Cijc Wanganui Cljronieie WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1941. THE DRIVE THROUGH BULGARIA

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 85, Issue 48, 26 February 1941, Page 4

Cijc Wanganui Cljronieie WEDNESDAY, FEBRUARY 26, 1941. THE DRIVE THROUGH BULGARIA

r J' , HE general anticipation is that Germany will, in the course of the next few days, make a drive through Bulgaria into Greece: this anticipation is likely to prove to be premature. The German Command in the Balkans is infiltrating into Bulgaria, and consequently it appears to be improbable that the Bulgars will offer any resistance to the main movement when it is launched. The probability is that the Bulgarian Government anticipated that the historic friendship which existed between their country and Russia, a friendship which brought about the Congress of Berlin, would be sustained in Bulgaria’s hour of peril. Russia has, however, proved to be true to her policy of non-intervention where her own vital interests are not immediately at stake. Turkey, on the other hand, while witnessing the preparations for the invasion of her buffer State between Germany’s might, has not felt called upon to move into Bulgaria. This unwillingness to move on the part of Turkey is to be appreciated, because Bulgaria did not offer an effective co-opera-tion with her Eastern neighbour, and without such effective cooperation Turkey would be at a disadvantage were she to move into Bulgaria to meet the German advance. From a technical point of view Turkey has more to gain by awaiting the German hosts at the passes, where the lines or communication are not satisfactory.

The probability is that the infiltration movement will continue for some time to come, and that the drive proper will not be launched until the snows melt on the mountains and the rivers again become less subject to sudden flood. In the meantime much work remains to be done in strengthening bridges and in building up roads to permit heavy traffic to pass safely over them. Further, it will be necessary to guard points where cliffs can be dynamited to destroy the roads, a technique which has been brought to a high pitch of effectiveness by the Greek troops operating in Albania. Finally, it will be necessary to remove to the safety of the concentration camps those leaders of the popular and peasants’ parties who might prove to be dangerous to the intruders upon Bulgarian soil.

There arc also other considerations to be taken into account, which must be dealt with by diplomatic rather than by military means, Germany’s policy is to select a victim and then to disassociate from that victim all possible allies and helpers. In contemplating a drive against Greek territory, Germany will strive to influence Yugoslavia and Turkey from cither an inconvenient neutrality or from active assistance to Greece. J ntil these diplomatic problems are solved it is improbable that the offensive will open.

Nevertheless it should not be assumed that the delay will be a long one: the delay in fact will be chiefly caused by weather conditions, and the diplomatic problems will be tackled during this enforced interim period of waiting. It is in the German interest to launch the attack at the earliest possible moment belore the British land a strong force at Salonika. The problem of the Near East, however, presents itself to Ihe British High Command in a different light. The interregnum is a period of advantage which the British Command now enjoys, and the problem is how to use it to the maximum of advantage. Can it be best used by launching an attack against Sicily, or will it be more advantageous to strengthen the Greek defensive position at Salonika? It is probable that this is the problem which Mr. Anthony Eden and Sir John Dill nave gone to Egypt to discuss with Sir Archibald Wavell. The problem requires a nice appreciation of the difficulties attaching to an invasion effort of Sicily, and the dangers of delaying action in Greece proper. To render Sicily valueless to Italy before the starting of the Greek campaign would be to help Britain’s ally very considerably, for it would make more difficult the German interference with convoys taking troops and supplies to the eastern end of the Mediterranean. Britain must, however, guard against a heavy commitment in Sicily which would absorb too large a force and so minimise the effectiveness of the military help which is eventually to lie sent to Salonika.