FURTHER PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE NATIVE INSURRECTION; BEING A MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A DEPUTATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVINCE OF WELLINGTON AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR.

Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives, 1861 Session I, E-01d

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FURTHER PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE NATIVE INSURRECTION; BEING A MEMORANDUM OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN A DEPUTATION OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE PROVINCE OF WELLINGTON AND HIS EXCELLENCY THE GOVERNOR.

LAID UPON THE TABLE BY ME. EOX, JUNE 20th, 1861, AND ORDERED TO BE PRINTED.

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Dr. Featherston said that they came in their capacity of representatives of the Province o* Wellington, to point out to his Excellency how utterly inadequate the forces at present stationed there ■would be to afford almost any protection in the event of a rising among the Natives. They regretted to be obliged to inform his Excellency that though peace had hitherto been preserved, and that though some considerable time after the commencement of the war at Taranaki there was every reason to believe that the great bulk of the Natives would continue loyal and well-affected; yet owing to various causes a feeling of intense distrust of the Government had within the last few weeks taken possession of the Native mind; large numbers were giving in their adhesion to the King movement, and in fact almost the whole Native population might be said to be preparing for a war which they deemed inevitable. What the Natives said was simply this, that as long as the war was confined to Taranaki they looked upon it as a dispute between the Governor and William King about Land, which would be settled sooner or later without their being dragged into quarrel, but that if the war was carried by the Government into other parts they could and would only regard it as a proof of the determination of the Government to attack and destroy them in detail, and that they would be forced to take part in the war. Even the most loyal chiefs—those who had proved themselves staunch allies of the Government —declared that if war was carried into the Waikato country it would be the signal for a general rising, they might not themselves join, but their tribes would make common cause with the Waikatos. Since they had been in Auckland they (the Members) had seen and heard enough to satisfy them that there was a strong probability of Military operations being undertaken in tlie Waikato country, and they therefore felt themselves bound to urge upon his Excellency the necessity of reinforcing the garrisons at Wellington and Wanganui, and of giving them the protection of some part of the i Naval force at his disposal. They did not pretend to say that his Excellency, even with the whole force at present in the colony, could defend the colonists beyond the precincts of the towns, but they felt that they were fairly entitled to ask that the towns lie had named should be rendered secure against any attack the Natives might make. The presence of a considerable force at Wellington and Wanganui might probably have such a moral influence as to prevent the Natives rising. Being anxious not to cripple his Excellency in the means of carrying on any Military operations that might be decided on, they preferred their present request with regret; but a sense of duty compelled them to urge it. Mr. Fox begged to corroborate, as regarded the district which he represented, what Dr. Featherston had said. He lived in the immediate neighbourhood of large bodies of Natives, on terms of entire friendliness and familiarity, but they did not conceal the fact that almost to a man they regarded the King movement with favour, that in case of a general war to suppress that movement they would fight in its defence. The Wanganui and Rangitiki District might be described as some fifty miles square, and what made its position eminently critical was that it was accessible on three sides to large bodies of Natives. The Wanganui River Natives, those from Tanpo and those from Manawutu, and even Ahuriri. In case of a general rising the district would be cut off from Wellington on the one hand and Taranaki on the other, while open to aggression from so many quarters. The only protection this wide district had, was (less than) 200 soldiers at Wanganui, who certainly could not do more than defend their own position, while for purposes of self-defence the colonists were entirely unprepared. They could muster perhaps 1000 men capable of bearing arms. The whole of the arms in the district provided by the Government did not, he believed, amount ts more than 100 rifles and about 200 muskets and old carbines. The settlers in the portion cf the district where he himself resided, about 200 capable of bearing arms, had not received a single weapon from Government, and their whole supply was about fifty private fowling pieces and a few pistols. In short, in case of an outbreak everything must be abandoned, and the whole of the settlers flee into the Town of Wanganui for refuge. Mr. Fitzherbert said that he was well acquainted with the different bodies of Natives living within thirty miles of Wellington, with many of whom he was 'm terms of friendly communication. Speaking with this local experience, he could not fail to observe that during the last twelve months the Natives of the parts referred to had become distrustful of the intentions of Government. They had gradually lost confidence, and had been driven back upon themselves ; and with the exception of some old and faithful chiefs and their more immediate adherents, these Natives had very generally declared themselves for the King movement. They frankly avowed in their conversation that, while they desired peace, yet if the Waikato were attacked they would immediately rise. Mr. Fitzherbert referred to the Memorial of the Wellington Provincial Council, and observed that unless a considerable addition

FURTHER PAPERS RELATIVE TO THE NATIVE INSURRECTION,

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FURTHER PAPERS RELATIVE TO

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were made to the garrison at Wellington, and one ship of war at least stationed at that port, the European inhabitants and the friendly Natives would be left in an exposed and entirely defenceless stats in the event of war breaking out afresh. Mr. Carter begged to call his Excellency's attention to the condition of the Wairarapa district, which he represented, stating that the Natives of that district, some few months ago were loyal and peaceable; but that recently a very great change in their demeanour was visible; that large numbers of them had now joined, the King movement, and that a very unsettled feeling existed among them, He did not think there would be any disturbance there at present, but if the war were commenced in Waikato the Waisarapa Natives were likely to be goaded into rebellion by Natives from other districts, and in that case the settlers in the Wairarapa, being in an entirely unprotected state, would be completely at the mercy of Insurgents. He (Mr. C.) did not ask for soldiers to be stationed in the district, but that the force at Wellington should he augmented to such an extent as to afford assistance to the Wairarapa in case of emergency. The population of the district was about 1500 souls, and there were more sheep and cattle than in the whole Province of Auckland. There were three separate townships, each with a population of about 200 souls, immediately contiguous, besides a large number of scattered families. His Excellency replied that as regarded a ship of war being stationed at Wellington, Commodore Seymour had distinctly told him that no vessel of war under his command should ever again be stationed at Wellington. That the Commodore was entirely independent of him—might take all his ships to the Fiji Islands to-morrow, and he (the Governor) could not prevent it. He had expressed a wish that a ship of war should he sent to Wellington, but it was not agreed to. It was true if he told Commodore Seymour that the safety cf Wellington imperatively demanded the presence of a man of war, he would have to take the responsibility on himself if he refused to send one. But he (the Governor) did not consider that any such emergency had arisen. In reference to the disposal of the troops, the General had ordered the force at Wanganuisome short time since, at his (the Governor's) request, to be made up to 400 men: whether they had yet been sent he could not say, as there was great difficulty in communicating with Wanganui. The force at Napier would be increased to 300, and additional arms would be sent to the Southern Settlements as they arrived. That out of 700 stand just now arrived in the harbour, 500 would be divided between Wellington, Napier and Wanganui. The Governor then adduced some returns to show that the Wellington Province had hitherto received its full proportion of arms. The figures were as follows:— Wellington and Wanganui—European population 12,000. Maori, 8,000. Troops—Wellington ... ... 300 i " Wanganui ... ... 200 Under orders ... ... 200 700 Arms— Wellington—Rifles and Percussion Muskets ... 710 Wanganui —Do. and Carbines ... ... 408 1108 Exclusive of 77 Flint Muskets. Auckland—European population, 23,000. Maori ... 38,600. Arms of all sorts ... 1,964. The Governor then read a letter from General Cameron, in which he stated " that the forces had been concentrated round Auckland at the Governor's express desire, in order to give weight to pending negotiations, and to enforce the submission of the Waikato tribes, should they refuse to accede to the terms offered and to acknowledge the Queen's supremacy; and that His Excellency's policy could not be carried out if the troops were to be distributed among the Provinces. " That in case of a general war great losses would inevitably fall on the outsettlers, and it would be impossible for him (the General) by any disposition of the troops at his disposal, to prevent the destruction of their property." His Excellency said that he concurred in these sentiments, that war was not made with rose water. That though he hoped there was no immediate danger, yet that there ought to be no misapprehension. His own opinion was that the first shot that was fired in the Waikato there would be a general rising of the tribes connected with the King movement in the several Provinces. Thetermshe had proposed tothe Waikatos he intended should be insisted on. That 20,000 soldiers could not protect all the outsettlers, and he thought the Government had a right to expect that the settlers would assist to protect themselves, which they were well able to do. In the event of an attack the outsettlers would have to take refuge in the centres of population—build blockhouses, as the settlers at Taranaki had done, and defend them. The Blockhouses at Taranaki erected by the settlers were very excellent buildings. If the forces at the General's disposal were to be divided up into garrisons, the General could not possibly take the field. He (the Governor) would not attempt to conceal from the deputation that war carried on in a country in which we dwell, and where our wealth and property are scattered broadcast, must be attended with great loss and very serious consequences. War was not yet certain, but he was of opinion that every exertion should be made to prepare for it, if it should be forced upon us.

THE NATIVE INSURRECTION.

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Mr. Fox desired to correct one or two fallacies which had occurred in His Excellency's quotation from General Cameron's letter and in his own remarks. He referred first to the expression " Outsettlers," which might lead to the belief that the bulk of the population would be protected and only a few scattered homesteads on the very margin of colonization be left uncared for. But the fact was the whole provincial population were " Outsettlers," except the comparatively small number who resided in the towns, and to decline to protect the " Outsetfciers" was in fact to abandon the persons and property of the whole population of the Provinces. The other fallacy to which he wished to call attention was the estimate of Native population which His Excellency had made. No doubt his figures were correct, but there was no impediment to incursion by the large hordes of Natives who lived up the Wanganui river, in the Taupo country, at Taranaki, at Ahuriri, and elsewhere, beyond the actual limits of the Province ; but who could all concentrate themselves upon it in a few hours at any time. The Province was quite as much exposed as Auckland was, though, perhaps, not from Natives being within its own boundaries. His Excellency rejoined, that he could only repeat what the General had said, that the " outsettlers" could not be protected, it was impossible to garrison every farm house : they must look to themselves. Mr. Taylor remarked that the estimate of the numbers of Natives and Europeans in the different Provinces was not a fair criterion of the danger to which the Wellington Province would be exposed in case of movements against the Waikatos being undertaken by the Government, for the probable .result would be to drive down the interior tribes on to- the Province of Wellington. Mr. Fitzherbert remarked that in His Excellency's "estimate of the proportion of forces in each Province, he had omitted the five men of war stationed at Auckland, which entirely reversed the proportion stated by him and apparently established by the Returns ho had produced. Mr. Carter observed that not a single rifle had been sent to the Wairarapa. His Excellency said that the distribution of arms sent to the South rested with the local Militia Authorities. In conclusion, His Excellency observed that Auckland, from its position, was particularly exposed that he did not believe that for some time past there had been any imminent danger even there. That at present he did not think there was any danger of an immediate outbreak anywhere. I. E. Featherston, W. Fox, William Fitzherbert, C. B. Carter, A. Renall, W. W. Taylor.