acquisition of nearly half the shares in the Canal Company was an example of that mixture, of luck and opportunism that so often attended the Island Race’s rise to greatness, and causes infinite regret and exasperation to the politicians of less fortunate countries. God loves His Englishmen.

The cutting of a canal from the Mediterranean to the Bed Sea was no nineteenth century inspiration. It first occurred to a Pharaoh about 2,000 B.C. The Pharaohs’ chief interest was to connect the big Nile cities with the Red •Sea to facilitate their trade with the Land of Punt (Somaliland) and the Persian Gulf. In those days the Bitter Lakes were an extension of the RedlSea, and all that had to be done was to coni tinue tire Eastern branch of the Nile Delta through the fertile Wadi Tuimilat, the Biblical Land of Golshen, and then south to the Bitter Lakes. This was at last accomplished some time after 1,000 8.C., and the dry course of the Canal can still be seen. It passed through many vicissitudes. Restored by Darius and Xerxeis of Persia, by the Romans and by the Arabs, it was closed at last in 776 A.D. to blockade the revolted cities of Mecca and Medina.

The idea of cutting a canal on the present line had been mooted even in those days, but a firm conviction that

the waters of the Red Sea were much higher than those of the Mediterranean killed the idea. This conviction persisted into the nineteenth century and it took several surveys to remote it.

For a thousand years the canal project was dormant, but never died. Venetians, Genoese, and French considered its possibility, for the land trading routes were long, difficult and dangerous. But the Turkish power,' as it spread across the Eastern Mediterranean, progressively wrecked the prosperity of the Levantine trade, and the discovery of the Cape Route, avoiding all the Mahommedan dangers, remained for long a simpler answer io the problem of East-West communication.

With the steady decline of Turkey in the nineteenth century the Canal came again into the sphere of practical politics. Napoleon’s daring bid for Egypt, defeated in essence by Nelson at the Battle of the Nile, had behind it the idea that France, by controlling this vital area, could strike at India, and so bring Britain toppling to the ground. The First Consul took with him engineers to report on a canal, and this attempt and the subsequent favouring of the French by Mehemet Ali, who made Egypt almost in depen-

dent of Turkey, awakened Britain to the threat to her interests growing on Egyptian soil. The British recognised the benefits of the Canal, but recognised that those benefits would accrue also to other European countries, who obtained less benefit from the predominantly British Cape route. The rivalry between the various Powers thwarted the scheme for many years.

At last, however, Ferdinand de Lesseps, a brilliant Frenchman, and a friend of the ruling Egyptian house, became infected with enthusiasm for rhe idea. On the accession of his boyhood friend, Said Pasha, in 1854, he put the .scheme up to him, and chained immediately a concession which many countries had angled for in vain. The grant, unfortunately, only marked the beginning of his difficulties. Lord Palmerston deliberately blocked approval by Turkey, and his attitude prevented English capitalists subscribing for shares. Fortunately both for de Lesseps and eventually for England, the Khedive Said took up the unsubscribed shares, Work started in 1859. The engineer, ing presented few difficulties but, as seems usual in all really big undertakings, the experts’ calculations, of expense were upset by various factors and funds were exhausted with little to show. Luckily the Emperor Napoleon 111 backed the scheme, and the crisis was surmounted. In October, 1862, the waters of the Mediterranean entered Lake Timsah. This was progress indeed, and the British Government, in spite of Gladstone’s opposition, redoubled its efforts to block the construction. It persuaded the Sultan; of Turkey to insist on Egypt resuming the land granted to the -Company and reducing the labour supply. Actually this proved a blessing for, on the ma - ter going to arbitration, the Egyptian Government had to pay a large indite . nity for these breaches of the origin* agreement, an indemnity w h i c bolstered up the Company’s unsteady

finances while the loss of labour compelled the installation of efficient C achinery. In the summer of 1869 the of the Mediterranean and Red Seas met in the Bitter Lakes. Britain, having failed to stop the Canal, now made the amende Honorable [jy conferring on de Lesseps the G C.S.I. and the Freedom of the City o f London, besides feting him at the Crystal Palace.

But still the Company’s troubles were not over. Shipowners proved curiously reluctant to make use of this new short cut, and once again bankruptcy threatened the undertaking. However, a further issue of stock was just sufficiently subscribed to tide over the crisis, and gradually the toll revenue picked up. It was soon obvious that the Canal’s future was assured. In 1870 tonnage passing through was 436,000. In 1920 it was over 17,000,000, and in 1937 over 36,000,000.

The Canal has had a great effect on Egypt, even though, owing to the cheerful . extravagance of the Khedive Ismail. Disraeli was able to buy for 14,000,000 the whole of his holding of nearly half the shares in the Company, leaving Egypt without any shares. Even her originally stipulated fifteen percent, of net profits was pawned by

the Khedive to meet his obligations. But the Canal, in creating a great new trade route, has brought Egypt prosperity, and the towns of Port Said, Port Fuad, Ismailia, and Port Tewfik are towns entirely created by the Canal.

The Canal also brought increased foreign interference for when Arabi Pasha’s revolt endangered it, Britain, now fully aware of its importance, felt compelled to step in, suppress the revolt and practically take over the country. She did not do this in an imperialistic spirit. She asked France and then Italy to help in the administration, but both refused, to their great subsequent regret. England indeed had acted on the invitation of the Khedive, but once in the country, remained there to protect the Canal.

This irritated the growing nationalism of Egypt. How necessary it was was shown in the Great War when the Turks actually reached the Canal. Just before the present war broke out England had so far yielded to pressure as to consent to withdraw all troops to the Canal Zone as soon as barracks could be prepared, but Egypt herself revoked this arrangement when the threat of war became too obvious. The future of the Canal is a matter for endless speculation. The Conces-

sion expires in 1968, and the Canal will then revert to Egypt. What steps will be taken to ensure its protection and its free use by all nations cannot now be guessed, but one thing is certain—it must he secure, and it must remain open. An alternative canal through the Dead 'Sea to the Gulf of Akaba has been mooted. It would be a poor commentary on the prospects of peace and international co-operation in the post-war world to suggest that it may be necessary to spend many millions digging an entirely unnecessary canal parallel to an existing one, merely to avoid certain difficulties which goodwill could iron out. It should not be, and almost certainly will not be.

Canal Facts and Figures:— Length— lol miles. Dilnensions —- 1870—26 ft. deep, 72ft. wide at bottom. 1924—42 ft. deep, 197 ft. wide at 33ft. Transit Time — 1870 hrs, 5 min. in Canal. 17 hrs. 8 min. actual navigation. 1938 —13 hrs. 23 min. in Canal. 11 hrs. 31 min. actual navigation. Normal Speed —7 knots. Mooring Stations — 1870—8. 19 '8—4,000. Life of Embankments — 15-20 years. Annual quantity of sand, etc., dredged million cubic yards. Largest ship to pass through prewar — ’’Empress of Britain/’ 42,000 tons. Draft 33ft. Maximum draft possible34ft. Charges per laden ton 1870 — gold fr. 1934—5 fr. 75 c. = 7/6 sterling. 19385/9 sterling. Tons in ballast half rates. Passengers — laden tons. Children are treated as in ballast they often are. Market value of England’s L 4 ,009,000 speculation— bout TA0, 000,000.