THE SHADOW OF THE LAND—a study of British policy and racial conflict in New Zealand, 1832–1852

Te Ao Hou, December 1968, Page 58

THE SHADOW OF THE LAND—a study of British policy and racial conflict in New Zealand, 1832–1852 by Ian Wards Government Printer, $6.00 reviewed by Mrs Maxine Tamahori, M.A The author first set out to write a history of the army in New Zealand, but because the initiation of military enterprise in this country cannot be divorced from its early history, the book was greatly broadened in concept. The result has been a vivid record of the political and social times surrounding the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi. Underlying the whole is Maori mistrust of European intentions, influenced and intensified by their own overriding desires to acquire European materials and advantages, for which the only acceptable exchange was their land. As the sub-heading of the book indicates, it is ‘a study of British policy and racial conflict in New Zealand, 1832–1852’. Policy and conflict activated each other. Conflict areas are located in North Auckland, Wellington, Wanganui and briefly, though significantly, in Nelson. It is associated almost wholly with the land. First chapters cover the early negotiations and developments in the acquisition of the new colony and by page 40, we are brought into Treaty of Waitangi times and the dark clouds of impending conflict in the North. The author gives new significance to this treaty, conceived in the interests of imperial policy, yet so phrased as to present a charter of ideal co-existence between two peoples at widely separated points in the time-scale of civilization. The chameleon nature of the words is not readily apparent, certainly Maori unsophistication was no match for it at the time, and the author goes to some length to clarify a situation which he claims has been falsely represented to five generations of Maori people. Disillusionment came quickly to some. Nopera Panakareao, a christianised Kaitaia chief of great influence, said at the signing of the Treaty, ‘The shadow of the land goes to Queen Victoria, but the substance remains to us’. Less than a year later he was to say, ‘The substance of the land goes to the Europeans, the shadow only will be our portion’. By the time that Governor Grey had arrived, so much blurring of Treaty ink had occurred that he found nothing incompatible with it in his instructions ‘to foster the education of the Maori and to consider his feelings and prejudices, but only when these were not inconsistent with the peace and welfare of colonists of European descent … to require implicit subjection to the law, and if necessary to enforce that submission by the use of all powers, civil and military at his command’. Grey was not slow to take advantage of the extreme in his instructions, and in spite of the warnings of officials and missionaries, that the continued violation of Maori rights might result in a united Maori front instead of the isolated resistance of a few chiefs, he virtually gave the colonists a free hand in the acquisition of Maori land. Less than five years after the signing of the Treaty, the Maori had become a second-class citizen in his own land and there was rebellion from Wairau to Kororareka, through the Wellington district and in Wanganui. Taranaki, Waikato and Tauranga were in a state of unrest. As a promise of peaceful co-

existence the Treaty had been an illusion. The illusionary character of the Treaty was perpetuated by Government policy. New thoughts on the government of subject peoples by ‘moral suasion’ rather than by military supremacy were current at the time. It promulgated an idealistic code of humane dealing with uncivilized subject peoples. It had its essence in consent to sovereignty without military coercion, and the welfare and advancement of the subject race foremost. The fact of the Treaty and the absence of troops at the time certainly gave some substance to ‘moral suasion’, but the author claims that as a genuine policy, it was a myth. At best it was an inference drawn from Hobson's and Fitzroy's attempts to come to terms with the situation that badly needed military support, and we ought not to suppose that idealistic principles were dictating a reluctance to use force. Evidence goes to show that actually they were searching for troops, which for various reasons were not immediately available. This does not imply that Hobson and Fitzroy did not have real personal convictions about the value of ‘moral suasion’. The characters of both these men suggest that they did, but farsightedness in weighing up the practicability of ‘moral suasion’ against doubtful advantage did the colonising image no harm. Whatever the practicability of ‘moral suasion’, and it is possible that it would have been successful in the New Zealand context, few people apart from the unsophisticated Maori of the time would have been naive enough to suppose that the European settler and the Government were going to willingly submit to a policy that would eventually do more for the subject race than for themselves. Grey was to explode the ‘moral suasion’ illusion completely when the long awaited troops did arrive. He made it clear enough then that there never was any intention to consider the Maori a British subject on the same level as the European settler. Conflict in the North centred in the struggles of Hone Heke, aided by Kawiti and Pomare, against a government now in command of military detachments and supported by Tamati Waka Nene. It is interesting to recall how school history texts so dictated our conception of the events at this time that Hone Heke was depicted as