The Wanganui Chronicle. TUESDAY, MAY 31. 1932. MIDDLE EUROPE AND GERMANY

Wanganui Chronicle, Volume 75, Issue 126, 31 May 1932, Page 6

The Wanganui Chronicle. TUESDAY, MAY 31. 1932. MIDDLE EUROPE AND GERMANY

% REHMAN Y looks upon Middle Europe as a proper potential market for the sale of her manufactured goods, which she could sustain because of her ability to absorb the wheat and other products of those countries. Unfortunately this development of international trade is now open to objection. The objection comes from France. To understand this objection it is necessary to recall the pre-war state of Europe. Then the dominant factor was Germany. The keynote of Bismarkian diplomacy was for Germany to avoid waging a war on. two fronts. He therefore negotiated treaties with Russia and with Austria. Because of tlife possibility of friction between Austria and Italy, the latter country was drawn into the alliance, thus forming the Triple Alliance. Italy soon realised that the alliance was only an insurance policy—it was not one for profit. Hence Italy was not inclined to fall cut with France. France saw in that arrangement, however, that, it was necessary for her to have allies, and through German diplomatic bungling Russia came to undertake that role, and the Entente Cordials was developed with England. France, however, is Gallophile. It thinks only of itself. Russia has gone into the wilderness of a Bolshevik regime, and the British Empire has vacillated between a policy of following France blindly and taking a line more favourable to Germany than France conceives to be in its own interests. Occupying a position of loneliness in the European situation. France is particularly sensitive of any move which shall bring Germany and Austria closer together. Anschlus, as the movement towards the closer union of Austria and Germany is called, is the bogeyman of the French, for if Germany and Austria are drawn into closer economic relationships then the economic or

trade union of the Danubian States in any form would open the way to Germany to pursue its Mittel Europa policy, while Italy, now somewhat belligerent in its attitude to France, would possibly gain entry into the Danubian group. This entry has been the goal of Fascist diplomatic policy of recent years. The Succession States, therefore, have been the subject of approach from both sides. Germany on the north, and Italy on the south. With the deepening of the depression in Central Europe, France has had to provide financial support, but such a provision was only a temporary expedient, for it could not go on indefinitely providing more and more short-term accommodation to the Succession States. The financial condition of Germany also makes it imperative that something be done to enlarge Germany’s markets. France, therefore, finds herself in a position of isolation. With Britain favourable to rehabilitating Germany and with the rest of the European countries anxious to save Middle Europe from chaos, the possibility is that despite the present predominant position of the French, their position may be diplomatically assailed for the benefit of Germany and the Middle European States, and with a possible inclusion of Italy in the Middle Europe grouping. Were this to eventuate, then the position of France would be in some way less satisfactory than it was in pre-war days. England’s position is not so definitely Frenchophilc. Russia is non est., and Poland provides an unsatisfactory substitute for the power of Tsar. Middle Europe and Germany are therefore placing France in an awkward dilemma, and it is because of this dilemma that M. Tardieu has struck his bargain with Premier M. Hcrriot.