Our Contemporaries.

Fair Play, Volume I, Issue 16, 17 February 1894, Page 6

Our Contemporaries.

J udging from the private letters we have received from various parts of the Colony expressing sympathy for us on account of the decision given in the recent libel case of Bell v. Fair Play, andjthe articles which have appeared in the different papers, the general feeliug of the press of New Zealand is with us. The sycophantic articles which appeared in he Wellington papers stand out in strong contrast to those dispassionately written by men of intelligence and discriminination untrammelled by the influence of the “ Wellington oracle.” We regret that lack of space precludes our publishing all the kind things that have been said about us. We have selected a few extracts for our readers, and in publishing them wish toreturn thanks to over confreres for their courteous fairness.

“ ‘ That doctors differ’ has long been accepted as an axiom —before long we will le able to enlarge the already broad interpretation given to the axiom by saying ‘ judges differ.’ In the libel case Bell v. Fair Play, several witnesses were called who deposed that they understood the offensive sentence to mean that Mr. Bell was intoxicated, or, as we more commonly say, drunk. In the recent libel case tried in this town the counsel for the plaintiff, when about to examine his witnesses as to the inferences they drew from certain expressions, was at once stopped by Mr. Justice Denniston, who said counsel could only examine as to facts —the inference as to what the words might mean was for the jury. This ruling of Judge Denniston’s seemed good law, and very forcible expressions were made use of in reference to the action of the plaintiff’s solicitor, who had apparently called a host of witnesses in order to increase the defendant’s costs in the event of even a very small verdict being obtained. The action of the presiding judge in Wellington again places us in a position of doubt. Which judge is right ? Surely the law of evidence is so clearly laid down, the authorities upon it so numerous, that it is impossible for a learned judge to make a mistake. But yet one judge or the other must be wrong. Which one is it? Common sense —defined by Allison as uncommon sense—would certainly agree with Judge Denniston. Except' in the case of expert evidence there are few—we are not sufficiently versed in law to say there are none—instances in which a witness should be allowed to speak of anything he does not know. Were it otherwise we might have a cloud of witnesses brought especially to say what their views are and the minds of the jurors become more befogged than usual. Take this Wellington case as an illustration. Mr. Bell might call a dozen witnesses to prove that in their opinion the paragraph meant he was drunk, while the defendants could call two dozen who would express their opinion it meant to convey Mr. Bell was intoxicated by success. What are the jurors to do in a case like this ? In addition to the unsatisfactory

character of a decision arrived at in this way there is another grave objection in the expense. Once we admit a man’s opinion as a factor in evidence, we allow the possibility of bringing in all persons who have read the paragraph complained of. Although things would never go to this ridiculous extent, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the admission of such evidence would not only lengthen the hearing to an interminable extent but would also increase the cost so as to make it unbearable to a poor man. The matter is of.such grave importance that we hope the Bench will, for the sake of its own reputation, put it right.” —West Coast Times. [Unfortunately for us the Bench didn’t look at it in that way.— Ed. Fair Play.]

“ It is rather significant that in nearly all the papers we have seen in which a report of the Wellington libel action is published, the heading reads, “ Bell versus Fair Play.” Of course, no one can object to Mr. Bell proceeding against a newspaper if he is personally convinced that he has been in any way wronged, but we take leave to say that, with regard to the action which has just terminated, and as a result of which Mr.

Bell has received j£l damages and costs on the lowest scale, the member has suffered more in public estimation as a politician than has the newspaper against which he took action in its character as a cleverly written journal. No one can really believe for a moment that there was any malice in the comment made by Fair Play. We should- be sorry to think that the private character of any man should be at the mercy of any unprincipled scamp who chose to act the part of the ruffian in journalism ; but in the case of Fair Play and Mr. Bell we do not believe that any harm was intended, and it would certainly have been more to the credit of the newly-fledged M.H.R. had he taken the reference in good part and laughed with the paper at an incident that, after all, was the product of excitement on the one hand and of not badly meant ‘ chaff’ on the other. It is when a man’s private character is assailed, when a low and blackguardly scribbler endeavors to positively injure a private individual by a series of mean and cowardly attacks, that the law should be set in motion and the offender be made to suffer for his dirty work. The item complained of by Mr. Bell was a mere political squib, and should have been allowed to pass. If there is any public spiiit in Wellington, the costs incurred by Fair Play should be subscribed by the public. The paper is a smart little production, well written, and deservedly popular ; but if every public man is permitted to revenge himself upon the proprietors for every harmless comment, we are afraid that not only Fair Play, but every other political newspaper, will have to hang crape on the front door, hire a couple of “ Mutes,” place a Stiggins in its editorial chair, make its columns the receptacle for drivel, stick a skull and marrow bones over its leading heading, and sob and groan about everything and everybody.” —Napier Evening News. “ The verdict in Mr. Bell’s action against Fair Play is another instance of the folly of such proceedings. If we take one of the dozen libel actions which have gone into the courts within the past four or five years, there is not one that has done anybody any good except the lawyers In nine cases out of ten it would seem that the action is prompted by revenge. As a rule newspaper editors do not use their columns vindictively, unless under the grossest provocation, and then they do what every man who is worth the name will —defend themselves against aggressive action. Where a newspaper becomes involved in a libel suit, it is nearly always on some action which it has taken in the public interest. In the case under review, we must say that we consider Mr. Bell’s action was quite uncalled for. The cause of the action was of the most trivial character, and such as only a lawyer would think of prosecuting. Indeed, had anyone but Mr. Bell been the plaintiff we should have considered that the action was prompted by other motives than the vindication of character —so trivial does it appear to have been. Such trivial actions should be discouraged in every way.” —Woodville Examiner. “ We are not amongst those who think more highly of Mr. H. D. Bell on account of the proceedings which he has recently taken against Fair Play. At a time when political feeling ran high Fair Play formed and expressed an opinion as to Mr. Bell’s personal habits, which has been proved to be erroneous, but it was rumoured that when Fair Play discovered it had made an error, it was willing both to admit its fault and to correct it. This in our opinion would have been the proper way of terminating an incident which was specially liable to occur during the course of a contested election. Mr. Bell did not care to be a party to a settlement of this kind and evoked the law by instituting a prosecution for libel. No one knows better than a lawyer what an inhumane weapon a libel prosecution is, and at what cost it may be made to punish an adversary. We can understand a lawyer using this weapon when urged to do so by, and on behalf of a client, but it is not a chivalrous nor a noble thing for him to use it on his own behalf as a weapon of defence. No one knows better than a lawyer that the libel law as it stands in New Zealand bears heavily against the press and that for this reason it ought not to be resorted to except as a last remedy As a public man Mr. Bell would stand higher if he were somewhat less sensitive to criticism. . . . Men of high character and position rarely bring libel actions, they rather disdain the miserable weapons that meaner mortals use, and Mr. Bell ought to know this.” —Wairarapa Weekly Times.

“T.he question at issue was whether Fair Play had accused Mr. Bel 1 of being intoxicated on the election day. The word used wa “ exhilarated,” which is perfectly harmless and nonlibellous in itself; but Mr. Bell took pains to prove that in this case it meant intoxicated Newspaper writers who wish to say that a politician was * exhilarated with something ’ will now have some idea of the monetary responsibility they incur in doing so. The question of costs is a serious one, and it remains in a very unsatisfactory state of uncertainty. Costs are left pretty much in the discretion of the judges, who resent any attempt of the jury to return a verdict which should decide which of the parties should bear all the costs of action. There is a popular delusion to the effect that no verdict under forty shillings can carry costs. ... If juries wish to mark then* sense of the trivialty of an action for libel their proper course is to award the plaintiff the smallest coin of the realm. No judge could with decency then declare that such a verdict carried costs.” — Lyttelton Times. “ A diversity of opinion exists amongst editors of newspapers as to whether Mr. Bell exercised a wise judgment in taking proceedings against the journal in question."—Wanganui Chronicle. i~ j

“ The case is a curious illustration of the change which has taken place in public opinion. A. century ago, it was a matter of course that three-fourths of the candidates should be very decidedly exhilarated after winning an election ; and the idea of solemnly denying such an imputation in Court would have been looked upon as ridiculous. Such an improvement in manners is most gratifying There are offences which, from a moral point of view, are quite as bad as intemperance, but which do not seem to have fallen under the ban of public opinion at present. If you call a man proud and ambitious, he is probably rather pleased than otherwise; you may call him covetous without hurting his feelings very much ; that is if you convey the imputation politely by saying that he is canny and cautious, and “ knows what he is about”; but if you insinuate that he ever exceeds the bounds of sobriety, you run the risk of an action for libel. And yet if we look at the history of the world we shall see that, where drunkenness has slain its thousands, pride ambition, and the love of money have slain their tens of thousands. . . . The lesson which journalists may learn from the recent case is that, though they may say of a man, as Lord Beaconsfield did of Mr. Gladstone, that he is “ inebriated by the exuberance of his own verbosity,” they must not hint that he is exhilarated by anything stronger than soda-water.”— Marion Mercury. “ It is difficult to resist the conclusion that the Wellington libel action was after all a rather trumpery affair. At the declaration of the poll Mr. Bell probably spoke unadvisedly with his lips, as a much greater man once confessed he had done, when in the excitement of victory he said the Wellington people had brushed aside the froth and scum of something —it is not quite certain what, Fair Play understood the expression to apply to the defeated candidates, and actually for aught we know it might apply to them very well; it would at least have been no great injustice to designate a goodly number of the candidates, Conservative as well as Liberal, as froth and scum. ... It was, however, perhaps unpolite in Mr. Bell to use the offensive expression, and unpoliteness is very apt to provoke recrimination. When a man says to his fellowman ‘ You’re a so and so,’ that fellowman quite naturally replies ‘You’re another.’ .... In politics particularly do men make fools of themselves. We do not mean that the plaintiff made a fool of himself at the declaration of the poll, Mr. Bell is a superior person and would not be likely to do so, but it is pretty clear that he must have been excited when he blurted out his characterisation of (let us say) the Liberal addresses. What more natural then than that his oppononts should take him up as sayiny that they were the scum and froth he meant ? And equally natural was it for one of the journals supporting them to retort that Mr. Bell must have supplemented the excitement by victory from another source. And where was the great harm m saying so? . . . 'ls it after all such a dreadful thing to sa y that a successful candidate has, in the crisis of his triumph, taken a glass too much ?• What mealy-mouthed times we live ln > to be sure. Sir Robert Stout, indeed, said,, with the disgust-

ing bluntness of an unimaginative teetotaller and special pleader, that Fair Play prnctically charged Mr. 801 l with being drunk. Such liternl-mindednoss, if wo may so oxpress it, oxcites pity rather than contompt. But it is characteristic of teetotallers that they can mako no distinctions. Good liquor in then* eyes is as much poison as the abominations sold in grog shanties; and with them there is no middle stage botvvoon absolute water-drinking sobriety aud drunkonoss. Thoy havo not tho slightest idea of what it is to elevated, which is propably all that Fair Play meant in Mr. Bell’s caso. . . - .

In these days, when Prohibition i« in tho air, it is hardly possible to get a jury to allow, so to speak, for allowable olovation. The Wellington twelve decided that Fair Play had practically said that Mr. 801 l was drunk, which wo should say is against all reason and common sense. Is there not a certain liberty, not to say liconce, permitted in the hoat of an election ? It is as impossible for colonial patriots to ohoose a representative, as it is to love, and bo wise. Lovers and olootors are both in a sense beside themselves, so that it is absurd to interpret their sayings quite literally. But such oonsidorstions, self-evident though they be, are apparently beyond tho common jury understanding—even beyond the judicial understanding. The twolvo good men and true (men may be both and yet bo dull) held that Fair Play had raised Mr. 801 l as it woro, above the legitimate elevation, and accordingly found a verdict for tho plaintiff. But tho case was, as wo havo alroady said, of tho most trumpory character. Mr. Bell expressly statod, undor examination, that he never thought of bringing it on till ho was advised to do so by members of Ins party. Wo can only say that he was monstrously ill-advised , evon though ho did got a verdict. Mr. 801 lis a very prominent, if a considerably over • rated man. His character is thus perfectly well known, so that he could have suffered no damage from what wo cannot help calling the very innocent libel in tho Fair Play artido. Wo do not suppose that evon a single .teetotaller would havo believed that Mr. Bell was drunk when ho uttorod his “ froth and scum” sentence. There aro offences, and wo should say the Fair Play statement was ono of thorn, which a man in Mr. Bell’s position can afford to ignore. Mr. Bell was of tho sanio opinion himself till his Prohibitionist supportors intorvonod—one of whom (a clergyman) is by the way an adopt in tho •‘high polite,” defining drunkenness as the “imbibing of intoxicating drink to excess.” Pity but Mr. 801 l had acted on his own judgment.— Napier Tclegra2)h.