THE HOME RULE BILL.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume XXI, Issue XXI, 7 April 1893, Page 25

THE HOME RULE BILL.

MR. GLADSTONE'S SPEECH.

(£<m£iA?<a£.) Having said so much, I proceed to endesvour in snch a way as I on, and I must farther ask the kind and patient indulgence of the Home, to give some intelligible account of the Bill I desire to lay on the table. Ido not undertake to snpply what may be called a table of the contentß of tbe Bill. I tbiDk if I did 1 Bhould probably bewilder my bearers, and completeness would be much more than balanced by practical obscurity. What I shall seek to do ie to present to the notice of tbe House the scheme, and the principal and Bilient points of the scheme, and leave, it I can, some living impreßsioD of its character on the minds.and memories of those who bear me. Of course, within limite, there may be differences of opinion on tbe question which are the principal peints. I may introduce some that, in tbe view of come gentlemen, are not principal. I may omit others that, in the view of other gentlemen, ought to have been mentioned. My only answer to that is to beg that the gentlemen will for themselves, as soon as they are able, and I trust it will be vtry soon indeed, consult the Bill itself. I may say in one word that it will be remembered, or may be remembered, that in 1885 there were five propositions laid down as cardinal principles from which there ought to be no departure. To those five principles we have endeavoured closely to adhere. Changes there have been, far from unimportant changes, but not, I think, in any measure trenching on any of those declared principles of 1886 which were stated. The object of the Bill was stated, and it remains the object of the Bill, with regard to which everything else is secondary or conditional. The object of the Bill was to establish a legislative body sitting in Dublio for the conduct of both legislation and administration in Irish as distinct from Imperial affairs (hear, hear), and (he limiting conditions which I say were then observed and have since, so far as we were able to do it, been sedulously and closely observed were these — We should do nothing inconsistent with Imperial unity —with that Imperial unity of which I will gay in passing, I know it will not be admitted that we are right, but, so far as our convictions and intentionß are concerned, they would be but feebly couched in the declaration that we did not mean to impair it. We wish to strengthen it (loud cheers). We wish to give it a greater intensity than it has ever yet possessed, and we believe that a wise extension of these privileges of local Belf-government has been shown by experience to be tbe most effective instrument for U c purpose (cheers). First, this Imperial unity was to be observed ; secondly, tbe equality of all tbe kingdoms was to be borne in mind ; thirdly, there was to be an equitable repartition of Imperial charges ; fourthly, any and every practicable provision for the protection of minorities was to be adopted ; and fifthly, the plan that was to be propped ought to be such as, at least in the judgment of its proposers, presented the necessary characteristics, I will not say of finality, because that is a discredited word, but of a real and continued set'lement. Well, that is the basis on which we continue to stand, and I will low state the main points in which we have endeavoured to give effect to it (hear, hear). In the first place, we have desired so to make what we tbiDk no unreasonable plan for the express settlement of the question of supremacy. There are two modes in which that might be done. It may be done by clause and|by Jpreamble. We ha7e chosen the preamble as t c worthier and better, for if it were done by clause it would bar too much the character of mere enactment, whereas it is a radical and cardinal principle underlying each and every enactment, and it is far better in our rew to notice and acknowledge reverentially in the preamble than to give to it the character of some d<cision which might be supposed to be a novel decision of Parliament and expose it to the cbtnee of any attack which such an enactment might entail.

It is not necessary to say many words for such a purpose. Onr words are : " Whereas it is expedient without impairing or restricting tbe supreme authority of Parliament," and then it goes on to declare tbe creation of a legislature, to which I will come, and what I wish to point out is this, with reference to the charge frequently, and I have no doubt in good faith, made against as that we are destroying the Act of Union. I wish to challenge an inquiry upon this plain and fundamental point. What is the essence of the Act of Union ((hearr r hear) ? I wish gentlemen would ask themselves that question— what is the essence of the Act of Union j That essence ii to be appreciated by the comparing the constitution of things that were to be found in this country before 1800 with the constitution of things now subsisting in England. Before 1800 we had two sovereignties in tbe country. One of those sovereignties collectively lodged in the King, the House of Lords, the House of Commons of England, and the other collectively lodged in the King, the House of Lords, and House of Commons in Irelaod, and there was no right in the true public sense, the historical and legal sense, no mere tight in the sovereignty residing in Great Britain to interfere with the sovereignty planted in Ireland than there was in the sovereignty planted in Ireland, bad it been strong enongh, to interfere with tbe sovereignty planted in England. Sir, tbe Act of Union made the kingdoms into one and tbe sovereignties into one, and the incorporation of Parliaments was a measure subsidiary to the Union, subsidiary and instrumental. That incorporation is the question which we raise, and which we wish particularly, under tbe conditions of the present Bill, not entirely to alter. The essence of the Act of Union was to establish the unity of the country, so that the body thereby constituted the sovereignty was to be a body entitled to exercise those rights of sovereignty equally and completely throughont the entire range of the thret kingdoms. So it was, and so the reader of this Bill, and indeed of the Bill of 1886, though with that I have nothing to do now, will find it remains. Then, sir, the Bill constitutes an Irish Legislature. Power is granted to the Irish Legislature, which coneists, first of all, of a legislative assembly empowered and here I quote the words of the Bill—" To make laws for the peace, order and good government of Ireland in respect of matters exclusively relating to Ireland or Bom 9 part thereof." That, sir, is subject to the double limitation which I will describe in a moment. First of all, it is subject to necessary and obvious limitations. The heads reserved to Parliament — not to reserve those heads as giving them to Parliament, but to reserve them by way of excludine tbe new Irish Legislature from doing anything in relation to the other will impose certain incapacities on tbe Irish Parliament, The heads reserved will be very short, and I may enumerate them. All that relates to the Crown Regency and Viceroya2ty, all that relates to peace or war, all that relates to defence, all that relates to treaties and defence, all that relates to foreign relations and dignities and to dignities and titles. Tne law of treason will not belong to it. The law of alienage will not belong to it, and everything that belongs to external trade— and upon that point I should make a remark by-and-by — and the subject of coinage and some other subsidiary subjects. Then, as regards tbe incapacities imposed, gentlemen have already been made familiar with this in the Bill of 1886. I will only describe them as relating to town subjec' s in these most large and general terms by way of a Blight sketch. They are intended for tbe I security of religious freedom and there they touch upon establishments and education, and for the security of personal freedom, in respect to which we have endeavoured to borrow— l hope without trenching upon any just sentiment of Irish patriotism— we have en1 deavoured to borrow, where we thought we could safely borrow, one of the modern amendments to the American Constitution. Then I come to executive powers, to change which, I think, is generally i recognised as reasonable. Given our main proposition— that is, to place the Viceroyalty of Ireland so as to divest it as far as we can of the party character which it has hitherto borne (Irish cheers), and I does bear to a degree far from desirable— this will be the first time that there has been any s'atutory appointment, and the appointment shall usually run five or six years, but subject to, of course, the revoking power of the Crown. That is tbe first part with regard to the Viceroyalty. The second point is that if the Bill become law it is to be freed from all religious disabilities (cheers). Religious disabilities may bave been used, which I thjnk was very improper and inadvisable, evtn before tbe abolition of the Irish Church as an estab'isbnaent, but snce that aboh'ion they have become really

nothing leas than preposterous (cheers). Then comes a clause which may be considered formal, though it is, of course, of great importance, providing for the full devolution of executive power from tbe Sovereign upon the Viceroy. Then comes the important provision for tbe appointment of the executive committee of the Privy Council in Ireland. Now, if the practice of ths Irißh Privy Council was the came as in England, I am not sure tbat we should have required snch an enactment, because in England there is no assumption by members of the Privy Council especially, unless they are specially invited to discbarge any real or important duties. But in Ireland tbe line i 9 not so carefully drawn between the merely honorary Privy memberships and tbe positive discharge of duties, and we propose to make this Executive for ordinary affairs and Council the Cabinet of the Viceroy (hear, hear). The question arises— Shall there be any legislative council at all ? We have decided there ought to be a legislative council, and upon these two grounds— first of all, upon the ground of general experience ; for, looking oat over the world, and looking out, I may say, over the whole circumscription, the whole circumference of the British Enapire, experience, I don't think, recognises or perhaps warrants our resorting, without just necessity or some strong peculiar recommendation, to a system of a single chamber. ButJ in Ireland, bo far from finding any such necessity or recommendation , we look to the legislative council as, on the contrary, affording us tbe most constitutional, the moßt unexceptional methods of redeeming that pledge — at any rate of endeavouring to meet that expectation which we have repeatedly held out — tbat we would if we could give to the minority in Ireland some means of local expression and of receiving a fair, full and deliberate consideration for itß views, though I do not say it should do that whioh has been done ia Ireland for so many centuries, viz, that the voice of the minority should overrule, absorb, and suppress the voice of the nation at large (cheers). The next thing is — Bhall it be nominated or elected 1 Well, sir, there we come to this conclusion : a nominated council is a weak council (Ministerial cheers). If it be made a weak council, and tbat council attempt to make itself in any respect troublesome, such council, being at once troublesome and weak, would probably come to enj >y a very short term of existence. Therefore, sir, we propose an elective council, believing tbat to be the only form in which we can give any great force to the vitality of tbe institution. Well, then, how do we differentiate this council — you may justly ask— from the popular assembly ? I will say, sir, we do not differentiate by qualifications imposed upon the councillors analogous to those which used to exist with reference to members of this House, and which, if they existed now, would deprive us of some among our colleagues whose presence we value in the highest degree (Ministerial cheers). We do not propose to adopt that discarded method, but we do this — in the first place we propose to take tbe number which it is proposed to give at 48 ; in tbe second place we take the term of office which it is proposed to fix at eight years — the term of tbe assembly being a lower term ; we then constitute a new constituency of the council — a constituency which, in the first place, must be associated with a value above £20. I may say tbat with that figure we hope to secure an aggregate conatitueccy approaching 1,700,000 pereons An bon member — £20 what ? Mr Gladstone — Twenty pounds rateable value. In that constituency I have included owners as well as occupiers, but sabject to the provision tbat no one person, whether owner or occupier, baa a vote in more than one constituency (Ministerial cheers). Lastly, the only characteristic I may mention ia that there is no provision in the Bill to make the Legislative Council alterable by Irish Acts. Then with regard to the Legislative Assembly, it has appeared to us to be highly inconvenient tbat we should attempt t> alter the numbers of the Legislative assembly If we were to increase it, we do not know what the result ought to be. If we were to reduce it, I think we •hould run very serious risk of causing practical inconvenience in Dublin, and especially at the time wheD the functions of internal government came to be newly exercised, and when probably there would be a great deal to do. We, therefore, leave the number at 103. We fix a term of five years. We leave the constituency as it ia now We contemplate tbat these 103 members must not, in order to fulfil

the spirit of the Constitution, pass from hence to the chamber in Dab • I<h by our authority, bat that they ought to be elected for Irish legislative business by the constituencies in Ireland ; and, lastly, we males these provisions as to the Assembly alterable with respect to electors and constituencies. The power of the Assembly would be limited by a declaration in the Act that there must be due regard had to the distribution of population. Well, then, it would be necessary, as we think, to consider in the Bill a promt on for the purpose of meeting what is callsd ■ dead-lock, and oar provision is this : In case where a Bill has been adopted by the Assembly more than one*, and where there is an interval between the two adoption*, either of two j*um or else marked by a dissolution of Parliament, then upon the second adoption the two Assemblies may be requested to meet together, and the fate of the Bill is to decided by the joint Assembly (cheers). Now, sir, I must run through with great rapidity a number of enactmenU of the Bill which I should not be justified in omitting, but which I shall not attempt to explain in detail, but I merely wish to show they have been provided for. First of all, appeals, it has been proposed, shall lie with tbe Privy Council alone, and not with the Privy Council and the House of Lords. Nsxt, the Privy Council may try the question of the invalidity of an Irish Act, and try it, of coarse judicially, and with a reasonable jadgment may try the question of invalidity, or of what ia sometimes called a question of ultra irires, not, however, upon the initiative of irresponsible persons, but upon the initiative either of the Viceroy or of the Secretary of Sta'e. Mr Balfoor— Tbe Irish ? Mr Gladstone— No, the Judicial Committee. The right bon gentleman will remember that was recognised by us in 1886, and is now recognised by us as the only approach we can make to ths Supreme Court of the United States, and, of course, I need not say that, in the composition of that judicial court, due regard must be had to the different claims of nationality (cheers). I do not apprehend any difficulty upon that subject. We declare tbe judges irremovable. That is quite enough, bat, at the same time, I really must say there is something quaint in our being so jealous of the judges as against the Irish Parliament, when it is recollected that the English Government in the days of its supremacy in Ireland, never lifted a finger to make the judges irremovable. They were not irremovable, and they would ' not have served the purposes of tbe English Government as well it they had bee a irremovable (a laugh). We bave got clausta to provide for the security of the emolument both of existing jadpes and of existing officers generally. Then there is a clause which is in* tended to correspond to and to supply, as far as needful, the purpose of what is sometimss called the colonial validity law. The effect of that clause is to provide this, that if the Irish Legislature pass an Act in any respect contrary to Acts of Parliament, tbat Act shall be good except so far as it is contrary. Tbat will dispose of any controversy upon tbat portion of tbe sabject. We provide that two exchequer judges shall be appointed under the authority of the Crown — that is to say, under tbe Great Seal of the United Kingdom, for. the purpose mainly cf financial business, of tbat business which is Imperial, be* cause there are certain matters with regard to which we shall not be able to exclude altogether the ordinary action of tbt British law. Besides the appointment of the exchequer judges, it will be provided that for six years all judges shall be appointed as they now are, and it will be understood that tbat is merely a method of dividing jurisdiction, because wa do not reserve to the Imperial Parliament any power to fix the emoluments. These emoluments will be fixed in Ireland. The effect will be to establish a joint control over these appointments. We believe that the month of September will probably be the most convenient time of the year for the Assembly to meet, and, therefore, there is a clause in the Bill providing that the Legislature shall meet on the first Tuesday in September (loud and prolonged Irish cheers). There are clauses securing tbe sole initiative of moving Bills to the Assembly, also providing tbat the Aasembly should not have within itself an initiative except upon the prior initiative of the Viceroy. Then there is also a clause in regard to fioancial arrangem nts which I will proceed to state immediately. There iB also a clause providing that they shall reconsider ihe matter after fifteen years, upon an address, either fiom the House of Com* njons or the Legislative Assembly. The principles which we recognise

aa applicable tt> the consideration of the important question connected with the cons'a v uilary ar« these— their gradual reduction, their ultimate dissolution or disHppearai.ee, our fu'l recognition and dischirge of every obliga ion towards them in Buch a way aa I hops we ■hall see that the interests of that remarkable and honourable force will not be adversely affected by the passing of such a measure as that now before the House. During the period of transition they will be uuder the control of the Viceroy aa tbe representative of the Crown. But of course it is to be contemplated tbat they are to be replaced by a fore« owi g its existence lo Irish authority. Therefore, wa propose and contemplate that, upon the gradual establishment by Irish authorities in local areas cf a sufficient new police force, the constabulary shall be withdrawn piecemeal from the local areas one •fter another. I have left out thus far two subj eti of the greatest importance ia tie consideration of the matter. Oae of these ia the grave controversy which arose in connection with the dictation of Irish leaders ia Ireland. It is urged that it is important to deal with Ireland in a spirit of prudence, or in a spirit of circumspection, or a spirit even of j«alou y, but this is a subject in a great measure taken out of our hands, at least to this extent, that, whereas in 1886 we proposed to allow the Irish representatives to drop entirely oat of this Honse, we have yielded to what we believe to be— we are not infallible —to be a public wish, that the Irish representatives should be retained (cheers). That j reface to the sabject is ao easy matter, but we shall not get on quite as smoothly as we proceed tj deal with its details, for, I mast say, whether we were right or wrong in 1886— a question on which I give no opinion, for it is immaterial— whether we were right or wrong in our view of the difficulties, the pracical difficulties, attending the retention of the Irish members we were far from being ia error. Strong laoguage of mine is often quoted with respect to my difficulties. I am boned to say, looking back after sevan years an ' admitting that that language wbb, I might almost say, impromptu language, on a repeated [consideration of tbe subject 1 cannot say tbat it was exaggerated. 1 ought to say with regard to the constabulary, one point was thai we h >pc the transfer m*y take place, and it may be found posfble to encourage them from the old to the new and proper Irish course, As I said, the dttails of the arrangements— Borne of them— will be preserved until a lattr etagp. Sir, on the important eubj ct of the ie en ion of the Irish numbers, I do not regard it, and Lever have regarded it, as touching wbat are sometimes called the five principles of the Bill. It is tot included in any one of them, but whether it be a principle, or whether it be not, tbere is nj ques ion that it is a very weighty, and if I may any s->, organic detail which cuts latler deep in tome respects into the composition of the Bill. Now, Ido not at all dissemble tbat there are strong arguments which may be alleged in defence of the retention of the lmh members for which we are nbout to propose a specific plan. But there is one argument that 1 must put aside. I thmk it a mos dangerous atgument, and in itself quite untt nable-the argument of those who say tbat unltss you retain tbe liish members theie is no Parliamentaiy supremacy ov<r Ireland. I entirely decline to admit that argument, and I &ay if jou do admit it, a; oneetroke you shatter and destroy the Parliamentary supremacy in this country, I might almost say beyoni the limits of the Qaited Kingdom, over the vast and varied colonies of the Empire. I pass on from that, and though I do not at all admit that the Parliamentary supremacy depmds upon the retention of ihe Irish numbers, yet I quite admit this, that tbe retention of the Irihh members has a great prac ical impor ance, because it vh-iUy exhibits that supremacy in a manner intelligible to the people, and exhibits it in a slate of action. Besides that, it gives Ireland what perhaps at the present moment she cannot be expected so keenly to feel about— but wbat I hope at an early period she will come to feel very much «bout— it gives to Ireland, or may give to Ireland, a voice, and a lull voice upon all Impeiial matters (hear, hear) ; and thirdly, it has this advantage. We cannot in our financial arrangements get rid of all financial connection between the two countries unless you are prepared to face the very inexpedient and inconvenient system of difJdrent sets of treaties and trade laws. That being so it mant be that British budgets will have more or less an influence upon Irish pecuniary balances, and it is, iherefore, highly desirable that. Ireland 6hould have something to say to these British budgets, llusr are a<gumenta in favour of the retention of the Irish members, and I reuliy know of no argument against the retention of Irish members, provided they are willing to take the trouble and

bear the charge of coming here for the purpose of discharging the public buoinesp. I know do argument of an abstract, theoretical, or cooßtitu ionsl character against their retention, but the argument against it tbat I do not mend to revert to, the old expression which has become rather familiar, I do not think it is in the wit of man to devise a plan for their retention which shall not be open to some serious practical difficulties ("cheers). My object here is to open oat and open up the whole question for the judgment of the House (bear, hear). Giving due weight to these considerations, I will endeavour to open out the nature of these inconveniences. They tarn oo two points— first, as to members ; and secondly, as to voting power. Tbe first question, that of number, is this. Is Ireland to be fully represented in this House (hear, hear) 1 Well, probably the feeling bf the House will be in favour cf an affirmative answer to that qaestion, and then arises another difficulty, and which, no doubt, can be got over, but which must not be altogether overlooked—what is the fall representation of Ireland (hear, hear) ? In 1884 this House treated Ireland in what I thought a wise, but undoubtedly a liberal, spirit (hear, hear). It was some compensation for the gross illiberality with which she was treated at the time of the Union with respect to her representation. In a liberal spirit she was aseigned 103 members. That number was then beyond wbat, according to calculations of population in this country and Ireland, Ireland was admitted to and claimed. Unhappily that disparity bae since been aggravated by a doable process. The population of Great Britain has continued to increase, while the population of Ireland, to our great regret, hat continued to diminish, and it has now reached the point that, whereas formerly, according to the ratio of population, Ireland was entitled to 103 members, she would, according to the same ratio, now only have the reduced number of 80. Hon. members will remember that in all tLese calculations I am dealing with round figures ai being more convenient for general comprehension than descending to minute aud petty details. Now, what 1 come to is this. Supposing there is a general sentiment that Ireland ought to be fully represented, then, also, theie ought to be a general determination to interpret that full representation according to the proportion of population as existing in lieland and other parts of the kingdom. In speaking of full representation then, I imply that the representation of Ireland in this House would be 80 Irish gentlemen, and, of course, it follows there would have to be an election of those 80 members in Ireland. It would be impossible, and the House would probably be indisposed, to recognise a commission given to 103 members as voters, when it had been determined that 80 were the proper number. The question may be raised— Can we go below 80? It may bo said -arid 1 caanot couctal fn;m myself the possibility— that in the partially developed state of its pDll;ic<»l life, of the practice of Leal gove nment, aDd the large prevalence of centralisation, that to supply tha full number for the Legislature in Dublin* and likewise to supply 80 members to the Imperial Parliament would Lot bo convenient to lieland. However, that may be met. There is ih's difficulty, tbat if Ireland is represented by 30 or 40 tkt effect and or juct of tbe retention would not be gained, because the voice of lrelai,d, the vote jf Ireland, would not be adequately heard and given upon tboee Imperial qiMStions in wtich Ireland, if she chooses to a^ert it, has just as deep, as vital, and large an inteiest ai England (cheers). Therefore the representation by 80 members will b 3 the first question. I won't enter into details on the mode in which we have arranged that, but we have endeavoured to arrange a schedule of the Bill in such a manner that this Imperial representation will practically not clash in apy inconvenient way with tbe representation in the Legislature in Dublin, which is to rtmain in tbe hands of tbe Irish authorities. Well, sir, here is a greater difficultj—What is to be the voting power of those 80 members (cheew aod laughter) ? That ie, if I may call it an article of diet— if lam to suppose lam providing the House with diet— that is an article of diet which I am afraid will be found, decide it which way you will, somewhat indigestible (lond laughter). The question ia this I« Ireland to be represented here in ful, ? That is my first postulate. Ireland is to be invested in full— that is my second postulate— with separate powers, subject, no doubt, to Imperial authority, yet still, aa we trust from experience, a practically separate and independent power, as it id in other legislatures of the Empire. Ireland is to be en lowed with separate powers over Irish affairs. Then the question before us now is -Is she, or is she not, to vote ao strong upon matters purely British ? I think that in that question there is material Buffi.

dent to exercise in a masculine and beneficial way all the nflective and reasoning powers of the House (laughter and cheers). My question is— ls Ireland to vote so strong under the two postulaUs as I hare stated on purely British queationg, and I propose the question ia a true parliamentary form, "Aye" or "No"? There are reasons both ways (laughter). I will go farther aod say that in my opinion there are strong reasons both ways (renewed laughter). I will go a little farther yet, and say that I hava no absolute certainty in my own mind what view the House of Commons will take of this question (loud laughter and cheers). I hope the House will tako the right view. A full and impartial exposition will bring out, (0 far as I am able, the different elements upon which in whole or ia part their judgment will have to rest. First, I take the argument in favour of their voting so strong mind you, upon purely British questions (a laugh). One argument is that to which I nude reference ia 1886. We cannot cut them off in a manner perfectly clean and dear from these questions. We cannot find an absolute and accurate line of cleavage between questions that are Imperial and questions that are Irish (cheers). More or less we must, unless we art going to allow them to vote on all British questions fa laugh)— don't anticipate too rapidly what we are going to do— unless they are allowed to vote on all British questions Ireland must, I believe, have something too little or too much, because there are questions which defy our efforts to arrange them with accuracy and precision on the proper side of the line as either English or Irish. There are some subjects of difficult detail which I have no doubt would arise in determining the competency of Irish members to vote. But the main question undoubtedly is, that we did not see in 1886, and we do not see now, the possibility of excludiog them from what is one of the highest and most important among all the functions of this Hooße, namely, determining the composition of the executive power. A vote of confidence is only a simple declaration, but it may be otherwise. But it m»y be, and it is, in the option of movers to make it a motion simply declarttory of the will of the House, I don't ccc— and I don't think anyone will differ on this subject— how it is possible to exclude Irish members remaining in this House from voting on that great subject. Well that is the first argument The Dext argument is this, and I own it touches me nearly and cuts deep, if I may so say, into the mind and heart of anyone with long experience in Parliament, and whose life has been associated for many years with the govjrnment of this country t It is this— Unless Irish members vote on all questions you break a great Parliamentary tradition That great Parliamentary tradition is the absolute equality of members of this House (cheers). I cannot say. sir, what a value I for one attech to that principle of absolute Parliamen'ary equality. Be a maa young or old, rich or poor, be he from the ranks of the highest nobility, or a representative of the working classes, be his powers what they maj, be his Btanding here what it may, I bo' 4 that in defiance of all merely conventional consideration? the essential equality of members of tbh House is a principleof deepest consequence. It for as a part, a fundamental part of the environment ia which we live and which, to a large extent, enters into and makes us what we are (cheers). Ia wh \t degree and manner that {quality is valued is another question, but anyone who considers the practical working oat of plans of this kind will agree with me that the presence of eighty members in this House with only limited powers of voting is a serious breach of eatablishe i Parliamentary tradition, and is a breach which, whether you resolve to face it or not, ought to be made subject to yonr moat careful consideration. Now I come to the reasons— they are not long— against the universal voting power. My first reason is an extension of a reason stated the other way which I have given to the House. It is difficult to say everything oa that side is Irish, and everything on this side is Imperial. That, I think, you cannot do. But. undoubtedly, you can draw the distinction as to thegreater matter of business. If you ask me for a proportion of it, I say nine-tenths, nineteen-twentieths, perhaps n>nety-niue-hundredths of the business of Parliament can without difficulty be classed as Irish or Imperial. The question of cleavage has not always appeared so. Then there is a great anomaly, I should admit it to be a formidable anomaly, aod it woul J be a great anomaly, I think, that those eighty Irish members should come here— no doubt with the most upright intention— and adding to the stock of abi ity, of which we have had experience (bear, hear)— lt would be a great anomaly that they should continually intervene in questions purely and absolutely British, questions affecting perhaps not only the United kingdom, but sections of the United Kingdom, and, so far as these questions are concerned, the vote might be deemed a great necessity. It is not, in my opinion, a strong argument to urge against the Irish members, and I am myself wishful to speak in a spirit of trust of all, for I believe that suspicion is the besetting vice of politicians (cheere), but, after all, we must not shut our eye?, so that we may not leave an easy door of entrance to a string temptation, I say nothiog against the personal character of men, but I cannot deny, I will not «ay that there have not been parties, but they cannot deny that there may be parties that might descend to intrigue for party purposes (laughter). If some very laige question or controversy! Bri ish, or entirely British, but atill of d«ep and vital importance for

severing the two great parties in this House arose, and that members of the House, parties knowing that they could bring orer eighty members from Ireland to snpport their views, I am afraid of opening in a case like that a possible door to wholesale and dangerous political intiigna (heaT, hear, and laughter). I hope hon members do not think that I am throwing ia the disagreeable delineation, that I have entered upon the infirmities of human nature upon one side in this House (laughter). I am rather supposing that the initiative comes from this side of the Channel (hear, hear), and that, actuated by some warm lore of country, they have yielded to the temptation, but still, after all, we are bound to consider a sta'e of things which wonld lay the way open to intrigue when the reset of British questions might be decided under Irish motives, and it is a thing from which we have suffered, and it cannot be avoided so long as the present state of things continues (cheers). The liishmen sit in this House with the welfare of Ireland as their supreme, paramount, overruling desire. I am speaking now of party conditions, and Ido not blame them when a British qiestion comes before this House that they are guided by the motive of terminating the wrongs of their country (cheers). Well, sir, it appears to me to be a most awkward question. I think even the point of anom.ly is serious. 1 think it is not merely anomaly as we may view it in this Home, it is a view that would claim the attention of English and Scotch members, and we would not understand why, by Irish votes, some question— we may say of education or some other matter, in which there was deep and profound interest in no respect Irish— we would not understand why, that being a local matter, its fate was to be determined by those who have a separate and exclusive power to determine the same question for themselves. As to the other contingency, the mixture, and even the possibility of the larger mixture, of impure motives between some party on this side of the water with a view of makiog use of Irish influence for the decision of an important question of purely British interest by indirect means and by holding out inducements connected with the welfare of Ireland, as that Irish members were to be paid, as it were, in a coin not legitimate for their services, I confess that lam not able to faca— my colleagues, on the whole, find themselves not well able to face— a contingency such as that. There are, I believe, very great difficulties. The difficulties we have felt, on the whole, most bard to anrmount are those to which I have last referred, and the consequence is that we have inserted in the Bill certain provisions contemplating the full retention of the fnll number of Irish members. We have inserted in the Bill provisions for the limitation of their voting power, and we have inserted in the Bill a covering proposition which I think is of the greatest importance—namely, this, that the decision of each House of Parliament shall be absolute and final upon all occasions that may arise, so that we may not run the faintest risk of getting this authority— this great authority— into collision with any other judicial or other authority. I will state very briefly what the limitations are. First of all, the Irish Memb ra are to be excluded from voting on any Bill or motion expressly confined to Great Britain ; secondly, on any tax not levied in Ireland ; thirdly, on any vote or appropriation of money otherwise than for Imperial service ; and there should be no difficulty in this, because in the schedule of the Bill we enumerate all the services which by law would stand as Imperial ; lonrthly, any motion or resolution, exclusively affecting Great Britain, or things or persons therein. I have re »d these instructions shortly, and, therefore, they will be indulgently construed as to precision, and then thare is a covering resolution— covering limitation -excluding them from any motion or resolution incidental to any of the foregoing, sxcept the first. The first was, any Bill cr motion expressly confined to Great Britain. You will understand why a Bill was made expressly confined to Great Britain. They could vote upon, Bnd were not excluded from voting upon a motion incidental to it. It has appeared to ns that when a Bill or motion exclusively relates to Great Britain, there should be some power of raising the question whether that Bill or motion ought to be extended to Ireland. Well, sir, I know there are those who will say :— <• You have set out to us with tolerable fairness as well as yon can all the difficulties connected with this Irish Legislation, but the conclusion we have come to is that the whole basinets yoa have undertaken is fnll of thorns and brambles " (loud Opposition cheers and laughter). Sir, th« object of this Bill is autonomy and self-government for Ireland in matters purely Irish. The Irish did not raise this difficulty (Irish cheers). They were willing to accept that autonomy, and to take your terms, whatever they might be, as to sitting here or not sitting here (h«ar, hear), bot we, for onr own purposes, have thought it right that there should be provisions for retaining them. Could there be anything more unstateemanlike or anything more ungenerous than to avail ourselves of our own wrong, when they had met us freely and frankly, and had accepted exclusion from this House ? I have atated the case of retention or non-retention, and, important as is the case, it in secondary to the great purpose we have in view. A secondary aim ought not to interfere with that which is the principal object in view. It was the beet plan which, after much labour and con ideration, we can make. We have, however, « freling that a shade of uncertainty may hang over the tubject, aod this we have faintly and moderately iodicated by affixing to the enacting clause the words, " excepting, and until, Parliament shall determine." {Concluded in our newt.)