THE RELATIONS OF FRANCE AND GERMANY.

New Zealand Tablet, Volume III, Issue 113, 26 June 1875, Page 9

THE RELATIONS OF FRANCE AND GERMANY.

++ The Government of Berlin does not long permit the world to indulge the dream that the quarrels of French .and Germans are likely soon to be numbered with tie things of the past, and according to the ordinary methods of reasoning the latest explosion of Gallophobia ought to be the presage of immediate hostilities. This will not be the case, we may take for granted, but the prohibition of tie export_of horses from Germany is a very^strong step, and by no means calculated to xeassure Europe. As a rule the exportation of horses is only forbidden when war is bo imminent and the wants of the cavalry and army transport so urgent that all other considerations have to yield to the demands of the public service. The alleged reason of the prohibition in the present case is so trilling that alarmists might feel all the more justified in looking elsewhere for the real motives of this extraordinary measure. We believe it was the ' Kolnische Zeiti ng ' that first started the story that the French Government purposed to buy ten thousand horses immediately in Germany lor the French cavalry, and the ' Norddeutsche Allgemeine Zeitung,' a worthy colleague of the Masonic organ of Cologne, hastened to repeat the rumour with numerous comments. The public opinion of tho country being thus artistically excited, the next stage was reached when a simple Imperial Decree appeared in the ' Official Gazette,' by Avliich German horsebreeders wore summarily forbidden to dispose of their stock in foreign markets. Now, in the first place, the French Government had never the slightest notion of making their purchases exclusively in Germany j among other reasons because Germany itself is in such want of horses that for years back the importations have largely exceeded the exportations. The French Government accordingly would Ibe only buying in an exceptionally dear market if it restricted its operations to the Germany territory. In the second place, by prohibiting the exportation of German hor»es, the Berlin Government ( lays itself open to reprisals if foreign countries were disposed to pursue so uncommercial a course. Above all. however, the decree is the most serious injury to the German horse trade. German horse dealers only sell their animals to foreigners because such sales are comparatively more profitable. By the interdiction of trade the interdiction of profit is equally effected, and while the markets of the world, minus Germany, arc open to the French Government, German horse breeders are excluded from all foreign trade as rigorously as if the surrounding countries had issued a decree of blockade against Germany. In fact; as far as the horse trade is concerned, the German Government has itself placed Germany imder the penalties of blockade. The stupidity ot (he proceeding is exposed by a German paper, the 'Tribune 5 of Berlin, with a clearness which leaves nothing to desire. " The prohibition of the exportation of horses has caused," it writes, "the liveliest emotion in the agricultural world. The breeders declare that this measure causes the greatest injury lo their interests, seeing that the prohibitiog prevents them from exp rting horses to England and Austria as well. They add that the exportation of 10,000 horses would have causer! no inconvenience to Germany, and that the measure, if it be designed to check the tendencies of France, it must be completely ineffectual, seeing that that country can easily find elsewhere all that it requires." This statement of a Berlin journal finally disposes of tlie pretence which has been put forward, and we are accordingly thrown back upon the search for some other explanation of a measure equally arbitrary and unfriendly. It is of course probable that Prince Bismarck may have information of dangers unknown to the public, or may be contemplating another stroke on the pattern of many preceding ones. It is gene-

rally reported aIBO that the Chancellor's nervousness has greatly increased of late, and that just as he is himself haunted by wild fears of assassination, bo he may conceive his policy to be threatened by perils of every kind. He is painfully conscious of the failure of his most energetic efforts both against the Church and against the recovery of France from the weakness in which it was left by the war of 1870-71, and he is apt to link together Catholicism and the restoration of French power in a way which, however little justifiedj ustified by reality, has none the less the most disturbing effects upon the equanimity of the man of Blood-and-Iron. The preparations which are being made, especially in South Germany, against France, are of a nature which it is difficult to reconcile with any firm intention of Berlin keeping the peace very long. Not only are the garrisons being strengthened and permanent fortified camps being erected, but the most extraordinary precautions are being taken for the immediate concentration of overwhelming forces in Wurtemburg and Baden. The population are required to furnish an account of the actual stores of food and the actual stock of cattle, and even poultry in every village, so that the Military Commissariat may be exactly acquainted with the resources of the locality, and may thus be enabled to compuie what further supplies may or may not be needed. Most curious and alarming symptom of all, however, lists are being drawn up of the females who in each town are prepared to undertake the duties of hospital nurses and assistants, while at the same time the most commodious btiildings have been marked out beforehand as military hospitals. Taking all these things into consideration we might be tempted to fay 'that war cannot be more than a few weeks distant. It is most probable, however, that the year 1875 will pass by without any resumption of the hostilities which Berlin warns us continually to expect. It is true, indeed, that German strategists would be very well inclined to renew the conflict without giving France any further time to restore its shattered strength. The war must come, and the sooner it comes the " better the chances for Germany. This is understood to be the universal sentiment of the German military leaders. There are, however, other countries still with some voice in the policy of Europe besides Germany and France, and it is not unknown at Berlin that any unprovoked attack upon France would have the extremely probable effect of forcing them to throw their swords and their wealth into the scale against any further aggrandizement of the German Empire. For these reasons we believe that war will be deferred until Germany has been able to settle with Russia the terms of that alliance which so many observers regard as a certainty in no distant future. Perhaps in three or four years at the utmost Russia will be sufficiently reorganised to paralyse the action of other countries. Then will bo the hour for the Northern Powers to strike, and they are pretty cortani to do so.