LAW REPORTS.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XXXIX, Issue 19, 20 May 1914, Page 322

LAW REPORTS.

(“ Times Law Reports,” Vol. xxx, page 367.) [K.B. Div. — (Channel, Scrutton, and Bailhache, JJ.) — 4th March, 1914.] Taylor v. Monk. Gaming—Betting—Use of House —Persons resorting thereto — Evidence of Resorting—Betting Act, 1853 (16 and 17 Viet., c. 119), s. 3. The appellant employed a man to stand on the footway outside the door of a house to receive money and betting slips from persons passing along the highway, and the appellant employed another man to stand inside the house and receive the bets from the first man. The Justices convicted the appellant of using the house “ for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto.” Held, That although the persons making the bets did not enter the house, there was evidence on which the Justices were entitled to convict the appellant of the offence charged.

This was a case stated by Birmingham Justices. Mr. Danckwerts, K.C., and Mr. Maddocks appeared for the appellant, and Mr. J. G. Hurst for the respondent. The appellant was charged by the respondent, George Monk, a Superintendent of Police, for that he on 2nd, 4th, 7th, Bth, 9th, and 10th July, 1913, “ being a person using a certain house . . . unlawfully did use the said house for the purpuse of betting with persons resorting thereto on certain events and contingencies of and relating to certain horse races,” contrary to the Betting Act, 1853. The following facts were proved or admitted : The house, 88 Branston Street, was occupied by a Mrs. Hughes, who lived there with her husband. There were two steps leading from the front door to the street, one being inside the doorway and the other on the footway. On 2nd July and the other days alleged a man named Siviter was on the footway just outside the door, which was open. Fifteen men passing along the highway handed betting slips containing money to Siviter, woo, immediately he received a slip, handed it from where he stood to one Markland, who stood inside the house, being sometimes visible from the outside and sometimes not, only his hand as it met Siviter’s hand being seen. The appellant, Herbert Taylor, was the employer of both Markland and Siviter. The appellant admitted that the slips and money were sent on to him elsewhere. He also said “ That (Siviter) is the man I employ to take in the streets ; the other one (Markland) I employ to look after the bets when they are in the house. They have to be taken to some house. We can’t do our business all in the streets.” No evidence that the appellant was ever seen in the house was

given. The Justices found as a fact that the house was used by the appellant for the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto, and fined the appellant £SO and 13s. costs, or in default ordered him to be imprisoned for three months, but stated this case. Mr. Danckwerts submitted that there was no evidence to support the Justices’ finding of fact. The people who handed Siviter the slips did not go into the house, but only went to the house ; therefore they did not resort thereto. There must be a physical resorting: Reg. v. Brown (11 The Times L.R. 54 ; [1895] 1 Q.B. 119). He also referred to Bond v. Plumb (10 The Times L.R. 137; [1894] 1 Q.B. 169), and Powells. Kempton Park Racecourse Company (15 The Times L.R. 266; [1899] A.C. 143). There was no evidence that the appellant used the house. He employed Siviter to bet in the street only, and if he did more the appellant was not liable. Mr. Hurst said that the bets were clearly made with the appellant though his employees, and the device of putting Siviter just outside the door was merely colourable. The offence was using the house for the particular purpose ; it was immaterial whether anyone did in fact resort thereto. He referred to Davis v. Stephenson (6 The Times L.R. 242 ; 24 Q.B.D. 529), Boulton v. Hunt (77 J.P. 337), and Stoddart v. Hawke (18 The Times L.R. 23 ; [1902] 1 K.B. 353). Mr. Danckwerts replied. Mr. Justice Channell, in giving judgment, said that they had not to review the decision of the Justices on the facts, but only to see whether there was any evidence upon which they could come to their conclusion. In order to sustain the conviction it was necessary to prove, inter alia, that the appellant was using the house for a particular purpose —namely, the purpose of betting with persons resorting thereto. Therefore the two questions were as to using and resorting thereto. Both were questions of fact, and if there was any evidence upon which the Justices could find that the premises were used in this way they could not interfere. They were of opinion that there was evidence, for it was a question of degree in each oase. The fact that the house was used continually by the appellant’s employees entitled the Justices to assume that it was with the permission of Mrs. Hughes. With regard to the question of resorting to, he thought that Reg. v. Brown (supra) decided that there must be a physical resorting as distinguished from a resorting by letter. But there might be cases where the person alleged to have resorted when going to the house happened to meet the occupier coming out of the house, or knocked at the door and the occupier came out, or whistled with the same result, and in those cases there would be no difficulty in finding that the person resorted to the house physically. In this case there was an obvious arrangement by which it should appear that the money was received outside the house. The man outside received the money with one hand and handed it with the other to the man inside. It could have been done mechanically just as well if the man standing inside had had a landing net into which the money was put, instead of the money getting into his hands by this ingenious scheme. The appeal must be dismissed.

Mr. Justice Scrutton and Mr. Justice Bailhache agreed. [Solicitors —Messrs. Judge and Priestly, agents for Messrs. Philip Baker and Co., Birmingham; Mr. J. Ernest Hill, Birmingham.]

(“Times Law Reports,” Vol. xxx, page 371.) [K.B. Div.— (Channell, Scrutton, and Bailhache, JJ.) —sth March, 1914.] Poole v. Stokes. Children — Neglect—Husband separated from Wife —Neglect by Wife Liability of Husband Children Act, 1908 (8 Edw. VII, c. 67), ss. 12, 38 (2). A husband who is separated from his wife by agreement, and who remits to her sufficient money for the support of their children, is, nevertheless, criminally liable for neglect of the children if to his knowledge she in fact neglects them.

This was a case stated by Justices of Nottingham. Mr. Barrington-Ward appeared for the appellant, and the respondent was not represented. The appellant was an Inspector of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children. The respondent, a dealer in old metal, separated by agreement from his wife in 1909 and since then had sent her a weekly sum for the support of herself and their family. He beard that she was neglecting the children and went to complain to the society, but he was himself arrested for neglecting them.

The Justices found as a fact that the money remitted weekly by the respondent was enough for the support of the children, and in what occurred the actual negligencejjwas that of his wife. The children though well nourished were verminous, and the premises were dirty and there] were not sufficient bed-clothes, so that the negligence was of a domestic character and concerned with matters for which the wife would have been responsible even if the respondent had been living with her. The Justices found that the respondent had done all that he could to care for the children in the oircumstances, and refused to convict ; but on the application of the appellant they stated this case to have it determined whether on the facts the respondent had been guilty of an_offence under section 12 of the Children Act, 1908. Mr. Justice Channell said that in answer to the~specific question put to the Court they were of opinion that an offence under the section had been committed. On the facts as stated, the respondent, though not living with them, was still in custody of the children within section 38 (2) of the Act; and though he might not have been guilty of anything deserving moral blame, he had neglected them within the meaning of the Act. The case must go back to the Justices to be dealt with by them. They would have fuller knowledge of the facts than the Court had, and it might be that they would not think it neoessary to inflict any punishment.

[Solicitors Mr. Edward Downes for Mr,]“C.]E. Wells Lucas, Nottingham.]

(“ Times Law Reports,” Vol. xxx, page 383.)

[Judicial Committee oe the Privy Council.—(Viscount Haldane, L.C., Lord Atkinson, Lord Shaw, Lord Moulton, and Lord Sumner.—Cth March, 1914.]

Ibrahim v. The King

Murder —Statement by Prisoner—Admission of Evidence —• Miscarriage of Justice.

The Privy Council will not interfere with a conviction on the ground of the admission of evidence of a statement made by the prisoner, when in custody, in reply to a question by his superior officer, if the admission of such evidence has”not“caused any miscarriage of justice. This was an appeal by Ibrahim, a native of Afghanistan and a private soldier in the 126th Baluchistan Light Infantry, from a judgment of the Supreme Court of Hong Kong of 16th December, 1912, by which he was sentenced to death. Mr. A. RomerflMacklin was counsel for the appellant; Sir Robert Finlay, K.C., and Mr. E. W. Hansell were for the respondent. In October, 1912, the appellant was tried before the Chief Justice of Hong Kong for the murder of Ali Shafa, a subadar, or company commander, in the same regiment as himself, whom he was alleged to have shot with a rifle in camp, at Canton, on 4th" September, 1912. After a trial lasting four days the jury failed to agree and were discharged. The appellant was tried a second time, and the trial, which occupied five days, resulted in a verdict of guilty. Sentence was postponed pending the argument before the full Court of points of law raised by the appellant’s counsel. These points were decided by the full Court against the appellant, and on 16th December the Chief Justice sentenced him to death.

At the appellant’s trial the Chief Justice admitted evidence given by Major Barrett, commanding officer of the regiment at Canton, of an alleged confession by the appellant in answer to a question by that officer as follows: Major Barrett asked the appellant, “ Why have you done such a senseless act?” and the appellant replied, “Some three or four days he has been abusing me ; without a doubt I killed him.” It was stated that at the time of the alleged confession he was tied up with rope and in the custody of a double quarter-guard. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the so-called confession was inadmissible in evidence, as the appellant was under arrest at the time and the commanding officer did not caution him before asking him the question, “ Why have you done such a senseless act ? ”

At the close of the argument for the appellant, The Lord Chancellor, addressing Sir Robert Finlay, said that at present their Lordships did not desire to ask him to argue, but, if later on, they needed assistance they would let him know.

Lord Sumner, in delivering their Lordship’s judgment, said the ground for appeal arose from the circumstance that after Ali Shafa was shot Major Barrett, the appellant’s officer, asked him, while in oustody, “Why have you done

such a senseless act?” and he replied, “Some three or four days he has been abusing me ; without doubt I killed him.” It was argued that Ibrahim’s statement was inadmissible, (a) as not being a voluntary statement, but obtained by pressure of authority and fear of consequences; and ( b ) in any case as being the answer of a man in custody to a question put by a person having authority over him as his commanding officer, and having custody of him through the subordinates who had made him prisoner. It had long been established as a positive rule of English criminal law that no statement by an accused was admissible in evidence against him unless it was shown by the prosecution to have been a voluntary statement, in the sense that it had not been obtained from him either by fear of prejudice or hope of advantage exercised or held out by a person in authority. The principle was as old as Lord Hale. The burden of proof in the matter had been decided by high authority in recent times in Reg. v. Thompson (9 The Times L.R. 435 ; [1893] 2 Q.B. 12), a case which was considered by the trial Judge before he admitted the evidence Their Lordships were clearly of opinion that the admission of the evidence was no breach of the rule.

Having quoted a long series of judgments on the admissibility of a prisoner’s statements, Lord Sumner said that the English law was still unsettled, strange as it might seem, since the point was one that constantly occurred in criminal trials. Many Judges, in their discretion exoluded such evidence, for they feared that nothing less than the exclusion of all such statements could prevent improper questioning of prisoners by removing the inducement to resort to it. This consideration did not arise in the present case. If a learned Judge, after anxious consideration of the authorities, decided in accordance with what was at any rate a “probable opinion ” of the present law, if it was not actually the better opinion, it appeared to their Lordships that his conduct was the very reverse of that “violation of the principles of natural justice ” which had been said to be the ground for advising His Majesty’s interference in a criminal matter. If the matter was one for the Judge’s discretion, depending largely on his view of the impropriety of the questioner’s conduct and, the general [circumstances of the case, their Lordships thought, as would hereafter be seen, that in the circumstances of the case his discretion was not shown to have been exercised improperly. Having regard to the particular position in which their Lordships stood to criminal proceedings, they did not propose to intimate what they thought the rule of English law ought to be, much as it was to be desired that the point should be settled,by authority, so far as a general rule could be laid down where circumstances must so greatly vary. That must be left to a Court which exercised, as their Lordships did not, the revising functions of a general Court of criminal Appeal (Clifford v. the King-Emperor, L.R. 40 Ind. Ap. 241). Their Lordships’ practice had been repeatedly defined. Leave to appeal was not granted “ except where some clear departure from the requirements of justice ” existed. The Board could not give leave to appeal where the grounds suggested could not sustain the appeal itself; and, conversely, it could not allow an appeal on grounds that would not have sufficed for the grant of permission to bring it. Misdirection, as such, even irregularity as such, would not suffice {ex parte Maorea, 9 The Times L.R. 463; [1893] A.C. 346). There must be something which, in the particular case, deprived the accused of the substance of fair trial and the protection of the law, or which, in general, tended to divert the due and orderly administration of the law into a new course which might be drawn into an evil precedent in future (Reg. v. Bertrand, L.R., 1.P.C., 420 ; 16 L.T. 752.) In England, where the trial Judge had warned the jury not to act upon the objectionable evidence, the Court of Criminal Appeal under the similar words of the Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, section 4, might refuse to interfere if it thought that the jury, giving heed to that warning, would have returned the same verdict.

Their Lordships thought that the jurisdiction which they exercised in appeals in criminal matters involved a general consideration of the evidence and of the circumstances of the case in order to place the irregularities complained of, if substantiated, in their proper relation to the whole matter. After reviewing the circumstances in the present appeal, Lord Sumner concluded : It appears to their Lordships that a clearer case there could hardly be, and that it would be the merest speculation to suppose that the jury was substantially influenced by the evidence of what Ibrahim said to Major Barrett. If not impossible, it is at any rate highly improbable, that this should have been so, and when the preponderance of unquestioned evidence is so great, their Lordships cannot in any view of the matter conclude that there had been any miscarriage of justice, substantial, grave, or otherwise. They will humbly advise His Majesty that the appeal should be dismissed. [Solicitors—Messrs. Langlois, Harding, Warren, and Tate ; Messrs. Sutton, Ommanney, and Rendall.]

(“ Times Law Reports,’’ Yol. xxx, page 396.) [K.B. Div.— (Ohannell, Lush, and Atkin, JJ.)— 27th February, 13th March, 1914.] Scott and Another v. Director op Public Prosecutions. Gaming — Lottery—•Newspaper Competition Determination by Chance —Element of Skill—Lotteries Act, 1823 (4 Geo. IV, c. 60), s. 41. A newspaper announced a competition for money prizes to a large amount, the competitors having to choose a word from certain given words and to add two or three other words, which had each to begin with one of the letters of the first word chosen, and had to have some bearing on that word. The editor undertook that all sentences reaching him should receive careful consideration, but his decision was to be accepted as final. Each competitor had to pay 6d. Held, That the adjudication was not a determination by mere chance, as the competition involved a certain amount of skill, and that therefore the scheme wa.s not a lottery ; and, further, that there was no evidence that the persons concerned contemplated that the scheme would be conducted as a lottery. This was a case stated by an Alderman of the City of London.

Mr. Gordon He wart, K.C., Mr. Bodkin, and Mr. Montague Shearman appeared for the appellants, and the SolicitorGeneral and Mr. Muir for the respondent. The two appellants, William Scott, a servant in the employment of Messrs. E. Hulton and Co. (Limited), the proprietors of the Sunday Chronicle, and Arthur Wellesley Woodbridge, the editor, were summoned under section 41 of the Lotteries Act, 1823, for that he (Scott) “did unlawfully publish a certain proposal and scheme for the sale of certain chances in a certain lottery,” and that Mr. Woodbridge “did unlawfully and knowingly . . . aid, abet, and counsel and procure the commission” of the offence by Scott. The appellants were convicted and fined, Scott Is. and Woodbridge £5, and made to pay ten guineas costs, but the Alderman stated this case. The case was as follows

On the 23rd April, 1913, Scott sold copies of the Sunday Chronicle for the 20th April, which contained the advertisement of a prize competition called “Bounties,” in which £I,OOO was offered in prizes, including prizes of £SOO, £IOO, and £SO, 20 of £5 each, 200 of £l, and 100 of 10s. Competitors had to choose a word from forty-two words given, then to add two or three other words, each of which had to begin with one of the letters in the parent word, having some bearing on that word. Examples were given— e.g., the parent word being “ Coincidence,” the added words were “Naturally impresses one.” “Reformation,” added words “Easy in theory.” Conditions as to time for sending in, &c., followed, and it was set out “the editor undertakes that all ‘ Bounties ’ reaching him shall receive careful consideration, but his decision as to the prize-winners must be accepted by all competitors as final and legally binding in all respects, and entries are accepted only on this understanding.” The result of this competition appeared in the number dated the 4th May, the first prize of £SOO going to a competitor sending in “ Undertaking—Terminates doctor’s experiments,” £IOO to “ Covetousness—Sickens the charitable,” and £SO to “Rapacity—Punishes itself repeatedly,” and all the other prizes were awarded. Coupons were attached to the advertisement, upon which the competitor’s attempts were to be written and sent in together with a postal note for 6d., and they were to arrive by the 24th April, 1913. The question for the Court was whether upon the above facts the Alderman was right in holding that the above competition was a lottery. It was pointed out by the respondents that, unless the competition was carried on at a loss, there must have been at least forty thousand attempts at 6d. each to return the £I,OOO offered in prizes. Mr. Hewart contended that this competition did not constitute a lottery. The prosecution seemed to be founded on the case of Blyth v. Hulton, the best report of which was in 24 The Times L.R. 719, in which it was held that “ limerick ” competitions, in which the competitor had to supply the last line, were illegal. Neither party in that case had raised that point, but in the course of the argument Lord Justice Williams raised it. Two things induced the Court to come to their decision —(1) the faot that there were sixty thousand attempts, which they held could not be judged on their merits in the time ; and (2) the fact that there were one hundred consolation prizes. The latter feature did not occur in this case. The Alderman had no right to draw the inference as to there being forty thousand attempts from the amount of the prize money, for the competition might be conducted at a loss, as many papers carried on similar competitions, and the appellants had to fall into line ; and there was no other evidence. It ought not to be assumed that the adjudication was unfair. There was a certain amount of skill required, and that was sufficient (Hall v.

Cox, 15 The Times L.R. 82 ; [1899] 1 Q.B. 198) where competitors had to predict the number of births and deaths in London during a named week. Mr. Justice Lush. —If this is a lottery, would not every competitor be criminally liable ? Mr. Hewart.—Yes, as aiding and abetting. Mr. Justice Ghannell. —-Perhaps the Solicitor-General will take the hint and use it to stop these foreign lotteries we hear so much of. Smith’s Advertising Agency v. Leeds Laboratory Company (26 The Times L.R., 335) was also referred to. The Solicitor-General said the question was whether the advertisement, read in relation to the facts, offered an invitation to come in and win prizes by chance. It was no answer to say that competitors must exercise some skill, if the result was not to be determined by some measure relating to the skill shown. There were six classes in the competition, and, if not a lottery, these must be graded on some standard of skill. That, he submitted, was an absolute impossibility ; it was impossible to say that anything had happened say in the £1 class to take it out of the 10s. class. There was no standard set; the editor might select the winners by drawing their names from a hat. Mr. Justice Atkin.—lf that is so, it is odd that the winning attempts here all have some point. Mr. Justice Channell. —I should put them all into the 10s. class myself. The Solicitor-General said that not only must there be skill, but it must be shown that the most skilful would win. The conditions determining the choice of the winner were too vague here, and it was impossible for all attempts to be judged on their merits. In the births and deaths case (Hall v. Cox, supra), the actual number was determined by experts, and, when that was ascertained, the most skilful competitor must win. Mr. Hewart, in reply, said that in the last mentioned case it by no means followed that the most skilful won, for previous statistics might be entirely upset by the results of the particular week. The Court reserved judgment. Mr. Justice Lush, in the course of a written judgment, said that the appellant had been convicted of an offence against the Lotteries Act, 1823, which applied only to distributions of money by chance and nothing but chance. If merit or skill played any part in determining the distribution there was no lottery—Hall v. Cox (supra). What he did was this. • He published in his newspaper, the Sunday Chronicle, a scheme to be conducted on the following lines: The competitor was to select one of a number of words and was to compose a sentence (the initial letters being fixed by certain rules) having sone appropriate bearing on the selected word. The following instances were given : “ Coincidence ” (that was the selected word), and the sentence was, “Naturally impresses one”; “ Reformation Easy in theory ” ; “ Servant ” —“ Appreciates respect.” With each answer 6d. had to be sent. The editor undertook carefully to consider all the sentences that reached him (this was obviously to guard against a claim by an alleged competitor who asserted that he had sent in a sentence which had been lost), but stipulated that his decision was to be final. Prizes were offered aggregating £I,OOO, varying between £SOO (first prize) and 10s., of which a large number were offered. A large number of persons sent in answers, and the names of the winning competitors were duly published. The first three answers to which the first three prizes were awarded were “ Undertaking ” —“ Terminates doctor’s experiments ” ; “Covetousness”—“Sickens the charitable”; and “Rapacity ” —“ Punishes itself repeatedly.” On these facts it was contended that the competition was a lottery—that is, that the competitors were invited to take part in a scheme for the distribution of money by chance and nothing but chance. It was contended, first, that the appellant must he taken to have contemplated that no less than 40,000 answers (which at 6d. each equalled £1,000) would be sent in, as one ought to assume that he would not carry on the competition at a loss. Secondly, that the time allowed for deciding as to the respective merits of the answers was so short-—ten days from the sending in of the last answer—that he must have known that he could not consider all the answers. Thirdly, that there was no standard of literary skill by which to determine to which competitor preference should be given. It was also contended that the case was concluded by two recent decisions of the Court of Appeal. A scheme might either be on the face of it a lottery, or it might be shown by extraneous evidence that the parties concerned contemplated that it should be conducted in that way. He agreed that if reasonable people ought to contemplate from the facts made known to them that it would be so conducted, it was none the less a lottery if it appeared not to be one; and also if the appeal to skill and merit was a mere blind to cover up the nature of the scheme. If all the sentences, for example, which oould he composed under this scheme would have practically an equal chance, one being as “ appropriate ” as the other, it would be

just as much a distribution by mere chance as if the scheme were so described. The Solicitor-General contended that the literary merit was of such -a low order that one could not say that one answer was “ better ” than another. The literary merit, no doubt, was not of a high order, and if the Lotteries Act had made it an offence to distribute money prizes unless it was of a high order, it would be an important observation. But unless one was prepared to say that no honest person could come to the conclusion that the three winning answers were more pointed, more amusing than any other answers would be—unless he must, if he exercised an honest view, say, for example, that “Appreciates respect” was as appropriate to the word “ undertaking ” as “Terminates doctor’s experiments he did not see how the poor degree of literary merit could convert the competition into a scheme for distributing money by mere chance. The answers appealed, no doubt, only to the taste or fancy of the person adjudicating, and there was an element of chance in that sense, but that did not make the adjudication a mere determination by nothing but chance. The same observation applied to the contention that there was no standard by which to adjudicate. He could not see how the absence or presence of a standard could convert an adjudication into a lottery or not a lottery, according as the merit was of a low or a high order. Taste and fancy were as much the test in one case as in the other. The distinction was very plain between a person who bought a ticket for a lottery and one who competed in a scheme like this. Nothing that the former could do could affect the result. The latter invented an answer which he thought most likely to appeal to the taste or fancy of the editor, and if the competition was honestly conducted it was what he did that determined the result. On the face of it, therefore, he was of opinion that it was not a lottery. Was there any evidence upon which the appellant could properly be convicted because it must have been contemplated that the scheme would be conducted as a lottery ? The prosecution relied on two assumptions—first, that the editor would not contemplate selling his paper at a loss, and therefore must have expected 40,000 answers; and, secondly, that on that footing there would be no sufficient time for him to look through and consider the answers. To convict of a criminal offence on such assumptions seemed to be of more than doubtful propriety; but he did not see that they were well founded in fact. It was a much more probable assumption that a large number of the answers would be rejected either through not complying with the conditions or through their being so pointless in comparison with the others as not to be worth considering. But the published answers must be taken into consideration, and, poor as the degree of literary merit might be, he eould not doubt that they showed that mere chance was not in fact the only determining factor. They indicated the contrary. The assumptions were gratuitous, and that contention failed. The question remaining was whether they were bound by Blyth v. Hulton (supra) and Smith v. Leeds Laboratory Company (supra). In those cases the Court of Appeal on different facts, and with respect to different competitions, arrived at the conclusion of fact that the parties did contemplate that the scheme would be conducted as a lottery. He failed to see how a finding of fact on one set of circumstances could be said to establish a legal principle which they were bound to apply to a different set of circumstances. Hall v. Cox (supra) was certainly not overruled. It was to be observed that in the case of Barclay v. Pearson (9 The Times L.R., 269 ; [1893] 2 Ch., 154), which was cited by Lord Justice Buckley in Blyth v. Hulton (supra) without disapproval, Mr. Justice Stirling citing a judgment of the Chief Magistrate at Bow Street apparently assented to the view that if the object of the competition was to find the most “appropriate” word, that is, in the opinion of the editor, the scheme would not he a lottery. He wished to add that he had realized that the consequences of these competitions where the sums offered were very large and the degree of skill was very small might be, and probably were, mischievous, and that in many cases the real incentive to the readers of the newspapers to take part in them was something not far removed from the spirit of gambling. It was not perhaps to be wondered at that an Act which was passed nearly 100 years ago, when the conditions were so different, was not effective to deal with this state of things. Newspapers circulated more widely now than they did then, and the competitive spirit had stimulated those who so desired to find fresh fields for their enterprise. But if a case was plain, as he thought this was, such considerations could not affect the interpretation of a statute not ambiguous in its terms. They were for the Legislature, and not for the Court. The conviction must be quashed. Mr. Justice Atkin read a judgment and Mr. Justice Lush read a judgment of Mr. Justice Channell (who was not present) to the same effect. [Solicitors—Messrs. R. B. Wheatly, Son, and Daniel, for Messrs. Cobbett, Wheeler, and Oobbett, Manchester; Director of Public Prosecutions.]