Engineering: Sea amd Land The Quebec Bridge. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DISASTER Canadian Views of the Disaster. Light Railways for New Zealand. The Lusitania and Mauritania.

Progress, Volume III, Issue 2, 1 December 1907, Page 50

Engineering : Sea amd Land

The Quebec Bridge. PROBABLE CAUSE OF THE DISASTER

Canadian Views of the Disaster.

Light Railways for New Zealand.

The Lusitania and Mauritania.

The tremendous significance of this disaster lies in the suspicion which, admittedly on all sides is staring every engineer coldly in the face, that there is something wrong with the American theories of bridge design, at least as applied to a structure of the size of the Quebec bridge. It is remarked by able men "Can it be that for some unsuspected reason a stress per square inch which is perfectly safe in the end post of a 500- foot railroad truss, becomes perilous when u c ed in the bottom chord of an 1800-foot cantilever ? As far as our engineering knowledge goes there is no reason whatever why this disparity should exist. But if not, why is the Quebec bridge now lying at the bottom of the St. Lawrence river ?" It comes to this then, " What is the matter with the formula ?" We have it on record that manyyears ago lc-rge posts which had been built upon the accepted formula were placed m a testing machine and subjected to compression until failure occurred These tests thoroughly verified the accepted formula and the latter has since been used universally in determining the dimensions of compression members necessary to carry any given load. Professional opinion, it is veil to bear in mind, began at the outset to blame the compression members for the failure of the bridge, and some experts said they were satisfied that the failure was not due to the breaking of any of the tension members, for eycbars, if the heads be carefully welaed (and great attention is always paid to this point) are the most reliable portions of a framed structure. This opinion was confirmed by the fact that the tension members can be traced in position all through the rums. Of course there are such things as negligence, faulty material, and poor construction It is possible for the sudden fall of some massive member while being placed in position to have brought the strain above breaking point. But there is no evidence in the published account, so far, to support any of these explanations which might have been to some extent consoling. We therefore think there is some reason for the fear that the fault must be m the original design ; and in this more than one expert journal concurs, including the Scientific American and Engineering News, both of which are proud of the American pre-eminence in bridgebuildmg. Returning to the formula — -This forrrmla was used in designing the chords of the Quebec bridge. They were designed to carry, under the most severe conditions, of full live load and maximum wind strain, a stress of 24,000 pounds on each square inch of metal. This is two-thirds of the elastic limit, or the limit at which the metal would begin to stretch. At the time of failure, this member was carrying only about 16,000 pounds per square inch, or less than one-half the elastic limit. Perhaps when compression members are built up according to the present methods, in sizes such as those in the Quebec bridge, there is a failure of the separate pieces to act together as a whole, and present that resistance to buckling which members built up in the same way have invariably presented when constructed in srmller sizes for bridges of less dimension 1 Here we may pause to realise that a suggestion has beenpubhcly made that to ascertain the c use of failure beyond doubt it will be advisable to build an exact duplicate of the compression member that failed and subject the same to increasing strains until both the elastic limit and the ultimate point of failure have been pissed The heroic nature of the proposition emphasies the sincerity of the well grounded admission. Furthermore, it is geneially admitted by those who were responsible for the design and erection of the bridge tl at it was an anchor arm that gave way, and there is an ever-accumulating mass of

evidence that the bridge fell because of the buckling of the lower chord of the south anchor arm, at a point marked by a cross in our picture. (See illustration). In this connection, however, the most suggestive piece of evidence is the following — " Two or three days before the accident it had been observed that this particular member was showing incipient signs of yielding, by springing from an inch and a half to two inches out of line, the deflection being toward the inside of the truss. It is matter for astonishment that upon this' discovery work was not instantly suspended. Instead of this, an engineer was despatched to New York to see the consulting engineer, and another was sent to Phcemxville to the works of the bridge company. At about the very hour that instructions were being forwarded to suspend work, the bridge fell." Thus it is clear (1) that the compression member aforesaid had proved unreliable, so much so, that work ought to have been stopped ; (2) that the designers and constructors of the structure incline to the theory of the failure of that member ; (3) that professional opinion is largely with them. There is the further evidence in the rums of the bridge, which show that there was no lateral disturbance, the materials subsiding without leaving the perpendicular, and the tension membeis (eyebars) being visible throughout the debris intact and lomed together. The failure of the bottom, chord seems to have been by this time quite established as the cause of the disaster. That failure will have the result of opening up the whole question of the design of large compression members. On this subject a leading American authority has confessedthat for many yearspast they have regarded with no little anxiety the tendency among bridge builders to cheapen construction by using latticed stiffening, where solid and continuous covering plates ;*nd internal plate diaphragms would seem to be demanded to insure absolutely safe work. Furthermore, " the tendency to reduce the diameter of compression members, with a view to facilitating shop work, field wcrk, and general erection, has led to the adoption of diameters a'together too slight. '\{J Consideration of the dimensions of this and ether structures throws a strong light on this terrible point. The compression membei which seemed to have failed measured only 4% feet by [>l- feet. In the Forth bridge the corresponding member is 12 feet in diameter and, being circular, is an inherently stifer section. Even in the new railroad-bridge over the East river at Hell Gate, which] is of only 1000 feet span as against the 1800 feet span of the Quebec bridge the mam bottom chord members measure 6 feet by 9 feet m section. That is to say, the corresponding member of the Forth bridge of 90 feet less span than the Quebec cantilever was appreciably far stronger, and that of a bridge shorter m span by 800 feet, near New York, built by American engineers was nearly three times as strong. It has been said that the budge will be proceeded with, of course. The necessities of the Canadian position require that imperatively, but it is verj probable that the design will be modified crucially. Naturally after the above brave admission, we find this conclusion inevitable ; and in face of the above considerations we are not surprised at the American surmise that their engineers may be led to adopt the cucular sections (by far the most effective form for long compression members) used by the late Sir Beniamm Baker for the Forth Bridge , nor at the expression of American belief that in future bridges of this si?e, " the ratio of diameter to length of compression members will be gieatly increased, and continuous covei plates will be used in place of the present open lattice- work re-inforcement." The financial position may be seen at a glance fro.v the figures published. The whole structure would have cost when complete between £1,200,000 and £1,400,000. Of this sum the steel work alone

was contracted for at £600,000. Practically half of the latter has been lost with at least as much more for the construction of the part that fell, and the whole of the material for the northern half of the bridge has been delivered and is ready for erection, bnt will have to be strengthened in accordance with the recent discoveries. The loss represents between £600,000 and £800,000 the alterations and new matterial will be about as much more, and the erection of the whole in situ cannot be (at the old figures) much less. Therefore the whole of the new structure cannot represent an expenGiture of much less than £2,000,000, and may come to considerably more.

The position with regard to the development of Canadian commerce, in which the Quebec bridge, which broke down last August was to have played a leading, in fact an indispensable part, is tersely summarised in the Times engineering supplement. The fall cf the half finished bridge is described as " something more than a calamity to Quebec." Further, we read how it postpones to a still later date the connecting up of the great Canadian railway systems, of which it is sure to be a most important link. The only other bridge over the St. Lawrence is at Montreal. The new transcontinental line of the Grand Trunk Pacific, a sanctioned and matured project of immeasurable value to the Dominion, was to cross the Quebec bridge, and its destruction adds another difficulty to the many aiduous engineering tasks connected with that scheme. Nevertheless, the bridge will be rebuilt ; Sir Wilfrid Laurier was prompt m making that assurance, for it is a national enterprise that cannot be abandoned. A great question has arisen among engineers ; for the cantilever portion of so large a structure, extending unsupported across the river, suspended from overhead, but entirely without pillars beneath, represents an awkward feature in bridge building. Its destruction does not so much raise the question of whether too much has not been attempted without pillar support, but whether enough regard has been paid to the degree of weight and tension to which elongated portions of incompleted bridges, projecting out from a tower at one end, and hanging on air at the other, can safely be subjected, pending the welding of the entire edifice. Upon the superstructure an enormous " traveller," built of steel, 215 ft. high, with an over-reach of 66ft., had been m constant operation, and appears to have gone down with the wreck. In this connection it is most interesting to read that the Phcenix Bridge Company, of Phcenixville, Pa., the contractors for the superstructure, followed a design which to some extent, did not admit of the observance of precedents in bridge building. "In many respects, certainly, the Quebec bridge stood in a class by itself, its long suspended span, with pin connections flanked by the cantilever arms, constituting its outstanding feature. That it has now become a total wreck almost suggests that m its design there had been too wide a departure from existing practice. There is probably only one other like structure which admits of some comparison with it, the bridge now building over Blackwell's Inland at New York. It has members of nearly equal weight and length, and is being erected by similar methods, but weighs much less, though designed to bear a considerably heavier traffic." The unheeded prediction of the disaster is at present being much canvassed in Canada. It gives a cunous turn to the story. "Two days after the disaster, people about the City Hall," we read in the Montreal Daily Stai , " are discussing with a great c'eal of interest the predictions made some three weeks as*o by Mr. Maurice Martin, M.P. for St. M.'-ry's Division that the Quebec bridge would collapse if they persisted

in building the cantilever span on the present system. He was in the .office of the City Clerk, and members of the staff there recall that he drew diagrams all over the blotters and office pads in illustration of his contention that the bridge was being put up on false lines." Mr. Martin is a cigar manufacturer, and is popularly supposed to know no more about bridges than to be able to distinguish them from bales of hay. His prophesy, therefore, met with a rather humorous reception and utterly failed to impress those to whom he set it forth, in spite of his very evident earnestness in the matter. He did not say where he got his information, but he persisted in his contention that there would be a horrible catastrophe unless something were done to alter the system of construction of the bridge. " I am so sure of what I say," he stated to those present " that I took the trouble to go to Sir Wilfrid Laurier about it and explain the affair to him. But he, of course, treated my explanations as you have done, and told me with a smile, that in spite of his great respect for my knowledge of bridges and general engineering, which he was sure was very great, as I had spent most of my life making cigars, he preferred to take the opinion of the engineers at work on the bridge structure. But you will see that my words will come true." There can be no question about either the prophecy or its dreadful fulfilment. Experts are necessarily reticent on such occasions. One in Hamilton, Ontario, however, has been induced to lift the veil so far as he can. A local journal thus gives his testimony as to the cause : — The Hamilton bridge building experts refused to express an opinion as to the probable cause of the collapse of the great cantilever bridge at Quebec with the evidence at hand. One authority, who refused permission to use his name, suggested that a defective piece of iron or steel work might have caused the disaster. " What about the length of the span being too great ? " he was asked. " I don't think that had anything to do with it," was the reply. " The strain was undoubtedly carefully calculated. The fact that the piers and abutments remained perfectly intact and there was no apparent cause for the sudden collapse, makes it look as if there had been a defective piece of steel or iron somewhere, or that some of the structure was out of perpendicular." Some laymen were, also necessarily, more outspoken. It is always the custom of those who know least to speak the most. The mayor of St. Johns declared that " Faith has received a shock and science is reduced to the point of human incapacity." The newspapers, obeying even greater necessity to be outspoken were some of them more caretul. One journal majestically placed the blame on the Government, " since the bndge was essentially a Government work." — Evidently an Opposition paper. Another, the description of which is " The Government organ," makes that description unnecessary by standing back to the Government and blazing at all and sundry Most of the others were content to deplore the calamity in terms heartfelt as well as picturesque. The Ftenmg Journal struck a deeper note •— '' The cause will be thoroughly probed beyond doubt. Even if the Government took no responsibility, the respective contractors would leave no stone unturned to fasten the blame either each upon the other or upon the Bridge Company's plans. Someone has a million dollar loss to face, to say nothing of a possible moral responsibility for the loss of so many lives." The terrible character of this disaster may be realised by the vivid picture of the failure of the rescue work given by the Daily Star. "Many criticisms have been made regarding the delay in beginning the work of rescue after the catastrophe occurred, but those who were near at hand all declare that no time was lost. It must be remembered that the bridge is situated in a spot that is very difficult of access. The long distance from the nearest town of any size, St. Romuald, and the difficulty in reaching the beach from the highway, were factors that delayed the men who rushed to the scene very much. The bridge is built out from a high bluff, and to get at the foot of where the debris lay, under which the men were imprisoned, took some time, for those who went to the rescuce were obliged to go from a third to half a mile. " It was this fact that allowed the workers on the bridge on the north side to be on the scene of the disaster, just immediately after they saw the structure go down. They went across in boats and thus were there before the scores of \\ orkers tha t came from the south side. All the residents of the vicinity are unanimous in this and say there was no delay in entering into the work of rescue, but that all joined with a rush to free their unfortunate riends and fellow work men, who were lying helpless on the shore. "Another story that has gone abroad is that instead of keeping up the rescue work after darkness fell, the

rescuers stopped and waited for tne d iwa. Tins also is a mistake. The night was very dark, and it was almost impossible to do anything but keep still all through the night. Boits were drifting around the wreck in the hope that someone living might still remain, or that the bodies of some of the numbers that had met death might be recovered. It was not possible to do much with the small lanterns at the disposal of the different parties, but still the search was not given up for an instant." St. Romuald, a little town of 4,000 people, situated about three miles from the scene of the disaster, was in proportion the heaviest sufferer m the matter of loss of life, and out of the eighty that were on the bridge when it went down, 22 lived there. Every one of those 22 is either killed or missing, and St. Romuald is in mourning ,tor many of the victims being heads of families. The finishing touch of horror is the proposition to employ dynamite to loosen ,the ( dead bodies from under the tangled misses of gigantic pieces of steel but nothing has been decided on the subject. Here is a description of the general perfection of the methods adopted which, in its sharp contrast to the miserable failure of the rescue arrangements acquires almost the force of irony — " The absence of smoke, noise and confusion were especially noticeable to a visitor at the bridge site, due chiefly to the admirable electric installation for handling all lifts." Sound was not wanting, as may well be imagined, to add to the terrors of the scene. The terrible nature of the crash is endorsed by the fact that it was plainly heard at Point Levis, a distance of seven and a half miles away. Many crossing in the ferry from Quebec to Levis at the time heard the noise, which~they took to be thunder. On looking up the river, however, a high roll of white mist or spray was visible. At St. Romuald the noise was plainly heard, and many were on their way to the bridge before they knew definitely what had happened.

There is but one good commercial reason why, il a railway i= to be built at all, it should be a light railway, and that is the existence (or prospective existence) ot only .1 moderate traffic— a traffic that is insufficient to pay the wcrkmg expenses and capital chaiges cf a standard line. There are not a lew branch lines in New Zealand that should never have been built except as light railways , the traffic on. them, while cloubtlesa good for tile district served, is altogether inadequate for anything but a light system. The usual reasons prompting the building of branches to correspond more or less with a main line, are absence of any need for trans-shippi lg goods at the jimcticn, and convenience of traffic operation The trans-shipment-cost reason is a bogey ; experience is plentiful enough cr this point, and m the United Kingdom the ligure never exceeds 'Id a ton, except where very fragile goods are concerned. On coal freights, where hopper cars arc used, and the hoppers hoisted from the light railway trucks on to mam line trucks, two or more going on each of the latter the trans-shipment cost is about three-farthings per ton. If it be taken that under New Zealand conditions the cost would be twi^e these amounts, what does it pro'it consignors that they save Sd on each ton and at the same time lose probably two or three shillings in ha\ing to pay standard railway height charges ? It is obvious, that with light lines costing a quarter or a third the money of standard ones, built m districts of moderate traffic and feedm ft the mam line, the all-round rates for rail seivice geneially must be less than where a goodly proportion cf the railway system is too expensive a machine for the total amount of work it' can possibly &et to do. Alter all, freight charges must be based in some degree upon the cost of the service, and the cost of the service is largely made up ol interest on capital invested. Ihe argument os to convenience in working traffic simply means that no special rclling stock is require' lor sole u^e on the standard branch railuay. It ignores the fact that the outlay lor roiling stock on a light railway it- trivial compared \>ith the saving effected by not having to build a comparatively li^avy track, erect missive bridges, form costh embankments, make r'eep cats or tunnels, and use large radius curves. Of course there are occasions when even a light riil\\c,y constiucted on a public road requires earthworks md special bridges., but the cost of these -,vill not be a quarter the amount necessary for ttie standard railway. If then a substantial saving cr the building and equipping of the light line, as against the banding of the btanderd on-;, can be made, the economy and convenience arising from the employment of mam line rolling t.tock are obtained at in excessive price, and are not worth having.

It would be^foohsh to assert the si perionty of the light railway for all branch jmes. _It has its limitations, in carrying capacity, in speed, and ia earning power. The future of a district must be considered much more than its present state, and if in any case there is scope for a traffic that would really tax the capacity of the cheaper^system, and a reasonable prospect of realising this condition within live or six years, the light railway, clearly, is unsuitable for it. So far as .New Zealand is concerned, there are very few districts ot this kind, if those lj'ing in the track of future main Imp railways are excluded from consideration ; as regards standard branch lines already built, anyone may judge how far the districts they serve were and are deserving of the expenditure, by noting on how many of them only tv j, four, ur six trains per week axe run. Th° widespread demand tor standard branch lines cannot be met at present, because the Government has no money available to build even the most promising lines, but how many ot the districts interested remember that at any time, capital, whether wanted by Co\ ernment or local bodies,, is only obtainable in a limited quantity within a given period, if it is to be at a reasonable price? JLo hold out, therefore, tor Lhe rr.ore expensive type of line can result in nothing eKe than prolonging the time of waiting for the majority. The frank adoption of a light railway pdicy will mean transport facilities at a near date for many districts, that otherwise will not see a railway for the nex generation. A leading railway enpineer has m?de the statement that in no country ought there to be any other classes cf lines than the 4'S^" gauge of medium to heavy type, and the 2' 6" gauge of light type. At the present stage of the worl i's development this is a counsel of perfection, but it contains endorsement of the sound principle that a co an try's railway expenditure should not be all on the standard type — and it may be added, not even when that standard is the \i' 6" gauge, as in New Zealand. The narrow gaage, light line is as necessary an auxiliary to our railways as it is to those of other countries. In the great majority of instances the gauge of a light railway is less than that of the standard lines of the country in which the undertaking is situated, but the fact of it being on the larger gau o e does not make it any the less a light lme. In level country, the choice of standard instead of a narrow gauge, docs not very seriously increase the cost of a line, as it is the amount of earthworks and roadbed formation necessary in a hilly or mountainous district th?t is the principal factor m determining expenditure. >lot many light lines, liowevfr, of 4' 8^" gauge have teen or will be constructed, as that go age is too wide to permit of the lightest track designs. For Mew 7ealand service, ;{' U" light railways while quite feasible fis engineering propositions, will be o built probably only in those cases where re-construction into standard lines in a few years' time is intended. 1 Inless such lines are laid out with easier curves than are usual tor light railways, mining line rolling stock cannot be run ov er them, and to get the easier curves is often a very expensive matter m hilly country. Low cppital cost being the main consideration in this work, its influence may be expected to exterd to the question of gauge in all cases but those just mentioned. For many reasons it is desirable that the same gauge should be adopted throughout *he country lor all lmht lines (other than 3' 6" ones) carding on public business. A common gauge for these systems n.eans cheaper rolling stock, because makers can standardise patterns, and cheaper repairs because standard spare parts can te stocked , it further means the possibility of sale or hire of plant from line to line, and it will enable neighbouring systems to some day link up as the d'-=trict develop. Flectnc traction will be largely useds and its interests panic uarly require a common, gauge, as motor equipments become very costly when built in small numbers for gauges seldom used. Taking all points nto consideration, the 2' 6" ganjie is, m my opinion, the one that should be chosen lor general acceptance • it giv^es a satisfactory freight carrying capacity — on the Leek light railway (England) which is of tins gauge, cars 40' long ?nd C 9" internal width are used, and run up to 30 miles an hour — and permits ot c nvenient roomy passenger cars that will operate without continual oscillation, lhe most important advantage of all, perhaps, is that it does not cramp the design<of electric traction motors to that degree at which either power or reliability and efficiency have to be sacrificed. Tt is as much the correct {,auge for these lines, where owing to sparse traffic steam locos shouH be employed, as for electrical undertakings ; sooner or later with the development of the district concerned, electricity wall claim consideration, and then the question of space available for motors will be of great importance.

It is probable that m most parts of New Zealand where light railways will be built, a better location than on the existing main, roads cannot be obtained. Certainly on the chain wide roads there is abundant room, and to spare, for a track with passing places and a pole line for overhead work, without restricting the genera] highway use. The Belgian light railways are to a very large extent built on the sides of roads, and the two lines now projected in this country Mill, if built be road lines. Possibly it is for this reason that the latter have so far been called tramways — a term which is rather apt to convey the impression of a track with grooved rails sunk in the roadway and a paved or macadamised surface uniform with the rest of the road. Actually, the only construction that is possible m these cases is an exposed rail of ordinary Vignoles sectiGn, with ballasting ou the road, instead of under it, the road surface being first brought to f~rmation level. Owing to the grades on such roads as are common m this country, it is a foregone conclusion that apart from any other considerations electric traction will have to be employed in the majority of road-located light lines. Few people will deny that great benefit will be derived from the establishment of these cheap yet efficient transpoit systems, or th?t many a district now longing and hoping for a standard branch railway, would gain more in the long run by building for itself a light line than by continuing to maintain expensive roads and pay heavj cartage rates for an unknown number of years. Private enterprise in matters of public utility is allowed few opportunities in New Zealand, but it is suiely desirable that it should not only be permitted, but'welccmec , under proper conditions, for fostering light railway development m every case where the local bodies are unable or unwilling to assume the responsibility. The Government, with several years of standard railway construction before it, cannot be expected to do much, if anything, towards building the lines, but it can easily render abortive other peopVs efforts, by imposing such restrictions and " safeguards " that neither Councils nor investors will be able to embark upon the work. It would be a thousand pities if the tie-up of the water powers were to be paralleled by a tie-up of light railway enterprise.

Perhaps the chief point in the triumph of the Lusitania and her great sister ship is the advance to the front of the turbine. It is well understood that if reciprocating engines had been adopted, it would have been necessary to employ three sets of them, one set abaft of the other two ; so that engines of enormous power, and with great weights in the moving parts, would have been installed far aft, and there would have been risks of undue vibration, even when all possible precautions had been taken to balance moving parts of the engines. The manufacture of the screw shafting and particularly that of the crank shaft, would also have involved great difficulties, as the sizes required would have been far beyond precedent. For these reasons, the committee, in which repre sentatives of the Admiralty, of Lloyd's, and of the manufacturers concerned took part, resolved to employ turbines. Accordingly, Mr. Parsons, to whose genius the introduction and development of the marine steam turbine is due, prepared the designs which were adopted by the committee, and which have given results fully justifying the decision. The Lusitania and Mauritania are, it should be remembered here, remarkable for the fact that they surpass all of their predecessors in size. In other words, but for the application of the turbine, any further increase of size would have been awkward in naval architecture on account of the enormous weights required by the reciprocating engine for the larger ships. It is the turbine which has removed the limitations of naval development imposed by the other type of marine engine. An effect of the British victory whirh h?s esc? pec' attention in this country hitherto was unexpected. At a dinner given in Hamburg in honour of the Bankers Congress in that city, the managing director of the Hamburg- Amei ican line, Herr Balhn, delivered a splenetic speech, m which he said, inter ahu. that ' the British Government had been compelled to depart from th^ principle of fair and free pl?y fcr all, which had made England great, and to pay a heavy subsidy to a single company m order to achieve a slight advantage over German shipping. Artificial hot-house plants could never flourish in the sharp atmosphere of free competition, and he hoped that shipping subsidies would be abolished, like the sugar bounties, by international agreement." The impudence of the suggestion, coming from the director of a monopoly nursed on the artificial food of subsidies and special favours, needs little remark. It is only necessary to say that the pnnci-

pie has been adopted in Britain in self-defence, and will probably not be discontinued in consequence of the protests of the monopolies it has created. The case for the I.usitania is thus well summed officially in the Times ; "The speed trials of a vessel differ froTi her maiden voyage. In the case of the former a start is not usually made in storm or dense fog. In the latter the ship has to accept whatever comes. Record runs, it should be remembered, are invariably made under good weather conditions. Several hours of fog, together with the desire not to strain the machinery, reduced the speed of the Lusitnma. No one who has seen the ease with which this passage was accomplished can doubt her ability to give a mean speed of 25 knots over this course under favourable conditions. This, with the 25-hour days of the westward passage, would really make the passage 4| days between Queenstown and Sandy Hook. " The turbines and all the machinery worked regularly and efficiently. Mr. Cunard, the director of the company, Mr. Luke, the constructor, and Mr. Duncan, the engineer, who are on board, assure me that the performance of the vessel is entirely satisfactory and up to their expectations. That the Cunard Line should have broken the record between Queerstown and New York and established the fastest passage between England and America, is therefore cause for genuine congratulation. It must be admit ted that there are a few unreasonable people who profess to be disappointed because full speed was not attained, but the tremendous recep tion which the vessel met in New York dispels that feeling of dis ppomtment. It is a magnificent achievement for a first voyage. "The complaints that the organisation of the vessel was not up to the standard set by the Cunard Company are unjust. The service must be pronounced efficient when reasonable allowance is made for the number of passengers, the size of the staff, and the newness of everything The purser, Mr. Lancaster, and his staff worked day and night for the comfort of the passengers, and deserve encouragement, rather than captious criticism. The behaviour of the ship gave her such steadiness that at times it was difficult to realise that the vessel was moving The vibration at the stern will be entirely removed by stiffening the upper structures rf the parts affected " On the American side it strikes even experts as very suggestive of the high state of development reached by transatlantic steamship travel, that the schedule of the arrival and departure of the Ltisitama on this, her maiden trip, should have been determined upon almost to the very hour, several weeks before she started from the other side. In this connection it was announced in New York that in response to the wishes of Mr. Vernon H. Brown, the general agent in that city, the Cunard Company decided to run the ship across at a speed which would bring her to the bar outside Sandy Hook at eight o clock on Friday morning on a rising tide ; and it is significant that in spite of several delays through fog the reserve of speed of the Lusitama enabled the captain to bring the vessel to the bar at 8.5 on the morning designated. No attempt whatever was made to push the ship beyond a 23-knot average. Both captain and chief engineer testified that the vessel had proved during the trip in every respect a perfect success , that she is exceptionally free from vibration ; and that the whole of the elaborate motive power operated without the slightest mishap. The question has naturally been asked : If a speed of 23 knots will bring the Lusitama to New York on Friday morning, why is she crowded with additional boiler and engine power to enable her to steam 2^ knots faster 5 The answer is that when the ship has " found herself," and the whole of the boiler-room and engine-room staff of several hundred men are thoroughly up to their duties, the Lusitama will be pushed to her lull speed of 25.5 knots an hour and will be in her dock by seven o'clock on Thursday evening. This is declared to be the confident expectation of the officers of the ship, based upon the ease w ith which she made 23 knots when using about 75 per cent, of her full power. That this is reasonable is proved by the fact that the Lusitama hp.d averaged 25 \ knots on a trial trip of over 1000 miles, and made 26£ knots over shorter courses ; while during this, her first voyage, she was tried out for stretches of several miles and logged a speed of over 26 knots. The incidental advantages of high speed are that even though a ship may not make use of it throughout a whole voyage, it gives a reserve which can be utilised to make up for time lost through fog or heavy weather. Thus, because of her °reat size and power and lofty freeboard, the Lusitama wculd be able not only to maintain an average speed of 20 or 21 knots against heavy w mds and seas, but when the storm has blown over, by utilising her full engine pover she could readily pull up the average to the speed which would bring her m to port on schedule time.