CHINESE MAKING MOST OUT OF THEIR KOREAN INTERVENTION

Wanganui Chronicle, 21 November 1950, Page 5

CHINESE MAKING MOST OUT OF THEIR KOREAN INTERVENTION

LONDON, Nov. 20 (Recd. 6pm).— The Chinese are now bent on getting the greatest possible diplomatic advantage out of their intervention in Korea, says “The Economist.” It continues that the Chinese Prime Minister (Chou Enlai) made a provoctive counter-proposal to the Security Council’s invitation to discuss General MacArthur's despatch dealing with the movement of Peking’s troops across the Manchurian frontier into Korea. Chou Enlai claims that since questions of Formosa and Korea are closely related by virtue of American aggression in each case, they should be discussed together on the basis of China's accusations. But, says “The Economist,” Chou Enlai is barking up the wrong tree if he thinks that, having spent so much blood and treasure in fighting aggression in Korea, Washington is now going to be put on the spot itself. The journal goes on to say: “General MacArthur is faced with a peculiarly exasperating and disappointing dilemma. “On the one hand, enemy aircraft as well as army reinforcements are using inviolable Manchurian bases where they cannot be attacked by superior air power, one of the Americans' strongest weapons; the troops face a bitter and disheartening winter campaign when victory once seemed near; and guerrilla activity behind the lines is growing. On the other hand the campaign cannot be wound up until the Manchurian border is reached while to do this runs the constant risk that the Chinese, may not only increase their ! ‘nforcement of the enemy very subs tantially, but that the flames of war may spread. The General Assembly decided on the unification of all Korea, and the incident will not be closed until this has been accomplished. But it is worth recalling that the original purnose of U.N. intervention was to stop North Korean aggression against the south and to prove to Russia that aggression does not pay. “This has already been achieved and it would be a pity to jeopardise the major aim for the sake of the minor. In that case, the united Nations could do worse than to consolidate temporarily on a front line across the narrow neck of the peninula from Anju to Hamkung. This would also have the military advantage of turning the North Korean mountains into a buffer region where air power could continue to be used against enemy preparations for attack’*