MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume LIX, Issue 14, 11 April 1934, Page 207

MISCELLANEOUS INFORMATION

Police Examinations] 1934. Members of the Force desiring the services of the coach in preparing for the literary section of the annual police examinations are requested to notify this* office through the usual channel as early as possible, so that arrangements .may be made to engage the coach if there ape sufficient candidates offering. W. G. Wohlmann, Commissioner of Police. Wellington, 10th April, 1934.

Memorandum.] Manufacture of Wine for Sale.—Licensing Amendment Act, 1914, Section 11 (1). In Police v. Velenski, charged in the Magistrate’s Court, Dunedin, for that, on the 28th day of July, 1933, he did manufacture wine *for sale without the authority of a winemaker’s license under section 11 of the Licensing Amendment Act, 1914, the defence raised was that to bring the charge within the section it was incumbent upon the prosecution to prove that the wine was made from fruit, and that it was not made from apples or pears (the wine appeared to have been made from potatoes, sugar, raisins, and malt).

The Crown Law Office advised as follows : “The essential feature under the 1914 Act is that the “ definition of the word ‘ wine ’ in subsection 13 is not ex- “ elusive, but defines that word as including any liquor “ being the produce of fruit (other than apples or pears) “ grown in New Zealand, and of a strength not exceeding “40 per centum of proof spirit. The object of this definition “ is merely to include the wine which was excluded from the “ Licensing Act, 1908, for certain purposes. It does not “ narrow the meaning of the word ‘ wine,’ but widens it. “ ‘ Wine ’ in its ordinary sense includes any intoxicating “ liquor made from fruit or, in some cases, from vegetables. 4< This wine is made largely from raisins. It is intoxicating, “ and so falls within the definition of ‘ wine ’. ”

The Magistrate’s judgment is as follows : “The defendant is charged under section 11 of the “ Licensing Amendment Act, 1914, that he did manufacture “ wine for sale. “ After evidence for the prosecution was heard, the defend- “ ant contended that no prima facie case had been esta- “ blished, in that wine is defined by subsection 13 of said “ section 11 as any liquor being the produce of fruit (other “ than apples or pears) grown in New Zealand, and of a “ strength not exceeding 40 per centum of proof spirit, and “ the prosecution had not established that liquor seized or “ sold was wine as so defined.

“I have to consider whether wine under section 11 is “ confined to New Zealand wine. “ The marginal note to subsection 13 reads ‘ wine defined,’ “ but section 6 (/) of the Acts Interpretation Act, 1908, “ expressly provides that such a note is not part of the Act. “ The general rule of construction is that words arc to be “ understood to have their ordinary meaning. If the defend- “ ant’s contention be sound then the word 1 includes ’ in “subsection 13 is used shortly for ‘means and includes “ and not in its primary sense. Wine generally is to be “ excluded and New Zealand wine only included. The “ meaning to be given to word ‘ include ’ was very fully “ discussed by Lord Watson in Dilworth v. Commissioner for “ Land and Income Tax 1899 Appeal Case at page 105—

“ ‘ It is not said that “ charitable bequest ” shall mean “ ‘ one or other of the things which are enumerated, but that “‘ it shall “ include ” them. The word “ include ”is very “ ‘ generally used in interpretation clauses in order to enlarge “ ‘ the meaning of words or phrases occurring in the body “‘ of the statute ; and when it is so used these words or “ ‘ phrases must be construed as comprehending not only “ ‘ such things as they signify according to their natural “ ‘ import, but also those things which the interpretation 44 ‘ clause declares that they shall include : But the word “ ‘ “ include ” is susceptible of another construction; which “ ‘ may become imperative if the context of the Act is “ ‘ sufficient to show that it was not merely employed for “ ‘ the purpose of adding to the natural significance of the “ 1 words or expressions defined. It may be equivalent to “ ‘ “ mean and include,” and in that case it may afford an “ ‘ exhaustive explanation of the meaning, which, for the “ ‘ purposes of the Act, must invariably be attached to “ ‘ those words or expressions.’

“I have carefully considered the whole of section 11. I “ am quite unable to find justification for holding that the “ word 1 include ’ used in subsection 13 should be taken as “ equivalent to 1 mean and include.’ I am of the opinion “ that the section is clear and definite in its terms and an “ absolute prohibition is made against the manufacturer for “ sale of wine generally. The marginal note is wrong and “ misleading. It may be said why then the need for any “ specific inclusion of New Zealand wine. I may be permitted “ to adopt the words of Mr. Justice Sim in Crawford v.

“ Nuttall ([l9lß] N.Z.L.R.) dealing with the provisions of sub- “ section 8 of said section 11, and say 4 that it may have been “ 4 enacted from abundance of caution.’ “ The sale of New Zealand wines as distinct from wine in “ general is dealt with under section 3 of the Licensing Act, “ 1908, which permits New Zealand wine to be sold in quan- “ tities of not less than two gallons, not to be consumed on “ the premises where sold. Section 77 of the Licensing Act, “ 1908, also deals with authority to sell and dispose of New “ Zealand wine, but not other wine on the premises licensed. “ It may well be that it was thought advisable to expressly “ include New Zealand wine, as it was the subject of the “ foregoing express provisions in the Licensing Act, 1908. “ Why the concluding words of subsection 13 ‘ and of a “ 4 strength not exceeding 40 per centum of proof spirit ’ were “ inserted I am unable to determine. “ Said section 77 limits the strength of wine sold under “ a New Zealand wine license to 20 per centum proof spirit, “ and it may have been thought desirable to increase the “ permitted percentage when wine is to be sold in bulk “ quantities. If a person manufactures for sale New Zealand “ wine exceeding 40 per centum proof spirit question may “ arise whether license be required. This does not arise in “ these proceedings. “The prosecution proved sale by defendant of wine whatever “ the constituents were. It was also shown that this wine “ was manufactured by the defendant and prima facie case has been established of manufacture of wine for sale contrary “ to section 11.” The Crown Solicitor at Dunedin, who appeared for the Police Department, added the following comment: — “ On perusing the judgment you will see that the Magistrate “ has held that the term ‘ wine ’ as defined in section 11 (13) “ of the 1914 Amendment Act is a generic term, and the “ words from ‘ includes ’ onwards are merely added to widen “ the definition and to make it quite clear that the New “Zealand wines mentioned in section 3 (c) of the principal “ Act are included. “ I am of opinion that your Department would be wise “ in any future prosecutions of a similar nature to lead “ evidence showing (if possible) the composition of the liquor “ concerned, and also as to the fact that it can be accurately “ described as ‘ wine,’ used, of course, in the widest sense. 44 It may be of interest to you to know that an extremely “ wide definition of wine is given in Murray’s Dictionary as “ being ‘ liquor made from the juice of other fruits (that is “ 4 other than grapes), or from grain, flowers, the sap of various “ 4 trees, &c.’ ” W. G. Wohlmann, Commissioner of Police. Wellington, 4th April, 1934. (P. 33/1067.)