Three Factors in the Defence of Gibraltar

Camp News (Northern Command), Volume 1, Issue 26, 25 October 1940, Page 2

Three Factors in the Defence of Gibraltar

By General Sir Alexander Godley Former Commander-in-Chief of the Rock

Gibraltar still remains the key of the Mediterranean. Conditions have changed very much since I was Governor there. But there are certain factors, whch lead me to think that, in spite of all modern developments, the Fortress is still a very tough nut to crack, and that there is every chance of our being able to hold it again against siege, as we did from 1779 to 1883. Then, the Fortress was attacked by France and Spain. Now it will be attacked by Germany and Italy, possibly with the good will, if not the active collaboration, of non-belligerent Spain. The factors in question may be considered from the point of view of the three elements and the. three fighting Services. 1. The Air.—Gibraltar has already been attacked by German, Italian and French aircraft, with little result. I believe it to be difficult for hostile aircraft to obtain good results. Our anti-aircraft defence is up to date and ample. The Rock presents a very small target. It is only three miles long by one mile wide, with its top, 1400 ft., a knife-edge. To be sure ,of hitting the harbour, the town, or Europa Point, the only worth-while objectives, airplanes would have to fly very low. To do this is particularly difficult and dangerous owing to the tricky • winds and innumerable air pockets which surround it. Facilities now exist for the Royal Air Force and the Fleet Air Arm to take a hand. 2. The Sea and the Navy.—Now that the French Fleet is practically disposed of, our naval situation in the Mediterranean would seem to be reasonably secure, ( and I see no reason to believe that our sea communications with the Fortress can be severed. During the great siege an attack from the Spanish coast by sea, across the Bay, by “battering ships” and fire ships was repulsed with great slaughter. 3. The Army and Land Attack. — Hitler already has large forces along the Pyrenees, the gateway to Spain, and I have seen it stated that there are large numbers of Germans in Spain posing as civilians. But it must be remembered that the only approach to Gibraltar by land is by a very narrow isthmus. The flanks of this isthmus rest on the sea, one along the Bay of Gibraltar, the other alqng the Mediterranean. The isthmus is very strongly defended with every conceivable obstacle to tanks and mechanised forces. J . ? There is no question of turning the flanks of the defence by land. The sea flanks would be closely guarded by the Navy and the Fleet Air Arm, who would also render effective assistance to the direct defences of the Fortress. Consider now the question of the heavy artillery and gunpowder of the Fortress. z , This is absolutely up to date, with the most modern armament of heavy guns, so sighted as to be able to deal effectively with hostile guns emplaced either on the Spanish mainland or at Ceuta on the Africa coast. During the Spanish Civil War, General Franco had heavy guns installed north-west of Algeciras, in positions which were well known to the garrison of the Rock. They may be there still. If they are they are well within range of our guns. Big and long-range hostile guns, further inland in Spain, would have a nuisance value, but would not affect the security of the Fortress. This brings me to the point that both as regards bombing from the air and shelling from the land, Gibraltar has wonderful facilities for shelter. The Rock is honeycombed with galleries, tunnels and caves and, in the town itself, the old casemates, walls and places of arms are of great strength and solidity. For the last two years, deep underground shelters have been dug below these, and in the Rock itself I believe there is now ample bomb-proof accommodation for the whole garrison and population of the Fortress. There remains the questin of food and ammunition. ' There are no doubt large stores of both, and as long as we have command of the Mediterranean there is no reason to fear but that further supplies can be ensured.