The Southland Times MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1942. The Battle Conies to Java

Southland Times, Issue 24682, 2 March 1942, Page 4

The Southland Times MONDAY, MARCH 2, 1942. The Battle Conies to Java

THE INVASION of Java was preceded by heavy air attacks, principally against air fields, and by a naval and air action which has been described as the biggest of its kind since the beginning of the Pacific war. Final details of losses on both sides have not yet been released, although interim reports indicate that the enemy has paid heavily, and that the battle may shortly be renewed. The Japanese have succeeded in landing at three different points in Java. It was too much to expect that this could have been prevented. If the enemy is prepared to sacrifice ships and thousands of lives he cannot be stopped from gaining footholds. But if the Allies can maintain their pressure at sea and in the air the Japanese will have difficulty in landing supplies and reinforcements on a scale large enough to give the invasion a strong and growing momentum. Already it has been reported that 40 transports were forced to turn away northward from the island. Undoubtedly they will return, probably with a formidable naval and air escort. But if the Allies have been able to build up any sort of reserve strength (and they have had time to do so) the invaders should receive a warm welcome from British and American aircraft. The Japanese leaders will probably make the naval base of Sourabaya their first main objective. If they could seize this vital point the Allied warships would no longer be able to return to the attack. Combined with a sustained bombing of the air fields, this operation may be the key to Japanese strategy. With naval opposition removed, and air defence reduced, the enemy would be able to land as many troops as he needed, and the issue would then be settled by sheer weight of numbers. The Dutch will clearly understand the importance of Sourabaya. Their commander-in-chief, General ter Poorten, was reported on Saturday to have made a firm and confident statement. “The Japanese,” he said, “will not get Java.” Similar statements have been made before, only to be confounded by events. But General ter Poorten ended on a new note —new, at least, in the campaigns of the Far East. “Soldiers of the Netherlands East Indies,” he said, “don’t defend yourselves passively. Attack everywhere.” These words imply an acceptance of the “offensive-defensive” theory which experts are coming to believe is the only answer to blitzkrieg methods. The Dutch are probably in a better position to use aggressive tactics than were the British forces in Malaya. They have made thorough preparations. All through 1940 and 1941 they were importing planes and equipment from the United States. They have trained a fairly large army, and in recent weeks they have been reinforced by British, American and Australian troops.

A Wider Defence

According to a message printed on Saturday, “experts who have just arrived in Java from the Malay Peninsula say that nowhere else have the Japanese had to face such carefully and scientifically arranged defences.” Moreover, the Dutch have shown themselves to be realistic and intelligent leaders. Their warships and bombers went into action long before the first attack was made against any part of the Netherlands East Indies. They have carried through their scorched earth policy with ruthlessness and precision in the outlying territories. And now that the expected blow has fallen upon their central stronghold they will meet it with skill and resolution. The Japanese must be stopped somewhere. Their war machine is functioning in top gear, and with remarkable smoothness. But if it could be checked at a single point the delicate mechanism of supply would begin to feel the strain. Although it is true, as General ter Poorten explained, that the enemy is fighting desperately at the end of his lines of communication, those lines have been immensely strengthened by the capture of Singapore. The attack on Java has behind it a system of bases and sea routes that so fai’ has been exposed to no serious danger. There could be no better way of helping Java than by thrusting at the flank, or preferably the heart, of Japanese communications. At the moment no such stroke may be practicable, although the recent American raid on the Marshall Islands showed what could be done in this direction. A similar raid, or a series of operations by long-range submarines near the coasts of Japan, would weaken the armadas before they entered the Java Sea. The battle of Java should not be regarded as an action to be fought exclusively in and around the precious island. Now is the time to hit the Japanese wherever they can be found, especially at sea. For Java is the last dam which keeps the wave of invasion from the Indian Ocean and the South Pacific. Its collapse would be a disaster that must lengthen the war and increase its perils for the Allies. It is to be hoped, therefore, that while the battle is raging in Java the enemy will not be left to concentrate unhindered on a vital operation. Nearly three months have passed since the attack on Pearl Harbour —time enough to recover from a first surprise and to enter vigorously upon a race for preparedness. The invasion of Java will not merely test the Dutch defences; it will also reveal the soundness, or otherwise, of Allied strategy in the Pacific.