Current Topics

New Zealand Tablet, 9 September 1915, Page 21

Current Topics

Failure of the Submarine Policy It is not always safe to take diplomatic utterances at their face value; but the very definite cable messages regarding Count Bernstorff’s written promise to America, and the reported ‘ illness ’ and ‘ extended holiday’ of Admiral von Tirpitz, would seem to afford tolerably conclusive evidence of an intended modification of the German submarine policy of ‘ frightfulness,’ and of the fact that in the quarrel between the German Admiralty and the German Foreign Office von Tirpitz has gone under. The disagreement between Grand Admiral Tirpitz and the Imperial Chancellor, Herr von Hollweg, has " been ' simmering for some considerable time. The open quarrel began with an article in the Lokalanzeiger, which is the property of a syndicate working under the direction of the German Foreign Office. The writer, Herr Eugen Zimmenuann, whose relations with that department are well-known and acknowledged, admitted, first, that he could not reprobate the English blockade, which was a method he would gladly see Germany employing against England, and which does not involve ‘ real starvation,’ but only a means of enforcing surrender ; and, secondly, that the German reproaches to America for delivering war materials through private firms to the Allies are ‘ unjust.’ This was a complete giving away of the whole argument by which the aggressive naval party had attempted to defend their murderous and piratical submarine policy and the Tirpitz press were naturally indignant. 3 hey at once opened a concentrated fire on the offending newspaper. The Colo fine Gazette denounced it for defending the very views which the anti-Germans had long employed to justify the ‘ starvation war,’ and for pleading the cause of the enemy against all German opinion. The Lokalanzeiger itself beat a sort of retreat by affirming that England had lost all claim to further observance of the rules of naval warfare by German submarines, and the Hamburger Nachrichten said that the whole people approved of the sinking of the Lusitania and did not' wish for any mitigation of the submarine war. The Deutsche Tageszeitung, a paper which has advocated the most ruthless forms of submarine warfare and gloried in such deeds as the destruction of the Lusitania, went farther. It published an article by Count Reventlow —a ‘ fire-eating Anglophobe naval expert ’ —which deliberately conveyed the impression that ‘ official circles ’ —that is, Herr von Bethmann Hollweg and the Foreign Office—contemplated the renunciation of the advantages of submarine warfare ‘ for the sake of peace with America.’ It went on to make the assertion that the addition of America to Germany’s enemies was ‘ a matter of entire indifference.’ Finally, it discussed the legal standpoint of the German Notes to the United States ‘ with scarcely concealed mockery,’ and added a personal attack on ‘a leading statesman.’ It even spoke of him as ‘ inadequate ’ and as ‘ clinging to his office’ to the detriment of the public good. For this article, and especially for its ridicule of the German Notes to the United States, the paper was suspended; and as Count Reventlow, the writer of the article, was known to be in the confidence of the Grand Admiral, the suspension was generally regarded as a deliberate rebuff to that dignitary. Mr. F. W. Wile, late Berlin correspondent of the London Evening News, summed up the situation as follows, so far back as the end of June: ‘I am strongly of the opinion that Prince Bulow, who returned to Germany only a. few weeks ago from Italy, had much to do with “inspiring” Zimmermann to indite “Timely Considerations.” The article dealt with what should be the wise line of action for Germany to take regarding America’s Lusitania protest. The kernel of the situation, as I view it, is fchait Germany is preparing to make substantial con-

cessions to the United States; it was due to Foreign Office inspiration ’ that, Zimmermann wrote his article in the Lokalanzeiger ; the Government desires to manufacture public opinion which will seem to support concessions and neither Tirpitz, Reventlow, nor any other minions of the Navy Press Bureau are to be permitted to interfere with that programme.’ The only conces- . sion announced so far in our cables is that contained in the following written undertaking given by Count BerustorfT to the American Secretary of State: ‘Liners \\ill not be sunk by our submarines without warning and without ensuring safety for non-combatants, provided that the liners do not attempt to escape or to offer any resistance.’ At its best that means very little; and at its worst it may mean nothing at all. Certainly it does not justify the absurd jubilations of Americans over the ‘ diplomatic victory ’of their President. It seems clear, however, from the facts and utterances above cited, that Germany is beginning to realise that the submarine policy of ‘ frightfulness ’ has failed, and that some sort of modification of it is under serious consideration. The Y.M.C.A. and the Soldiers The enterprising representatives of the Dunedin T .M.C.A. are to the fore with an. offer to the Soldiers and Dependents Welfare Committee in which patriotism, social advertisement, and good business are very ingeniously combined. The proposal is that the ‘splendid building' of the Y.M.C.A. and ‘its facilities’ should be made available for tho purpose of a Soldiers’ Club, heir use to be granted on the following conditions : ‘(1) The club to lie called the Soldiers Club, Y.M.C.A. (2) The club to be open to any member of the N.Z. Expeditionary Forces, (3) Full privilege membership tickets to be issuer! (including bath and gymnasium) to any man who registers as a member of the club—registration lee to lie 2s fid. The Patriotic Association to subsidise the Association to an amount per member to be agreed up. (41 The club to be under t lie direction of a committee of five members of the \.M.C.A. Board. (5) The club to provide facilities for correspondence, smoking, games, reading, piano, papers, magazines, etc. Members to have full use of the building, and its comforts and conveniences. (6) For a small charge (2d each per cue, r 50 up), the two billiard tables to be placed at the disposal of, members of the club. (No billiards on Sundays.) (7) The club to be a rallying centre. Its central, position gives easy access to places of interest and amusement. (8) Correspondence and parcels may be addressed ‘c/o the club.’ (9) The club to be open every day in the week (Sunday included). (10) Concerts and social evenings to be arranged at intervals. (11) Supper to he procurable in the evenings at nominal figure, say 3d.’ It is understood that a donation from a private citizen has enabled the Y.M.C.A. to frame this suggested club membership fee on a somewhat an unusually low basis; and with the pushful commercial spirit which is characteristic of our times the Association seeks to induce the Soldiers and Dependents Welfare Committee to further supplement its resources out of what is commonly known as the Patriotic Fund., * The desire of the Y.M.C.A. to supply means of healthy social recreation for the returned soldiers is entirely commendable, and the spirit underlying their proposal is doubtless worthy of all praise. But the proposal itself, as a practical proposition, is open to serious objection. (1) Although ‘ The Club ’ is to be ■ called 'the Soldiers’ Club, Y.M.C.A.’, it is not really a soldiers’ club at all. There is not a word in the scheme submitted by the Association to suggest that the soldiers are to have—even for a limited period of the day or night—the exclusive use of the clubroom. They are only to be permitted to share the privileges with all the members of the Association in good standing, so that the so-called soldiers’ club is seen to be merely an annex or side-line to the regular Y.M.C.A. (2) There is an objection on principle to the allocation

of moneyr from the Patriotic Fund to the Y.M.C.A. in the fact that this organisation : is, in respect to its, management and control, a distinctly sectarian institution. It is perfectly true that nominal membership —entitling to use of gymnasium, baths, etc. — open to ‘ any man of good moral character.’ Such members, however, unless they comply with the limitation hereafter to be mentioned, are excluded from all office, and have neither vote nor voice of any'sort in the carrying on of the institution. The real membership— the membership which extends beyond the pool table and the shower-bath, and which involves, as ajll true membership does, participation in the working of the institutionis strictly limited on a purely sectarian basis. The present rules of the Dunedin Y.M.C.A. were adopted on August 5, 1910. Section 3 of rule 2 reads thus: —‘ (3) Men who are members in full communion of evangelical churches, who are 18 years of age and upwards may become governing members of this association. Only governing members have the right to vote and hold office.’ Under this rule, Catholics, High Church Anglicans, Jews, Unitarians, etc., are excluded en bloc from representation on the active membership,, of the institution. The money which has gone to build up the Patriotic Fund has been subscribed by Jew and Gentile, Protestant and Catholic, Christians and non-Christians; and it is wrong in principle, and distinctly unfair, that such money should be applied to the benefit of a sectarian institution without the express consent and approval of the subscribers. _ (3) In this peculiar so-called soldiers’ club, the soldiers themselves are to have no say in the management of affairs. As we have shown, the rules provide that only ‘ men who are members in full communion of evangelical churches’ are allowed to become governing members; and the scheme submitted expressly lays it down that ‘ the Club is to be under the direction of a committee of five members of the (existing) Y.M.C.A. Board.’ In any soldiers’ club worthy of the name, the soldiers must surely be given the right to run the institution on the lines that appeal to them. Before the Y.M.C.A. intervened with their present proposal a promising movement was on foot to establish a. soldiers’ club on thoroughly general and cosmopolitan lines. If a well-organised appeal is made to the public for such an object, there will, it may confidently be anticipated, be a sufficiently liberal response to enable the establishment to be run quite as cheaply as the somewhat hybrid scheme submitted by the Y.M.C.A. The Harmsworth Jeremiads Colonel Repington, the military correspondent of the London Times, is generally credited with having been the first man to bring home to the British nation the grave deficiency in the matter of high explosives and the urgent necessity for remedying the delect, ; and if the claim is true, he certainly deserves all honor and gratitude for this very real service. But it cannot be denied that he has greatly weakened his reputation and his claim to be taken seriously as a guide and mentor in the present crisis by his perpetual pessimism and his shivering and lugubrious warnings as to Britain’s inability to hold her own against Germany. From the very first lie has played the part of the Fat Boy of Dickens, and has evinced a constant and chronic desire to matte our flesh creep. Everywhere and" always he sees blue. So long ago as October of last year he gravely descanted on the imminence of a German invasion of England, and took the most serious' possible view of the probable overthrow of the Empire. ‘ Now that the war is reaching the- climax of its violence,’ he said, ‘we must anticipate that all the living forces of Germany will be thrown into the conflict, and that the German Navy will no longer remain inert. We must expect to be attacked at home, and must not rest under any comforting illusions that we shall not be assailed. As an attack upon us can have no serious object, unless the intention is to land an expedition in England, for the purpose of compelling us to sign a disastrous peace, it is well we should look the situation ..calmly in the. face and reckon,up, not only Germany’s

power to do us harm, but also our power of resistance and the means for improving it.' After looking the situation ‘ calmly in the face ’ he comes to the usual conclusion that England, has a very poor chance of. warding off the threatened attack. ‘ From the soldiers’ point of view,' he wrote, ‘ the naval defence of. a country situated as the British are to-day," presents difficulties which not even a marked preponderance in offence can with absolute assurance overcome. The length of our coast, the absence of our best troops oversea, the want of a National Army (which is still only in the forming) the submarine menace which keeps our fleet often far from .the ultimate decisive point, the Zeppelins, the mines, and other conditions, which are more or, less novel, throw upon Sir John Jcllicoe a burden of responsibility which no one ’must underrate.’ lie can hardly be classed as a naval expert, but he was quite confident that Germany had ample ships for the undertaking. ‘ With an intact navy and the initiative much can be done," and as hope springs eternal in the human breast, it will probably be hoped that while the German Navy engages ours tho transports, escorted by older warships, may slip across and complete a lauding under the protection , of mines, submarines, and yessels sunk in a fairway. There is ample shipping in the German ports for embarkation of a quarter of a million men or more, and from the evidence which we have had of the calmness with which German generals sacrifice life to obtain their objects, we can be sure that the-loss of 50,000 men would bo considered a cheap price to pay for throwing the remainder ashore.’ fie believed that, even with all the men she then had in the field in France and on the Eastern frontier, Germany had still sufficient in reserves for the purpose, and proceeded: • There is much reason why the Germans should wish to strike at us. The land campaigns do not at present appear likely to produce decisive results favorable to Germany within any period of time that can be foreseen, and the strain on Germany is tremendous. Antwerp shows that she seeks for the line of least resistance in order to strike a blow which may be at least resounding. She may consider a death’s grapple with our forces at. home to be another advance on the line of least resistance.’ That was nearly a year ago. The expected invasion may still, of course, eventuate; but these lachrymose prognostications have proved, at the very least, to be a little premature. Nevertheless, Colonel llepiugtou still continues in the Times — as last week’s cables show us-— his ‘ Willow, willow, waly ’ over the blunders of our military directors, who, he tells us, have done absolutely nothing right from first to last of the struggle ; and another Harmsworth journal, the Dai/;/ Mail, is still laboring the invasion bogey and trying to make the flesh creep. ‘The people,’ it says 5 in a recent issue, ‘ who muddled the equipment of .the men who are marching about without weapons may be muddling the invasion question. Invasion is dependent upon one mistake, and one mistake only, of our Fleet. " That is exactly what it depends uponneither more nor less. The same brains that muddled the Dardanelles operations may interfere with the operations of the Fleet,’ etc., etc. ■aAs we have already hinted, it is quite possible though, unless the naval situation be greatly altered, we should hardly think probable— some attempt at an invasion of England may yet eventuate. It seems to be considered that as Germany’s difficulties increase, and the chance of her ending the war in a •way favorable to herself becomes less and less, some sort of raiding attack may be expected as certain. . But the prospect, while it calls for a measure of pre- V paration, does not justify the panic and pessimism of the Harmsworth press. Two things,’ says the Specttator, ‘ will happen to the invading force. In the first place, their sea communications will be cut within a very few hours. Next, they will find their advance inland barred by the new ambulatory form of fortress — a line of trenches. They will be met by an army which will dig itself in all around them—ran operation,

again, of .comparative _ ease/ considering that the raiders .. will not be likely to number more than tsixty or seventy thousand,' and that they, .will 'be without " the heavy . artillery which they depend upon to cover their attacks, and, again, - without those masses of shells upon which the German infantry have been taught to rely.’ The invasion may; come, but there is nothing in the pros- . pect gravely to worry or alarm sensible people. Heligoland ; J/; July 1 was the. twenty-fifth anniversary of the cession of Heligoland to Germanya somewhat melancholy anniversary for Britons, for the Conservative Government of that day . committed a blunder which the Empire now has cause bitterly to regret. In 1890 Great Britain bartered Heligoland for certain tracts and right of way in German East Africa. To-day she finds the island the key to the formidable wall of redoubts which protects Germany’s North Sea coast-line and the approaches to Hamburg and Bremen, and the principal link, also, in the chain of coast defences which enables the German Grand Fleet to. remain, comfortable and secure, in the safe haven of the Kiel Canal. According to the general view of experts, the place is now, almost absolutely impregnable. , ‘ To one who has carefully observed the naval and coast defence policy pursued by Germany within the last fifteen years, the suggestion of a successful raid upon this portion of the -Empire, appears impossible,’ said an American naval officer recently. ‘lt is fortified and protected to a degree which has no parallel save possibly Gibraltar or Cronstadt.’ The development of the Heligoland defences furnishes an interesting .and striking example of German thoroughness. First, measures were taken to protect the island from the merciless ravages of the elements, which threatened to rend it asunder at certain seasons of the year. . The fierce blast of the North Sea gales and the crash of the immense seas against the soft sandstone cliffs crumbled them away at a rapid rate. Millions of pounds were expended on the construction of sea walls, crevasses were filled with concrete, and a splendid harbor was built. Then the work of fortification was commenced in earnest. A large section of the rocky plateau was made to conceal heavy guns in armored turrets, great coast weapons on disappearing mountings, and a formidable array of rapid fire guns. Hewn out of the solid rock were. ammunition magazines and ,bomb-proof shelters, and the entire scheme of fortification is so ingeniously engineered as to be, from without, completely invisible as well as allegedly invincible. The island is also a mighty naval station and is provided with disappearing hangars for aeroplanes and accommodation for dirigible balloons. Within the fortress, even in normal times, is a supply of reserve provisions sufficient for three months, and a full complement of seamen, gunners, and artillerymen for the garrison. * % Some naval authorities hold that Heligoland would become untenable if subjected to a heavy bombardment, but it ■is an accepted axiom of naval war- v fare that valuable war vessels should not, unless in very exceptional circumstances, be risked by opposing them to shore batteries/ The teaching of history and the opinion of the best experts agree that in such a conflict the advantage is heavily on the side of the forts. The ship is liable to be sunk by gun-fire, submarine, or drift mines, and torpedoes launched from tubes on shore. The fort can only be battered by gun-fire. The possible protection of a gun afloat is always limited, for to accumulate armor beyond a certain point is to sacrifice a corresponding amount of power, armament, or ammunition. On the other hand, there is practically no limit to the defences that can be accumulated around the gun on shore in the shape of earthworks, concrete, and armor. Again, the ship affords a much better target to hostile fire. To make effective hits on a battery is difficult, even with the help of aeroplane observation. Shrapnel fire can be met by head cover, for it is only a question of stopping A shower of bullets. The only serious harm can come

from shells exploding .oh' the crest of the parapet/ or penetrating the embrasures- and /bursting beside a gun or making direct.: hits on . the gun of its mounting; Now hits of this kind are practical bull's-eyes. On the other hand, the vulnerable surface of the ship is large. Hits on the gun positions of. the water-lines, or shell explosions starting . fires on board, - are all serious. It is true that the - long-range gun, and, aerial reconnaissance, and the large high-explosive shells of the modern warship have tended somewhat- to equalise matters; but on the whole history shows a clear verdict on the handicap of a contest between ships and ; forts.' Those who believe that the fortress of Heligoland could be reduced by gun fire declare that the high explosive shells would dislodge large masses of sandstone. It is stated, however, that experiments have been made by the Germans, who announce that the island was unaffected by the concussion of the heaviest ordnance in the cliff batteries or by the explosion of powerful projectiles against the precipitous heights. In event of a concerted attack, the British squadrons would be shelled by invisible guns protected by the stoutest armor and concrete, the artillerymen being practically immune from danger. The elevation--of the batteiies makes possible the direction of a plunging fire which would prove destructive to war vessels protected even by the most approved types of armor. It is held by the German army authorities- that the guns could annihilate the strongest fleet of battle craft atlong range. That may or may not be so; the claim is not likely to be tested, for it is not probable that a direct attack will be made on Heligoland. • But if the German Grand Fleet ever does come out and. face the music, and if the greatest naval battle of history is fought in the North Sea, it will be within hearing' if not within sight of the German garrison behind the ramparts of the island which twenty-five years ago Britain so short-sightedly threw away. ' °