WHY CAPTURE AT SEA SHOULD BE ABOLISHED

New Zealand Tablet, 13 August 1914, Page 22

WHY CAPTURE AT SEA SHOULD BE ABOLISHED

A GREAT STUMBLING BLOCK. TO INTERNATIONAL GOODWILL.

A passenger on one of the newly-armed merchantmen wrote a , few weeks ago to the London Nation , saying ; 1 am travelling on one of the new 44 defensive privateers. Two 4.7 guns ai'e stowed away out of sight in the stern of the ship, and there are several bluejackets on board playing deck quoits, and trying to kill time at the public expense. The sailors say it is “ a piece of foolery,” and that the owners have only consented to it to please the Admiralty, in order’to get a quid pro quo. The idea of a beautifully built passenger vessel like this, equipped at huge expense (and crowded with passengers) engaging in a fight at sea, is really too absurd. The officers tell me that if one of these guns was fired, every port-hole and window, and every bit of glass in the ship would be smashed or blown in. One shot from a cruiser would send the ship to the bottom.’ Sir Edward Grey’s Notable Speech. This letter was in reference to Mr. Churchill's* policy of arming certain merchant vessels in time or peace ; and incidentally it bears upon the vital question of the existing rights of belligerents to capture and confiscate private property at sea, as to which there has been a good deal of discussion since Sir Edward Grey, in reply to a demand for a revision of the law, made an important statement in the Commons. Mr. Morel’s motion invited the Government to negotiate with other Powers for such a revision of the

laws of naval warfare as would secure immunity to all private property, except in the case of ships carrying material oi war or attempting to violate a blockade. To this Sir Edward Grey replied that ‘ the Government could not consider or accept any motion committing them to the abolition of the right of blockade in time of war. But if that question were eliminated, they could discuss the matter in a much less uncompromising spirit. The Government could not say pointblank that they were prepared to agree to the abolition of the right of capture of private property at sea, but their attitude had never been irreconcilable, and the question was one which they would have to consider more carefully before the next Hague Conference. ‘ His own belief was that there was no reason why they should not devote their efforts, not to supplying their delegates with arguments for opposing the proposals, but to examining the conditions on which they could safely instruct their delegates to accept such a resolution.’ These conditions he then proceeded to define as ‘ (1) a recognised understanding as to a blockade ; (2) a very strict understanding with regard to contraband; (3) a quid pro quo in the matter of floating mines.’ ‘ In his instructions to the British delegates at the second Hague Conference,’ says the Manchester Guardian, ‘ Sir Edward Grey held out the hope that if foreign nations would agree to restrict their armaments on land we might agree to restrict our powers of offence at sea. His personal views, as he frankly admitted, have been modified since then. He no longer balances our retention of the right of capture of private property at sea against the European military system on land; he is, apparently, willing to consider the abolition of this right on conditions which relate solely to maritime war and have nothing to do with war upon land. The Admiralty Blocks the Way. ‘ If there is any risk that serious naval war would diminish our profits as the carriers of the world’s trade, would send up the prices of food and the raw materials of our industries, and would throw our people out of employment just when the prices of the necessaries of life were bounding up, that risk is entirely due to the retention by the Admiralty of the right to capture the property of the enemy at sea. For the sake of naval power the Admiralty threatens to throw away what makes the possession of naval power a necessity for this country. The broad fact is that the Admiralty at this moment, by its insistence on the retention of the right of capture, is the most dangerous foe to the security of our sea-borne supplies in time of war, and to the abundant employment and sustenance of the people when the strain on the nation would bo most severe.’ Opposition to the Abolition. The case against any change in' the present law has been strongly put by the Sew Statesman, which says that * the Liberal and Labor case for declaring private property to be immune from capture at sea rests on three arguments: (1) that as Great Britain depends more on her merchant shipping in war time than any- other country, she would gain most by an agreement that such shipping should be immune ; (2) that the German navy has -built to protect the German mercantile marine, and therefore that to declare that marine immune would relax Anglo-German naval competition; (3) that the capture of merchantmen at sea is a barbarous anachronism, a relic of piracy, which human progress ought to eliminate from war.’ ,4 ■■ And the New Statesman then proceeds to say that 'the third argument may be curtly dismissed since ‘ all war is a barbarous anachronism, but it is hardly progress to begin by eliminating the least inhumane of its alternative methods. Nor is the second argument that about Anglo-German naval competitionmuch more tenable, for, while the British Government has been willing to consider the immunity of shipping in conjunction with an agreement to reduce armaments, the German Government has consistently declined to

reduce armaments on this or any other [suggested ground. We are thus left, with the single argument about the advantage to Great Britain of having her own enormous merchant shipping immune from capture in war time. But in the first place, even if the immunity were absolute, the possibility of military invasion would compel us still to maintain a preponderant Navy, as being by far the best means of defending our islands, and the only means of defending our oversea Empire. Secondly, it could not be absolute, and no one could predict how far it would bo observed.’ And, moreover, no country can defend itself unless it has some power of attack. The capture of merchantmen and the institution of blockades are the only offensive weapons that a purely naval Power possesses. If wo gave them up we should have to develop a non-naval weapon instead —i.e., become a military Power like the other Powers.’ Support of Shipping Interests. On the other hand, emphatic resolutions were unanimously adopted by the shipping representatives of eleven nations at their conference in London against the existing rights of belligerents to capture and confiscate private property not contraband of war, and calling upon the Governments of the maritime nations to take into early consideration the question of abolishing such rights. At this conference ‘ the address of the president, Mr. W. J. Noble, of Newcastle, was,’ says the Daily Scut, ‘ a remarkably clear presentment of an overwhelming case. he object of the resolution he defined as being to substitute the real and inexpensive protection of law for the unreal and costly protection of competitive armaments.” ’ ‘As shipowners,’ he said, they objected to the retention of the right of capture, as it placed upon them an unfair burden, and one not borne by any other members of the community. Liability for capture not only meant large armaments, but was calculated also to encourage privateering. No navy, however powerful, could completely protect its merchant marine. This was practically admitted by the arming of fast liners by some of the Great Powers, who evidently now realised that, in time of war, only such vessels would be able to trade, and that for all practical purposes the ordinary mercantile marine would be nonexistent.’ Promotion of Goodwill. ‘ We agree with Sir Edward Grey,’ says the Daily Citizen, 1 that a step will have been taken toward the solution of the armaments problem if there is ‘‘a growing belief among the great nations of the world that they have good intentions towards one another.” We can imagine nothing that will do more to promote their friendlier feelings than the sweeping aside by all countries of this piratical right of capture, and we are glad that the Government has at last become convinced that it is not to our interests that we should “pose as being the champion obstacle.” That, beyond question, has been the position of this country in the past.’ Set Commerce Completely Free. Summing up the discussion of this subject, the Manchester Guardian contends that abolition of capture would ‘ complete for this country the emancipation of our commerce from the fetters imposed upon it. The existence of the right of capture is as certainly a tax on trade and commerce in the supposed interest of the Navy as the old Corn Laws were a tax on commerce for the supposed benefit of agriculture. The continued retention of this right of booty is the clearest possible case of obstruction, in the interests of a department, of the greatest and most vital national interests. It is a new species of Protectionist preference preference of a department over the whole of the rest of the nation. The time has come when it should be overthrown.’ .