CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume III, Issue 151, 24 March 1876, Page 7

CONDITION OF THE FRENCH ARMY.

In the ' Journal des Debats' we find an interesting article on the French army, "Apropos des Orandes Manoeuvres." The writer, M. H. Houssaye, speaks of the calling out of the reserves of the class of 1867 as one of the happiest events for the reorganisation of France which have occurred since the war. He is convinced, too, that it is an event of pacific tendency — in fact, that its signal success will secure the maintenance of peace for a long time to come. As Mr. Gladstone has just sounded the trumpet of alarm about the aggressive tendencies of France, it may be worth while to examine the grounds upon which the writer in the ' Debats' bases his opinion of the pacific and absolutely defensive character of the Republic. Only a few months ago almost a panic was created in the higher circles of diplomacy by the disclosure of a design on the part of Prussia to invade France without any fresh cause of quarrel, and for the avowed object of crushing the French nation so completely as to leave it powerless for a long time to come. At that time the military organisation of France was passing through its most critical stage, and it was boasted, and generally believed, that she could just then offer no effective resistance to the gigantic military power of the invader. Whether or not France was even then quite so helpless as iraa commonly supposed we shall not stop to inquire, but, at all events, the helplessness of a transitorial period no longer exists. M. Houssaye explains the new tactical organisation of the army, which allows the reserves to be so rapidly fused in the ranks. The regiments of infantry are composed of three service battalions, besides a fourth battalion, which, on the peace footing, consists only of the cadres (or staff) and two depot companies. Each serA vice battalion has four companies, each company sixteen squads, •^ut these squads are ordinarily reduced to eight, and are reckoned by the odd numbers — 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15. On the arrival of the reserves the even squads are formed, and when several classes of reserves and the men on furlough are called on, both the odd and the even squads are complete to their full number. When the service battalions are completed to four companies, each of two hundred and fifty rifles, the surplus passes into the fourth battalion, which, according to M. Houssaye, could rejoin their regiments almost at the first outbreak of hostilities. As an example of the rapidity with which this mobilisation can be executed, M. Houssaye tells us that of the class of 1867 nearly one hundred and fifty thousand men were clothed, armed and equipped in twenty-four hours, and were ready to march against an enemy fifteen days afterwards. The successful calling out of a single class of the reserves has thus dispelled the idea, so prevalent a few mouths back, of the inefficiency of the French military i

organisation ; but a little consideration will show that this efficiency exists for the purpose of defence — that any alarms about the aggressive designs of France are the merest hypocrisy. As a ■weapon for aggression, the st mding army, composed of well-trained soldiers, can alone be counted as of any value, and the effective strength of the standing army of France hardly exceeds at this moment two hundred thousand uien, the number at which it was estimated some months ago by a military writer in ' Blackwcoi's Magazine.' The calling out of the reserves would, no doubt, give one hundred and fifty thousand veteran soldiers ; but even with this addition, the French army would be plainly inadequate for offensive operations against any first-class power. But for defensive purposes, the men who have undergone a six months' training, or who served as Mobiles during the late war, may be counted as effectives, and these in resisting an invasion would swell the ranks of the active army to nearly a million strong. Add to this the territorial army, also purely defensive, which will be tolerably organised before the ensuing summer, when the next panic may I c expected to set in. This force will consist of a quarter of a million of veterans who have served their full time in the active army, and of three-quarters of a million of men who served as Mobiles or National Guards during the six months' campaign of 1870-71. Plainly, then, France, after a few months more of military reorganisation, will be 3tronger than ever to resent invasion ; but far from being in a condition to think of attacking her neighbors. In trnth, her new military organisation is entirely based on the idea of defence, fully three-fourths of her forces having only the training of a militia. One thing would convert this immense mass of military material into a conquering army — namely, that which turned the conscripts of the First Republic into the soldiers of the First Empire — an invasion of France, followed by a protracted war. The success of the late manoeuvres render such an invasion far less probable than it seemed six months ago, arid, so far, is a guarantee for the preservation of peace. — ' Dublin Freeman.'