The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1915. HAVE WE FAILED AT THE DARDANELLES ?

New Zealand Tablet, 28 October 1915, Page 33

The New Zealand Tablet THURSDAY, OCTOBER 28, 1915. HAVE WE FAILED AT THE DARDANELLES ?

jjpiis?fa CCORDING to quite a number of authorities WllnmSk there is only one possible answer to the //t&VAV question. Tire well-known Berlin paper, J/xfflj&p tn e Norddeutche AUgemeine Zeilung, gleefully declares that ' the Anglo-French |swosf|* action in the Dardanelles, as all the world £*&£?s* knows, is a pitiable failure.' A Dutch ifr * correspondent, the Sofia representative of the Nieuws .van den Dag, states a that it ;• may be considered certain that the Entente's undertak- • ing at the Dardanelles has-, failed.' "_•; The Associated •, Press correspondent— .. at r Constantinople—*

announces that it is impossible for the Allies to advance from Sedd-el Balfr by- operations conducted within the ;:-range of reasonable and permissible sacrifices'; and that '"from a strictly military viewpoint the Allies' position *••" on Gallipoli Peninsula is more unfavorable to-day than it was on April 26 (the date of the landing).' General . von Sanders, in command of the Turkish forces, is not so sweeping and dogmatic, but he is nevertheless quite - confident. 'I am too old to be an optimist,' he is . reported as saying, ' but I am confident that unless something extraordinary occurs we will hold the Allies where they are.' Nevertheless, with all due deference UuPo : these high authorities, we venture to think that. ;; there is something to be said for Sir Conan Doyle's ; view that it is too early to say we have failed at the Dardanelles.' It is true that we have attempted to force a position of the utmost natural difficulty in the ; face of an enemy amply supplied with guns, with forces numerically inferior to that enemy's. It is ', true that after six months' hard and heavy fighting our : troops are still busy overcoming the first main obstacle, which begins at Krithia and leads up to the summit of Achi Baba. But it is true, v too, that once this obstacle is conquered, subsequent proceedings will be relatively easy. And it is also beyond doubt true ■■ that there is a growing absence of ammunition on the Turkish side and therein, it may frankly be admitted, , lies our chief hope. If—as at the moment seems enT tirely —Roumania should abandon her neutrality or should throw in her lot with the Teutons, or if von Mackensen should. succeed in forcing a passage through the north-east of Serbia into Bulgaria and thereby open up a way for fresh supplies to Gallipoli, the position of the Turks would undoubtedly be immensely improved. So far, however, von Mackensen's effort in that direction has failed : and in the meantime, and so long as car loads of munitions remain held up on the Roumanian frontier, it is certainly too early, as Sir Conan Doyle claims, to write off the*Dardanelles on the debit side of the account. As to the policy of the whole project of forcing the Dardanelles, volumes will doubtless be written after the war—always assuming, that is, that the project fails. If the scheme succeeds, there will be nothing but plaudits for Mr. Winston Churchill, even from those who are now most-anxious to criticise. These statements cover, by implication, practically all that is to be said on the matter. In other words, the enterprise was virtually a gamble, as every operation in war is" to some extent a gamble, even after all the chances and unknown quantities seem to have been allowed for. In defence of this particular venture, it may be urged that, you cannot have omelettes without breaking eggs; that if the throw was daring, the stakes at any rate were high; that there was at least a sporting chance of early success; and that at the inception of the undertaking the circumstances were such as to give ground for the belief that it could be carried through without any serious weakening or wasting of the forces available for the main theatre. The strategic importance of the forcing of the Dardanelles lay in the fact that it would have meant the fall of Constantinople and consequent downfall of Turkey; that it would have supplied an outlet for Russian wheat and an inlet for arms, ammunition, and much-needed .chemicals for our Ally; that it would have exerted immense and immediate influence upon the hesitating Balkan States; and that it would have exercised a -decisive effect in putting an early termination to the .war. Who shall say that these possibilities were not worth a very considerable risk And even though success has been delayed, it is safe to conjecture—apart from other advantages of the move set forth by Sir. ; Conan Doylethat Bulgaria would long ago have taken ,the field on the side of the Central Powers but for the /diversion . caused by the threat on Constantinople and f : ;on; Turkey. > ; ' It is to he observed also, as we have .already indicated, that the forces to be utilized were ;such as could be provided without entrenching upon .the new service* armies which were destined for Sir

John French's command. The warships employed were those which , were *- available . after every need of home defence had been amply provided * for, > The 120,000 men; who ; were assigned to the Dardanelles operations can scarcely—with the exception of the 29th Divisionbe said to have included any troops who had been definitely relied upon for France and Flanders. General D'Amade's Colonials were a special effort of North African depots; the British Naval Division was an Expeditionary Force for Admiralty purposes; the. Australasian and Indian troops and the Lancashire Territorials had already. been set apart for work in Egypt, and but for the collapse of Djemal's invasion, might still have been engaged on the Canal. It, may, therefore, be taken that at any rate the bulk of the Expeditionary Force were composed of troops not earmarked for France and Flanders, but specially reserved for such expeditions as the Dardanelles. It is only fair to state, also, that Mr. Churchill cannot be justly saddled with the sole responsibility for the enterprise. As a matter of fact, the plan was discussed both by English and French authorities, and was as much supported by the latter as it was by the former. It has even been said that there was a formal request from Russia for some such demonstration', but certain knowledge on this point cannot be had until the secret political history of the war is published. * But whatever may be the judgment of posterity on the policy of the Dardanelles project of its consequences, there can be but one opinion as to the superb gallantry with which the scheme has been carried out, especially so far as our Austalian and New Zealand troops are concerned. The landing itself was a fight without a precedent. Sixty thousand men, backed by the most powerful Navy in the world, attacked a shore which nature seemed to have made impregnable, and which was held by at least twice that number of the enemy, in positions prepared for months, and supported by the latest modern artillery. ' The mere problem of transport,' says Mr. John Buchan, ' was sufficient to deter the boldest. Every rule of war was set at naught. On paper the thing, was impossible as the Turkish Army Order announced. By the text-books no man should have left the beaches alive. In Sir lan Hamilton's words, it "involved difficulties for which no precedent was forthcoming in military history." All accounts prove that the Turks fought with superlative boldness and courage—with chivalry, too, as their treatment of our wounded showed. That our audacity succeeded is a tribute to the unsurpassable fighting quality of our menthe Regulars of the 29th Division, the Naval Division, and not least to the dash and doggedness of the Australasian corps.' Well may Sir lan Hamilton proclaim that he is proud to have commanded such troops, and well may Mr. Henry Nevinson, the well-known writer and war correspondent, who was wounded at Anafarta, declare that ' the Australians and New Zealanders filled him with a new hope for the race the world over.'