WAR IN THE FUTURE.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume XIX, Issue 6, 7 November 1890, Page 11

WAR IN THE FUTURE.

In the future wars railways, the number of which in Europe is daily increasing, will play an unprecedently important part, not only strategically, but also tactically. For mob.lisation and concentration at tbe outset of war their value was ahowa in 1870 ; with armies of increased sizs they will be still more essential. After the commence* ment of operations they will still occasionally — especially in tha case of the army which assumes the defensive— be us«d for the rapid conveyance ot troops, but as a rule they will chiefly be emp oyed for the transport of food and stores. It has been calculated by the Americans, from the experience ot their great civil war, that to supply an army ia the field of a hundred thousand men by meao9 of a single line of rails there should ba twenty-rive loonutivea and six freight carriages to every mile of road. It is therefore evident tnat even with double lines an army of a hundred thousand men worki >g a hundred miles from its base would require — setting aside the requir - ments of sieges — au immense quantity of rolling stock. As to the movement of troops by rail, experience on the Continent shows thattiaie is not gained when the proportion of bayonets and sabres to a mile of double line is greater than four hundred and thirty-five. Apart, therefore, from the fact that once the arruy in the field, the railway resouices will be absorbed in bringing up stores and taking back sick and wounded, the railway transport of troops will seldom be proa" able for an army oq the offensive. The strain on the railways needed for the conveyance of food and stores will be largely augmented, seeing that in all probability the siza of armies will be much increased. Tha limit to thdir aiza will, in fact, ba practically determined by tbe canying capacity of toe railways. Hence, two things aie obvious : First, that for strategical operations railways will, after the commencement of a campaign, bo used comparatively little ; second, that even if onlye mployed for the transport of storeß, their capacity will have to be largely increased by the addition ot sidings, the construction of platforms, and tha doubling of lines. For this retson all armies are daily paying iucreased attention to the formation, augmentation, and training of military railway battalions, we, perhaps, least of all. For operations which lie in tbe border lane between tactics anl strategy, occasional use with great effect will piobably be made of rai ways for the conveyance of tro>ps for short distances. Had Bazaine turned his railway facilities tj full account at Forbac i tae result of that battle migit have been different. It can easily be understood that, thougn there would be no saving of time in transporting an army corps, with all its impediments, a distance of thirty mi es by railway, it would bu feasible and desirable to convey a brigade of four battalions, with a field battery attached, a distance of fifuen mikß. la the former case 185 trains would be required, and the operation, under the most favourable cirenmstances, would occupy four days. In the latter case the troops moving with nothing but mea, officers, chargers, and what the French call a train de combat, the whole force could be transported to its destination in two hours from the time tbe first man entered to the time the last man quitted the train. As to armour clad trains, they will on exceptional occasions be used and be of great value, aa was shown in the case of Sir Archibald Alison's operations at Alexandria in the first Egyptian war. — Col. Knollys in the Fortnightly Review.