The Surrender to the Boers.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXVIII, Issue 17, 27 April 1907, Page 38

The Surrender to the Boers.

“Uapax imperii nisi imperasset.”

(By

Surg.-Captain R. H. Bakewell, M.D.)

I suppose a member of a New Zealand contingent may be pardoned if he gives utterance to some of the feelings of disgust and shame that he entertains for the astounding folly of the surrender of the two South African col-

onies—The Transvaal and the Orange •—to the Boers? In all history, since history commenced. I can remember nothing to be compared with the conduct of the British Government regarding the Boers and the late war. Up to the time of the sending in of Kruger's ultimatum, there is no doubt now, 1 suppose, in anyone’s mind that the Boers had right on their side. At the instigation of the capitalists of the Rand, for the most part German Jews, Air Chamberlain made a series of demands on the Government of the Transvaal which were a direct violation of the terms of the treaty by which that country had obtained the right of legislating for itself on the basis of an independent State, with one solitary exception: They were not to make any treaty with a foreign Power without the consent and sanction of the British Government. Otherwise they were as independent as New York State, or the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Air Chamberlain insisted on changes being made in their laws about nationalisation, in such a direction that the electoral body, instead of being exclusively composed of Boers, these would be only in a small majority. lie alleged that there were certain grievances from which foreigners, of whom probably three-fourths were by birth British subjects, suffered. A long jangling correspondence was kept up for month after month, every day endangering the prospects of peace, and evidently intended to provoke some mark of hostility on the part of Kruger's Government, which would be a justification for war. Chamberlain had, as s matter of justice, no locus standi. The British subjects about whose welfare he professed himself so anxious, went to the Transvaal for the purpose of making money, and for no other purpose. If they did not like the conditions imposed by the local Government for their residence,

then all they had to do was to leave the country. Unfortunately for Great Britain, Kruger forced on a war' by sending the famous ultimatum of October 9th, 1899, followed two days afterwards by the invasion of Natal. It is needless to recall the various incidents of the war; they are fresh in the memory of every adult amongst us. The whole Empire may be said to have joined heart and soul in vindicating the honour of the Mother - Country, and for once party feeling, although showing itself in the most virulent and unpatriotic form, was completely crushed by the fervour of the nation’s patriotism. But what a series of blunders it was! From first to last there was an utter want of comprehension of the enemy's force, of their tenacity of purpose, of their power of resistance, and even to the last, of the spirit that animated them. From the time when General Buller landed in South Africa, and it was expected that he would eat his Christmas dinner in Pretoria, to the assemblage of the Boer delegates in a conference at Veeriniging, when absurdly favourable conditions of peace were offered, and. in fact, they were bribed into a surrender, there was manifest the same incompetence, the same want of a “man.” As some witty Frenchman said, referring to our Indian Empire, "You cannot govern a great empire by a public meeting—i.e., the House of Commons.” So it may be said that a public meeting cannot carry on a great war. If, instead of a graceful scholar, a drawing-room philosopher, a pleasant debater, and an admirable golf player, we had had for Prime Alinister a man like the elder Pitt, and the first Duke of Wellington, armed with the powers of a dictator, the war might have been finished completely in six months. To begin with, the moment the ultimatum was delivered, the general in command of the South African troops should have telegraphed to Kruger that no combat;int s would be recognised ns lawful belligerent troops except thosa

dressed in regular uniform, and that anyone found on British territory in the possession of firearms would be treated as the Germans treated the French franctireurs, and shot on the spot, if taken prisoners. The only troops the Boers had properly dressed in uniform were their artillery, and a few mounted troopers who formed the President’s bodyguard. If this had been done, and rigidly adhered to, at least a month's delay would have taken place before the invasion of Natal, in order to procure uniforms. The German general order was for any armed party capturing a man not dressed in. uniform with firearms in his possession, to shoot him on the spot, and not to take him prisoner. And this,was invariably done.' Another thing that might have been done which would have stopped the innumerable surrenders that disgraced our army, would have been to issue a general order stating that any unwounded man, in possession of arms and ammunition, who surrendered, should, on being released by the enemy, be publicly dismissed from the service with ignominy.

Another great blunder was the annexation of the two States before they were thoroughly subdued. But 1 have written about this before.

Then, again, it was officially stated by the Secretary of State for War, at least a twelvemonth before the peace, that the Boers in the field did not exceed 10,000. Yet more than twenty thousand surrendered after the peace. But that, after the completion of the pacification of the country, after all the millions ( £220,000,000) spent on the war, after the loss of twenty thousand of our best troops—for it is the best men who get killed in action—that the British Government should deliberately grant with the certainty that that would mean the surrender of the whole country into the hands of the men who were fighting us only five years ago, does seem almost incredible. I believe that in a thousand years hence it will be considered an absolutely incredible myth that has somehow grown up in the course of years. I can easily imagine one of the higher critics of the year 2907. a disciple of Alatthew Arnold, sarcastically summing up the whole history, as we know it, and declaring in conclusion that for a nation like the British nation, a nation that was not only regardful of its honour and dignity as much, at least, as

any nation of that period, but was essentially a business-like and practical race, that such a nation should have been led into a war on behalf of a worthless pack of land sharks and mining speculators, and then have surrendered all that had been gained by the enormous expenditure of money and the loss of twenty thousand lives within,’.! frat years of the surrender < i ff the wholb remaining Boer army, such a critic will pronounce the narrative “unhistorieal’ r and incredible.

It is certain that a nation that, perpetuates such follies with a light heart, and hardly discussing the matter, is in its decadence.’ It is no longer a great ruling power; it has no political conscience. Physically and mentally it is degenerating; it cannot win in its own specially national games, but is beaten by little communities not containing a fortieth of its population. “The predominant partner” is no longer predominant, but prefers to be ruled by Scotchmen. The only three possible Prims Ministers are Scotch, the Lord Chancellor is Scotch, the Secretary of State for War is Scotch, the Colonial Secretary—Scotch, the Lord Lieutenant of Ireland— Scotch, the late Chief Secretary for Ireland—Scotch, the Archbishop of York is Scotch, and one is only surprised that the Scotch allow the Archbishopric of Canterbury to be held by an Englishman. Oh! for the days of old Palmerston! Onehunga, April 14th, 1907.