Modern Spies of Peace.

New Zealand Graphic, Volume XXXI, Issue XX, 14 November 1903, Page 54

Modern Spies of Peace.

HOW THE POWERS DISCOVER EACH OTHER’S MILITARY SECRETS. There are many things about each •ther which nations would like to low. In order to discover what they must know (says the “Daily Express”), but • re not allowed to, civilised States employ military spies. They may be Military or Naval Attaches, duly accredited to an Embassy, or secret agents, who are sent to reside or travel In those districts from which information is required by the Intelligence Department. The work of the first class is not unimportant, but it is not risky. The officer may not overstep the bounds of common honesty, and rarely, if ever, attempts to achieve anything secretly. He is closely watched and knows it. If he becomes a strong centre of attraction he may divert the attention of watchers from some seeret agent who is possessing himself of the particulars the Attache is ostensibly so anxious to acquire, but is successfully prevented, from securing. The Attache is useful as a clearing agent. Spies become possessed of facts which are of no real value to those who employ them, but are assumed to be worth much by the agents of other countries, and an exchange of “pieces” is effected. Sometimes apparently useless information is sought simply for its exchange value. For instance, some years ago two British officers created considerable annoyance in Russia by their persistence in hanging about the district in which the autumn manoeuvres were to take place. They were invited to join the staff—the British Attache was there—but this honour they declined. BRITISH SPIES. Then representations were made at the British Embassy, where the officers were unknown, and subsequently they disappeared for a time, only to be discovered at the end of the manoeuvres in one of the five great fortresses which protect the west frontier of Russia, and the one that had been the centre of the military operations. Had these men been Prussian officers their position would have been dangerous, and an unpleasant international incident might have The Russo-German frontier is nothing to Great Britain, neither is the FrancoGerman. We exchange the first “piece” with Germany for the second, and the second with France for a little bit of news about Russia in Asia, which India believes to be important. And thus we get home. Each country has its own peculiar sphere of interest to which it devotes Its greatest attention. Great Britain has so many that properly speaking it has none. But India is always alarmed as to Russia; and agents—British and native—of the India Department are ever busy seeking particulars likely to be of service when we have to defend an Empire which already in the military sense extends from Aden to Hongkong. Most of the Indian agents in Russia are officers of the Indian army. but. needless to state, they do not travel as such. Some affect to be tourists of an innocent but inquiring turn of mind; some go as commercial travellers: some lean to religious propaganda; while others collect curiosities. COMMERC LAL TRAVELLERS. These agents have been so energetic and so prolific in their disguises that in the South of Russia the bona-fide commercial traveller excites suspicion. The Russians now insist upon all “commercials” being licensed and taxed: moreover, the Intelligence Department has found the orders for goods obtained by its travellers somewhat embarrassing. As a buying agent the spy has also worked well. No Briton can now go across the Caspian to purchase skins any more than to sell hardware or even just to amuse himself, without his letters being opened and the company he. keeps carefully noted. Elsewhere than in Central Asia the Inquisitive foreigner is likely to be detained as a suspect if found near a dockyard, arsenal, fortress, masked battery, or military undertaking of any kind. The real tourist may excite ■nspieion, and no doubt manv of the people arrested are innocent, but occa-

•tonally a spy is captured, and usually, of course, is liberated after inquiries. Foreign < onsuls are apt to be much more energetic, emphatic, and positive when a Government agent is taken than they are when the innocence of the parties held is so apparent that it needs no proof. In ordinary circumstance*, when the spy is known he thereby becomes innocuous. and he knows it. If discovered the impolite Russian way is to forbid him to enter the country, or to declare he comes from a plague-infested port, or that he is a Roman Catholic or a Jew. POLITE METHODS. The polite way is to offer him a guard, or helpmate, or companion. The spy is then shown what he must see, and as soon as he has seen and reported, the various military dispositions are changed so that the information he obtains is worse than useless, b<<ng actually misleading. The polite Britisii way is to take the recognised spy round the golf-links, or give him pegs of whisky and tell him soft stories as he sits on a stool enjoying ,( ti interminable regimental cricket, then to send or take him home a happy, talkative man with nothing to tell. That i« what happens when a Russian vessel calls at Perim “for water,” or Russian officers show themselves curious as to the forts at Aden. Many are the dodges resorted to by British agents in order to avoid being “spoofed” by their Russian hosts. Their eomon way is to hunt in couples, each independent of the other, so that if one is taken the other may still succeed in getting through with the work. This plan has other advantages. The Eastern races make adept spies. Russia's agents, when out of uniform, betray their calling by being so wellinformed, which is unusual in Russia, but it takes a clever, educated man to detect them, and there are few such among the class of people the agents frequent in the East, for they pretend to be merchants, veterinary surgeons, pedlars, and even vagrants. In the Far East in the matter of espionage, Japan has the game almost entirely to itself. A Japanese ean readily become so good an imitation of the Chinaman. Mancini, or Mongol that the Russian cannot identify him. and the Chinaman who does will certainly not denounce him. He ean simulate ignorance, almost imbecility—-which the Russian spy is too vain to do—and as merchant, artisan. or interpreter he can go everywhere. Then there are the women! The Japanese amah, apparently stupid and ignorant as a German goose-herd, is really as competent as the average spy in taking notice of things that matter. What a Japanese does not know of the Russian military dispositions in Manchuria is not worth knowing, and this knowledge, like all careful espionage. makes for peace, not war. Had the British methods of espionage been belter there had been no war in South Africa in IS9O. Since tliat date we have improved considerably, but have yet much to learn.