LAW REPORT.

New Zealand Police Gazette, Volume XXXV, Issue 33, 24 August 1910, Page 366

LAW REPORT.

(“N.Z. Law Reports,” Vol. xxix, page 641.) [Court ob’ Appeal.—7th April, 1910.] Rex v. Hare. Criminal Laic—The Crimes Act, 1908, Sections 240 and 268 — Theft —Meaning of “ Menace"—Threats contained in a Letter. The prisoner picked up a letter, damp and ungummed. This letter contained some important information, which, if published, would upset certain business arrangements. The prisoner read the letter, and afterwards wrote anonymously to the addressee demanding a sum of money for the letter, and threatening to send copies of the letter to interested persons unless his demand was complied with. A further letter and postcard reiterated the threat. Held by the Court of Appeal (Stout, C.J., and Williams, Edwards, and Chapman, JJ.), That the conduct of the prisoner showed that he had formed the intention of permanently depriving the true owner of the letter, and that he was rightly convicted of the theft under section 240 of the Crimes Act, 1908 ; also, that the prisoner was rightly convicted under section 268 of the said Act; that the word “menace” in the said section means “threat,” and that a “threat” can be conveyed as well by writing as by word of mouth. Held, further, per Williams, Edwards, and Chapman, JJ., That, the Crimes Act, 1908, is a code, and should be construed according to its ordinary meaning, and the history of prior legislation should not be looked at to ascertain that meaning unless such meaning is ambiguous or doubtful.

Case reserved by Cooper, J., under section 442 of the Crimes Act, 1908, for the opinion of the Court of Appeal. The prisoner, Arnold Hare, was convicted of theft under section 240, and of an offence under section 268 of the Crimes Act, 1908. The evidence of the Crown, which was undisputed, showed that the prisoner had picked up a letter, damp and ungummed, on the Government Railway-station at Auckland. He read the letter, and then wrote anonymously to the addressee, Mr. T. E. Clarke, demanding a sum of money for the letter, threatening to send copies of the letter to interested persons unless his demand was complied with. The letter contained important information and instructions, which, if published, would upset certain business arrangements. The addressee was to advertise if he accepted the terms. The matter was handed over to the police for investigation, and an advertisement was inserted agreeing to comply with the prisoner’s demands. The prisoner then named a place for the deposit of the money. Coppers were deposited instead of gold. Further correspondence in which the threats were reiterated by advertisement followed, the prisoner demanding a smaller sum for a portion of the letter to show his bonafides. This sum was deposited in the place indicated, and a detective set to watch. The prisoner was arrested in the act of leaving the hiding-place of the gold. He did not then have the money in his possession, but it was found secreted near by, as if something had disturbed him. The jury found that the threats contained in the correspondence were calculated to excite fear and alarm in the mind of the addressee. The question reserved for the opinion of the Court of Appeal were :

1. Was there evidence to go to the jury upon which they could properly convict the prisoner of the theft of the letter ?

2. Was there evidence to go to the jury upon which they could properly convict him of the offence set out in section 268 of the Crimes Act ? 3. Were the communications sent by the prisoner to T. E. Clarke threats? Stout, C.J.:— The questions stated for our opinion are really two. There are three questions put in the case stated, but only two were argued, namely: 1, Was there evidence to go to the jury upon which they could properly convict the prisoner of the theft of the letter ? 2, Was there evidence to go to the jury upon which they could properly convict him of the offence set out in section 268 of the Crimes Act—that is, demanding the payment of money by menaces ? lam of opinion that the answer to both questions should be in the affirmative.

As to the first question, I am of opinion that the whole conduct of the prisoner showed that he had formed the intention of permanently depriving the true owner of the letter unless he bought it back. The only inference the jury could draw from the evidence is that the prisoner intended to keep it or to exercise dominion over it by treating it as his own if the owner did not pay him for it. In my opinion, his conduct clearly showed an intention to treat the letter as his own. The threat in the letter showed that he assumed dominton over it, and, combined with his conduct, fulfils the definition of theft in section 240 of the Crimes Act.

As to the second question, the word “ menace ” means “ a threat to enforce.” It may mean not only to accuse a person of a crime, but also to injure him in his position, whatever that may be ; and the case of Reg. v. Tomlinson (1895 1 Q.B. 706, 708) shows that the word may be construed quite widely. The prisoner made a threat to injure the owner of the letter, and such a threat can be conveyed by letter just as readily as personally by word of mouth. We have no power to limit the word “ menace ” tothe latter kind of threat only. The word is used in section 268 in the widest sense, and includes a threat by letter, and therefore it cannot possibly be said that the act of the prisoner does not come within the very words of the section. For these reasons, I think there was evidence upon which the jury could properly convict under both sections, and the conviction should be affirmed. The other members of the Court concurred.

Solicitor for the Grown: The Crown Solicitor (Auckland). Solicitors for the prisoner: Bamford & Brown (Auckland)