The Russian Navy.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXII, Issue XIII, 26 March 1904, Page 55

The Russian Navy.

GUN PRACTICE AND STRATEGY. OFFICERS MOST BE OF NOBEE BIRTH. 1 INTERESTING SIDEEIG UTS. It is generally understood that the Russian Admiralty cherishes theories of strategy (says Mr. John Stnnrt in an article contributed io the London Morning Post”) which are not the same as those adopted by other Powers. For instance, great importance is attached to bow and stern fire. The heavy guns nre plaecd higher in the vessel than is usual in other fleets. More confidence is set in small quick-tiring guns than might be expected. Consequently the weight of the broadside fire, to which so much importance is attached in Great Britain, is lower than might be expected from vessels of heavy tonnage. On one point information is lamentably incomplete. It Is impossible to arrive at any leasonable estimate of the Russian fleet s efficiency In gunnery practice. Accounts vary, generally in proportion to the hospitality shown to the observer on Russian warships; if, indeed, observer be the correct word, for the Russians arc always reluctant to expose either their strength or their wekttess. Certainly their shooting at Crete was uncommonly bad. It is .safe to remark that their disposition of guns, especially on the battleships, is n token of remarkable confidence or of an equally remarkable misunderstanding of the conditions of modern naval war. It is also Impossible to avoid leflectlons on the lack of botnogeuMy lu the Huss inn fleet, for the pace of every squadron is determined by the pace of Its slowest member. Formerly the Russian navy used Io be recruited entirely from Finland and Oourland (continues Mr. Btewart), but now le-

▼les arc in adp on all parts of the Empire. One flaw in the system is that the men arc not recruited till they are 21, another (which, however, chiefly affects (he officers) is that the squadron do not grt enough practice in -combined manoeuvres. a point in the favour of the Russian sailor is that the authorities have never abandoned the practice of mast-drill, ashore or afloat. It is said that the men are not intelligent. Intelligence has been proved a most useful quality In our own navy, and the Japanese are intelligent. Evenl’hiioIlussfans complain that the artificers and engineers, especially* in the lower ranks, are incompetent, inexpert, and not particularly strongly devoted to their profession. This is a serious fault, since all the best ships are fitted with Belleville boilers, except the Rctvlsan aiid the Tsarevitch, which cany Nivlausso 1 boilers and the Niclausse needs just as careful handling as the Belleville. There is r.o question about executive authority. Any oflicer may punish a man who Is under him. nnd discipline is merciless. At the end of last year , ail the Russian ships on the Pacific station were rather undermanned, but probably this defect has been remedied. Their full complement is rarely so great as In a Japanese ship of a Corresponding rating.

For officers the navy. ,is the fashionable service in Russia, and every officer must be of ndbic birth. It is a reproach commonly urged against Russian officers that they are too eager for shore billets, and do not Jove the rough-and-tumble of their work. On such a point the ordinary writer's experience is limited, but one may l»e permitted to remember three or four who were skiild navigators or devoted to the practice of gunnery, or in some way or another nt once patriots and keenly engrossed in their profession—nil fluent talk ors on strategy, too. But arguments on strategy do not necessarily imply competence in war. It ought to bo said that our own officers-have little-regard for the efficiency of the Russians. The Intelligence Department of the Fleet is. however, ad inf’-nble and thoroughly well informed. It will probably be amply rcpiesented on the scouting cruisers.