ARE OUR PEACE TERMS FOOLISH?

Wanganui Herald, Volume LI, Issue 15194, 14 April 1917, Page 5

ARE OUR PEACE TERMS FOOLISH?

By Robert Blatchford

Are our statesmen "prepared to let the Germans down too lightly? Mr Blatchford looks around and makes some pertinent comments on this and other vital problems of the hour. NO "FOOL'S PEACE." Beaten at Jutland, beaten at Verdun, beaten on the Somme, beaten at Ypres and Nancy and in Champagne, with the blow at Egypt foiled, with the British Empire resolute and united, with a fighting Government in power, with a steadily tightening blockade, the Germans have begun to talk of peace. We do not need spirits risen from the vasty deep to make clear to us the meaning of such proposals. The answer is No! But when we come to consider the terms formulated by the Allies for the information of President Wilson we find ourselves in deeper waters. Have our readers, I wonder, noticed the remarkable reticence of the British Press with regard to the Allied terms? Those terms, though very satisfactory to the Americans and some other neutrals, do not appeal to a Briton. After so much sacrifice and loss we seem to be amazingly modest in our demands. We seem to be more than modest; we see mto be foolishly magnanimous, dangerously incautious. But our Press has said so little about it that one feels the Press must be thinking a lot. I don't think we need worry. I notice in the official' terms of peace published by the Allies at least two blessed words: "reparation" and "guarantees." When the time comes for a more definite formulation of terms I fancy those two words, "reparation" and "guarantees," will bulge somewhat largely on the enemy and neutral eyes. There will, for instance, be reparation for the murders of British women and men, and for the sinking of Allied and neutral merchant ships. There may be guarantees for future peace that will throw a new light upon the modest and gentle document sent to President Wilson. We went to war, we were told, to break the Prussian power. We must have guarantees that the Prussian power is broken. There will be some guarantees.

THE NEUTRAL BOGEY. We need not worry over the inclinations, interests, or embarrassments of Holland, America, Norway, or Sweden. What- the neutrals think or want is their affair. They are neutrals. Putting aside the neutrals and avoiding all unnecessary analysis and speculation, we find ourselves confronted with a very simple proposition, quite easy to understand. If German asks for peace it because she wants peace, and the fact that she wants peace is a sound reason why we should refuse it. Such open and apparent hypocrisy would not deceive a child. The answer of the Allies was inevitable: "No. We do not intend to discuss terms of peace; we intend to impose them." Before the ena of the year, perhaps, peace may be within the Allies' reach; but it will have to be won by the Allies' arms; only a fool will hope for it by German concessions. The Germans entered this war with every advantage on their side. They had the central position, they had unity of control, they had a war machine the most tremendous ever seen; they had a clearly marked plan; they were ready to a gaiter button; they had the advantage of surprise; they had all the value of 40 years of espionage and peaceful penetration; and the nations they attacked were unprepared. And the Germans have failed. They never defeated the French army; they never defeated the Russian army. They failed with their Zeppelins and submarines; they failed upon the seas. They are held upon the Eastern and the Western fronts, ana the power of the Russians and the British grows greater every day. TINO'S TREACHERY. What is the matter with Greece? We can alj see that King Constantine has been a secret and treacherous enemy; and we can all see that our diplomacy in the Balkans has been unsuccessful. But we do not know what the difficulties have been. We do not know what obstacles have stood in the way of our diplomacy. On the face of it, one is tempted to conclude that the Foreign Offices of the French, the British, the Russians, and the Italians have all been duped and be-fooled. But the treachery of King'Constantine and King Ferdinand has been so obvious that one is bewildered.

When nearly every man in tire street in all the Allied countries could see what the King of Greece was aiming at it is difficult to believe that the Foreign Ministers of France, Britain, Russia, and Italy were all blind. Now the irresponsible unprincipled scribbler of the smart reader's imagination could easily deal with the Greek problem. Our diplomacy could be scorned and our diplomats lectured, and the scribbler could air his sagacity. But a writer who knows his. job does not rush at a puzzle like Sm bull at a red rag. No. When a situation looks too easy and to obvious, the old hand grows suspicious, and goes slow. For my part I am not touching the Greek problem. It is too obvious for me. 1 want more data. I smell mystery. I remember how the whole of Europe was humbugged about the origin of the Franco-German war. WHY—AND WHY AGAIN?

Let me hand out to the smart persons who so disdain the scribbler a few war problems. Why did Mr Asquitb resign? Why did the Russian Premier resign? Why did the Russian supply of guns and shells break down at the moment when the Russians seemed to be on the crest of victory? What is the actual political situation in Russia to-day? Why are the Swiss re-mobilising some of their divisions? Why, in IT) 14, did the French Government make the of leaving Belgium almost without help? Why did Lord Fisher leave the Admiralty? And whv is Sir H. Smith-Dorrien witiaont

an active command? Everyone of these problems is a pitfall in the p-ath of a journalist who has to write about the war. THE RUSSIAN MYSTERY. Take a hint. During the first year of the war the Russian Grand Puke Nicholas was lauded as a great captain and a great strategist. Then, suddenly and without reason given, he was removed to the Caucasus. People wondered. I wondered. It was all we could do. I don't think a single scribbler volunteered an explanation. And Who under heaven would have been able by any mental process of deduction to 'discover that the"key was probably in the hand of —Rasputin? Rasputin! Who was Rasputin? Most of us had never heard of him until he was dead. Rasputin was a power behind the throne* He seems to have been an ignorant and dissolute peasant; a charlatan priest, I ask our smart young men who could postulate a Rasputin? And how is one to know that there is not some uirknown and unimaginable quantity behind some of the other mysterious enigmas of this war? When the Russians were driven back, losing all they had won, and more, the military experts here were hard put to it for explanations of the disaster. They offered many ingenious theories. I read all • those theories and considered them anxiously. I shook my head. The explanations were not convincing. Then by degrees the truth leaked out. The Russians had only one rifle to three men. They were short of artillery" and almost without shells. We could not blame the military experts for not knowing that. How were they to guess?

MYSELF AND THE CRITICS. The masses are inarticulate. The army is inarticulate. Very few soldiers or workmen have a chance to be heard, even if they had the skill and the desire to write or speak. I know the masses very and the army also. I know that the private soldier and the workman are not valued or treated as they deserve. I am a writer and I have the opportunity of doing the masses and the soldiers a good turn. I try to use that opportunity; and I think Ido a little good. Because, although I offend many people and make mies, and though my work may seem harsh and blunt and deficient in style, yet it serves its purpose. My readers may kick and prance and throw verbal bouquets at me; but they do not generally go to sleep. I usually contrive to cause them to sit up and take notice; and that is my object. And all that I have said about field punishment, about discipline, about the masses and the classes is true. I have been writing war articles for more than two years. It is very anxious and difficult work. One has to walk warily between the dangers of saying the things one knows and may not tell and the things one does not know and is expected to explain.