NEW ZEALAND RACING CONFERENCE APPEAL BOARD.

New Zealand Illustrated Sporting & Dramatic Review, Volume XII, Issue 741, 19 May 1904, Page 8

NEW ZEALAND RACING CONFERENCE APPEAL BOARD.

The following is the full text of the findings delivered by the Appeal Board of the New Zealand Racing Conference (Sir W. Russell, M.H.R., Mr F. Logan and Mr G. Hunter) in the cases presented at the recent sitting at Napier : — CONVOY-GLADSOME CASE. The judges find that the mare Gladsome was ridden in the Wellington Cup and Racing Club Handicap at Wellington by F. D. Jones, who, although properly apprenticed and having served for over a period of twelve months, did not hold an apprentice’s license. Rule 143 (1) expressly states that only holders of jockeys’ and apprentices’ licenses shall be qualified to ride, and subsection 2 of the same rule provides that apprentices’ licenses shall be issued free. Sub-section 4 of the same rule provides that on application for a license the applicant shall forward to the secretary of the jockey club in the district in which he resides the necessary fee and fill in the proper application form. A form of application for an apprentice’s license is set out at the end of Rule 143. Sub-section 6 of Rule 143 provides that all licenses shall expire on July 31 in each year. Sub-section 8 of Rule 143 defines the meaning of apprentices, and provides that no apprentice shall ride in any race until he has served one year of his apprenticeship, and later on states that an apprentice may ride in any race “save as herein otherwise provided during the term of his apprenticeship.” The judges are of opinion that in the face of the express provision of sub-sec-tion 1 of Rule 143, which states that only holders of jockeys’ and apprentices’ licenses shall be qualified to ride, supported as it is by the other sub-sections above referred to, an apprentice is only qualified to ride after he has served one year of his apprenticeship and after he has applied for and has obtained and holds at the time of riding a license from the jockey club (as defined by Rule No. 1 of the Rul es of Racing). Were this not so, apprentices after having served one year would be able to ride in any race, notwithstanding the fact that if they were jockeys they might not have the slightest chance of obtaining licenses at the hands of the . jockey club. They might remain apprentices for ever. It is the fact of being licensed that r< ’ mits and allows jockeys and apprentices to ride, and nobody is, in the opinion of

the judges, entitled to ride unless the holder of a license. Throughout the- rules—by way of example, see Rules 79, 84, 90, and 116—the word “ jockey,’’ in order to have any sensible application, must be taken to mean a licensed rider, and the judges are of opinion that n sub-section 7 of Rule 143 the term “ unlicensed jockey ’’ must be interpreted as covering an unlicensed apprentice. The judges therefore uphold Mr Young s appeal. PLATYPUS-BENEFACTOR CASE. The judges uphold the appeal of Mr Knox, the owner of Platypus, which ran second to Benefactor in the Pahiatua Cup, run at Pahiatua on January 27, 1904, on the same grounds as are set out in the judgment in the Convoy-Gladsome case, as the rider of Benefactor had not at the time of winning the race been apprenticed for a period of twelve months. d McKinnon v. Auckland racing club. In this case it is admitted that the horse Beddington was the joint property of Messrs L. D. and N. A. Nathan, and was entered in and ran under their joint names in the Sylvia Handicap on January 2, 1900, and that no deed of partnership in the said horse was registered at that date with the secretary of the Conference, as required by section 59a of the Rules of Racing, 1900, but no suggestion was m ade of any concealment of the partnership or joint ownership. No objection was lodged with the Auckland Racing Club until December 11, 1903 —three years and eleven months after the running of the.race. Rule 116 of the Rules of Racing, 1900, provides that an objection on the ground of fraud or wilful mis-statement or omission in the entry under which a horse has run may be received at any time within twelve months after the race, and Rules 113, 115, and 117 (1900) define the time during which such olijections may be received. The question for decision is whether the time during which an objection can be raised on the ground of non-registration of partnership deed had elapsed at the date the objection was first made. As Rule 116, 1900, defines the period after which no appeal can be made on the most serious ground of fraud or wilful mis-statement or omission as that of twelve months, and the other rules limit definitely the period during which other complaints or objections can be made, it appears evident that the intention of the rules is not to permit of objections such as is made by Mr McKinnon being received in any case at a later date than twelve months after the running of the race. The judges therefore dismiss the appeal.