MOVE EXPECTED.

Ashburton Guardian, Volume 62, Issue 307, 9 October 1942, Page 3

MOVE EXPECTED.

JAPANESE AT GUADALCANAR. RELATION TO NEW GUINEA. '(Special Australian Correspondent N.Z.P.A.) SYDNEY, Oct. S. An all-out Japanese attempt to recapture Guadalcanal’ Island, in the Solomons, is imminent, according to many observers, including BrigadierGeneral H. S. Sewell, military adviser at the British Information Department in Washington. However, if the enemy remains unwilling to risk a major naval engagement the troops which he landed by stealth on Guadalcanar may be_sacrificed. Military observers in the United States say that the Japanese are withdrawing from New Guinea to concentrate on reoccupying their 1 bases in the Solomons.

“Japan may be unable to carry on exacting campaigns simultaneously m New Guinea and the Solomons,” says the “New York Times” in a leading article. “In this event it would be logical to sacrifice the operations against Port Moresby if that would /help to regain Guadalcanal’. While Guadalcanal* and Tulagi are in Allied hands the Japanese left flank is exposed to danger.” “Insufficient air power to nrovide cover for both his Papuan and Solomons drives appears to have been the greatest single factor in prompting the abandonment of the enemy’s land drive against Port Moresby,” says the “Sydney Morning Herald” to-day. “The Japanese have now to shew whether they are strong enough in the air to carry the .southern Solomons alone. The longer the enemy delays the promised attack in force on Tulagi and Guadalcanal*, the greater will be the task before him in dislodging the Americans, who are steadily strengthening their positions. “The Japanese landing of reinforcements at night on Guadalcan'ar is merely an adaptation of the enemy’s set tactics of infiltration,” says the , “Sydney Morning Herald,” “but Guadalcanal’,- in spite of itsi size on the map, offers nothing useful to the attacker or defender except one flat space on the north-west corner of the island, where the all-important aerodrome is situated. So long as the enemy fails to assert sufficient naval and air strength to seize and hold this foot of the Port Moresby-Tulagi-Rabaul strategic triangle, the mere maintenance of hisi forward troops there, as on the Papuan length of the second leg of the triangle, must be an expensive gesture. “Just as the Japanese at loribaiwa, lacking strength for forward movement, were, obliged to retire, so the- planting of small parties of troops on Guadalcanar must become futile if they are not to he aided in their purpose by strong naval and air action.”