The Australian Commonweal and New Zealand,

New Zealand Illustrated Magazine, Volume 1, Issue 1, 1 October 1899, Page 22

The Australian Commonweal and New Zealand,

By G. M. Newton,

T a time when the Australian Colonies have almost consummated a federation that will have momentousand far-reach-ing results, which will largely affect this Colony for good or ill, it is opportune to consider

I) the terms of the proposed union as settled by the Commonwealth Bill, and to give some account of the arguments that have so for been, or may be, advanced for and against New Zealand's becoming' a member of the Union. At the outset it may be said that the federation which the members of the Convention were called upon to frame, is not. an amalgamation, a unification of the Colonies. It was not contemplated that the boundaries should bo swept away for all purposes ; and that each colony should merge in the Commonwealth, and have no separate existence. On the contrary, each colony, while becoming a constituent part of the Commonwealth and sharing its larger powers, will retain its own individuality, preserving its own constitution, having its own parliament, and making, subject to the laws of the Commonwealth, its own laws. The effect of the union will be to make a composite state with a supreme federal government, acting, not only upon the sovereign members of the union, but directly upon all its citizens in their individual and corporate capacities. 'Ihe federal constitution is embodied in a Bill called " The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act," which recites that the people of the colonies to be named therein, have agreed to unite in one indissoluble Federal Commonwealth under the Crown of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, and under the Constitution thereby established.

The following are the principal provisions of the Bill :— The Parliament. — The legislative power of the Common wealth is vested in a Parliament consisting of. a Governor-General, a Senate composed of six members from each State, directly chosen for a term of six years by the people of the State, voting, until Parliament otherwise provides, as one electorate ; and a House of Representatives, directly chosen by the people of the Commonwealth, the number being as nearly as practicable twice the number of Senators, and to be chosen in the several States in proportion to their respective populations, but each original State having at least live members. The qualification of the electors of both Houses is to be the same in each State as that of electors of the lower House of each State, and each elector must vote only once. Parliament may make a uniform franchise, but so that no citizen who has a vote in any State can be deprived of his right to vote by the Federal Parliament. Thus the uniform franchise when made must be as wide as the widest existing franchise in any of the States, and as at least one of them has already achieved adult suffrage, it will be seen that the franchise must be of the greatest possible liberality. The qualifications for members of either House are (1) twenty-one years of age, (2) an elector entitled to vote, or person entitled to be an elector, (3) three years resident in the Commonwealth, and (4) a subject of the Queen, either natural born or naturalised for live years. Powers oj Parliament. — The Parliament has power to levy taxes, but not so as to discriminate between States ; to provide for the general defence and welfare of the Commonwealth; to borrow money on the public credit; to regulate trade and commerce

■with other countries, and among the States ; to make laws with respect to bankruptcy, marriage, divorce, old age pensions, insurance copyrights, inventions, etc. ; to coin money, and fix the standard of weights and measures ; to control postal and the like services ; to provide for the service and execution throughout the Commonwealth of the civil and criminal processes of any State, and the recognition of its laws ; to deal with immigration and emigration, and the influx of criminals ; to establish courts of conciliation and arbitration for the prevention and settlement of industrial disputes extending beyond the limits of any one State ; and to legislate on other matters, as set forth in the Bill, for the peace, order and good government of the Com mon weal th . The Executive Government . — The executive power is vested in seven ministers who must be members of either the Senate or the House of Representatives. It has been urged that responsible government is incompatible with federation, but the framers of the Bill seem wisely to have thought that the principle of the responsibility of the Government would be a guarantee of the liberalism of the constitution, and in that opinion rejected the referendum as unnecessary under the form of government chosen. The Judicature. — The judicial power of the Commonwealth is vested in a Supreme Court to be called the High Court of Australia, and in such other Courts as the Parliament may, from time to time, create or invest with federal jurisdiction. The High Court will have jurisdiction in all matters of law and equity arising under the constitution, laws, and treaties of the Commonwealth, and an appellate jurisdiction from the Supreme Court of any State, and from it there will be a limited right of appeal to the Privy Council. As the highest Court of the Commonwealth it will be formed of honorable and able men. It will be its duty to preserve the popular liberty, and to prevent the Commonwealth dominating or infringing upon the rights of the States, or the States usurping the functions of the Commonwealth.

Finance and Trade.— Tho largo powers given to the Commonwealth for the control of trade and commerce will not" come into fall force and effect until the imposition of uniform fedei'al customs duties, which must be imposed within two years of the establishment of the Commonwealth ; and 'upon tho imposition of uniform duties of customs, trade and intercourse between tho [States will become absolutely free. All customs duties will be collected by tho Commonwealth from the outset, but until uniform duties are imposed, each State will receive back the customs snicl excise revenue actually collected therein, loss its proportionate share of the federal expenditure. Tho same system will be pursued i'or live years after the adoption of a uniform tariff, except that accounts will be kept between the States instead of duties being collected at the border. At the end of the live years period, Parliament may provide for the distribution of the surplus revenue among the States on such basis as it deems fair. During a period of ten years after (he establishment of the Commonwealth, threefourths, at least, of the net revenue from customs and excise must ■ be returned to the States, or applied to the payment of interest on State debts. This clause of the Bill, known as the " Braddon Blot," haw provoked much hostile criticism in New South Wales, but it has much to commend it, inasmuch as it conserves to each State a great part of its revenue. The Commonwealth is prohibited from giving to any State or part of one State, by any law of trade commerce or revenue, a preference over any other State or part thereof. During the first ten years, however, and thereafter in the discretion of Parliament, financial assistance may bo granted to any State. The Bill provides for the creation of an Interstate Commission for the execution and maintenance within the Commonwealth of the provisions of the Constitution relating to trade and commerce, and of all laws made thereunder.

■ A State may grant any aid to, or bounty on, mining for gold and other metals, and, with the consent of the Federal Parliament, any aid to, or bounty on, the production or export of goods. Monet/ Bills. — Bills imposing taxation or spending revenue must originate in the House of Representatives. The Senate cannot amend Bills either imposing taxation, or appropriating revenue for the ordinary annual service of the Government, but may suggest alterations which may be adopted or not as the House sees fit. The Senate may not amend any Bill in such a manner as to increase any proposed charge or burden on the people. Deadlocks. — If the House of Representatives passes any proposed law, and the Senate fails to pass it, or passes it with amendments to which the House will not agree, and if after an interval of three months, the House again passes the proposed law and the Senate fails to pass it, or passes ifc with amendments to which the House will not agree, the Governor- Genei'al may dissolve both Houses simultaneously, unless the deadlock occurs within six months of the expiry of the House of Representatives by effuxion of time. If after such dissolution the proposed law fails to pass with or without amendments, the Governor- General may convene a joint sitting of the Houses, and the members then present may deliberate, and shall vote together upon the proposed law, and if affirmed by a majority of the total number of the members of both Houses, it shall be taken to hare been duly passed. The States. — The constitution of each State is preserved as at the establishment of the Commonwealth, as are the powers of every State Parliament, save such as are exclusively vested in the Federal Parliament, or withdrawn from the Parliament of the State. All laws of any State relating to matters within the powers of the Federal Parliament, will continue in force until the Oommonlegislate upon such matters, and in case of inconsistency, the laws of the latter will pi'evail.

The Commonweal th is bound to protect every State against invasion ; and, if appealed to by the State, against domestic violence. New States may be admitted to the Commonwealth, or be established by it, upon such teirns, including the extent of representation in either House of Parliament, as ihe Federal Parliament may think fit. Alteration of the Constitution — Any proposed alteration of the constitution must be approved by an absolute majority of each House of Parliament, or twice by an absolute majority of either House, and must then be submitted to the direct vote of the people. It must be approved by a majority of votes in a majority of States, and by a majority of votes in the whole Commonwealth. There is the important restriction, however, that no State is to lose its proportionate representation in the Senate, or its minimum representation in the House of Representatives, unless a majority of the electors voting in that State give their approval. These are the main provisions of the Commonwealth Bill. While it may be conceded to its opponents that it is not pei'fect, as no human creation is perfect, still it embodies a constitution saturated with democratic sentiment and the principles of free government, and one, perhaps, the most liberal and elastic ever framed in any country. In whatever aspect we may regard it, tho creation of a Commonwealth out of the six colonies that are, for all practical purposes, our only neighbours, the fact of their entering into a partnership, which New Zealand has been invited, but has so far declined, to joiru ought, while it is still open to us to join on equal terms, to put us to the fullest enquiry as to our position, and whether we should continue to stand aloof and retain our independence of action, or whether it may not be wiser to throw in our lot with the federation at its inception, as when it has once beei> formed we can only do so upon such terms as the Federal Parliament may impose. Within the limits of this article the arguments on either side cannot be adequately discussed, but some of them may be briefly

stated. Beginning with those in favour of federation, the principal points are : (1.) Intercolonial freetrade. Upon the imposition of uniform duties of customs by the Commonwealth Pai'liament, trade and intercourse between the States will become absolutely free. A3 the greater part of the revenue of the Commonwealth for some years to come will be raised by customs duties, there can be doubt that the federal policy will be protection against the world, and there is no reason to suppose that New Zealand, stand iug apart, will be favoured above other countries. The effect of this throwing open by the States of their markets to one another, and setting up a high tariff against the products of this colony, will in all probability cause a considerabledimitiution in our trade with Australia. It will affect more or less injuriously the small agriculturalists, the shipping trade and all those connected with it, and the injury done to them will re-act on others. The bulk of the trade so stopped could not be diverted to other countries. (2.) The conversion of the public debt. — If the Federal Government could convert the loans of the States and raise future loans at a rate of interest less by from one to two per cent., as is confidently anticipated from the example of Canada, it would enormously lessen the burdens of the taxpayers by the large saving effected in the payment of interest. (3.) The guarantee of defence from foreign invasion and the danger of isolation. — The Federal Government is bound to protect every State from foreign invasion. It has been said that this is an era of big States and huge armaments. Small States are without importance or influence* and merely exist by the sufferance of the more powerful. The tendency is towards aggregation, and it is wiser to become an inconsiderable, though still important, part of a lai'ge federation, than stand aloof from it and be dominated and overshadowed by its proximity. We cannot always rely upon the protecting cegis of Great Britain.

(4.) The dignity derived from citizenship of a great country, Sir Charles Dilke has said, is a point, the importance of which will not be contested by anyone who has been in America since the war. He also thinks that federation would tend to secure better local and general government. (5.) The prosperity achievod by the Unitod States and Canada under federal constitutions, which cannot bo compared to that of the Australian Commonwealth for liberality and freedom, and the state of insolvency of Newfoundland, the only State that has stood out of the Dominion of Canada. On the other side of the question some of the main points are : (1.) The distance from Australia. — The fact of New Zealand being 1200 miles from the continent and the seat of Government, would militate against, its representation in Parliament by its best citizens, many of whom are actively engaged in professions or business, and could not afford to be absent from the colony for the length of time which parliamentary duties would require. The distance of the seat of Government would be apt to cause discontent, and a feeling that the interests of the Continent would be paramount, and would chiefly ongago the attention of Parliament to the detriment of this colony. (2.) Trade will ii;.d its natural channels, and Australia will not be able to shut out commerce. Our trade with Australia is considerable and increasing, but represents only about one eighth part of our trade with all countries. The bulk of our trade is with the Old Country, and must for some years continue to be with it and with the continent of America, the United States even now trading with us to an amount exceeding £1,000,000 annually. While the opening to us of the markets of all Australia is an advantage, that advantage may be outweighed by the opening of our ports to the products of the continent. We may havo more to gain by conserving the right at all times to protect our industries, and to mako treaties of commerce with other countries, than by becoming bound by the policy of the

Commonwealth in which we should necessarily have but a small voice. Here it may be said that, while, as a State, New Zealand would have equal representation in the Senate with every other State, in the House of Representatives her i*epresentation would be, on the basis ofjpresent populations, fourteen out of eighty-eight members. (3.) The defence afforded by the Commonwealth would not be sufficient for our protection for many years to come. Meanwhile our only bulwark is the strength of the fleets of Great Britain, and we must look for our security to the power of the Mother Country, and the unity and solidarity of the Empire. (4) The initial cost of federation will be considerable, and in a country of so large an extent as Australia, so great a part of which has yet to be opened up and improved, the efficient working of the Federal Government may necessitate directly or indirectly heavier taxation that we have now to bear. (5.) The alien question. — Probable causes of future trouble and discord are involved in the occupation of the North of Australia. If that part of the. Continent is to be colonised by aliens, and its industries carried on by means of Asiatic and coloured labour, and it is questionable whether they can be carried on by other means, then Australia is laying up trouble for herself in the not very distant future, and it behoves us to consider

whether* we should involve ourselves in such matters in which we have no immediate concern. (6.) Centralisation. — In most federations the power of the central government tends to increase, and the local authority to decline. More than any other colony we have to fear this tendency to centralisation. (7.) The indissolubility of the Union. — The step of joiniug the federation once taken, there can be no withdrawal. The union is indissoluble. Experience only can prove whether federation in the result will be beneficial or disastrous to this colony. Should it prove the latter, the experience will be dearly bought, and without profit. In conclusion it may be said that we should both gain and lose by federation, and whether the gain or the loss would be greater is a question only to be determined after the fullest and most searching enquiry into the subject. The ultimate court to whom this question must be submitted is the people of ' the colony. They must be the arbiters of their own destiny. But before they are called upon to decide, every fact of importance and every argument that throws light upon them should be published, and thought and discussion promoted and stimulated from one end of the colony to tie other. Then we may leave the question to the people in the fullest confidence that their decision will be just and wise.