VERY FOREIGN

Poverty Bay Herald, Volume LXVI, Issue 19886, 13 March 1939, Page 3

VERY FOREIGN

EUROPEAN AFFAIRS A SATIRICAL REVIEW POST-WAR HISTORY A satirical review of post-war affairs in Europe is contained in John Scanlon's "Very Foreign Affairs," published by George Allen and Unwin. John Scanlon is cynical because he is disposed by nature to be so, or because he thinks it is a little late to be anything else; perhaps because he has come to the conclusion that the effort of being fiercely and successfully constructive is too much for him or anybody else. He falls back on his cynicism like a tired man into the irmchair —and seems to enjoy it"Vcry Foreign Affairs" deals cleverly with British foreign affairs from the end of the war until the Munich agreement, and Hays every politician who dabbled in peace treaties or attempted to solve the problems of post-war Europe. The author frequently quotes speeches of the leaders with alarmj'ng results, for they are apparently for 2ver contradicting not only opponents, but themselves. An exception of this :-ule occurred in 1931, when "at the 2nd of one week of truth telling about each other Mr. Maxton for the first time found himself in agreement with ooth sections of his party." Mr. Scanlon criticised Lloyd George cor his lack of success in appeasing Surope and his hatred of the Turks. In the elections of 1922 Lloyd George's party of National Liberals was almost Wiped out. "North Wales alone renamed faithful, as many of the decors in the remote parts did not know ,hat the war was over." The Labour Party is unmercifully tealt with; the Labour Party which "on every occasion there was a .hreat of war issued the most violent Protests. The record briefly is:— 1920 —No intervention in Russia. 1921—N0 pact with Fance. 1923—N0 war with Turkey. —No Czechoslovakia;! support for Trance. 1926—N0 warships for China. From then there was a long lull in vhich all parties' energies were demoted to disarmament. Then the re•ord seems to vary as follows: 1935—Fight Mussolini in Abyssinia. 1936—Don't fight for Spain. 1937—Fight for Spain. 1937—Send battleships to China. 1938—Fight for Czechoslovakia. Reparations Rapacity Ramsay MacDonald (but the Labour M.P.s by now only loved Mr. MacDonald. He made such beautiful speeches"), suffers at the point of the Scanlon pen, as do the cohorts of French Premiers who individually lasted as long as the franc liked hem. If the Premier could not prop ip the franc, if the franc did not like iim, the Premier went. M. Herriot was, however, "still defying France to and any colour of government to vhich he could not adapt, his views." The reparations do not escape the uithor's notice, and he is nearly as nilspokcn about the Treaty of Versailles as Adolf Hitler himself. In the 1918 elections the candidate who suggested the biggest sum for reparation expected to get the most votes "A candidate could not hope to win on less than £50,000 millions in London, whereas in Liverpool he rould win on £25,000 million, whilst in Aberdeen, where they think m small money, it was possible to win , )ii £IO,OOO millions." The payment of reparations in gold ;eemed not to benefit the creditor; the payment in goods was definitely damaging. Mr. Arthur Henderson, ,vho thought that Germany could and should pay £5,000 millions, stuck "to -lis economic doctrine that if we got 1 pair of boots free from Germany, a mild in Germany and one in Britain ,vas bound to go barefoot." Despite the poverty of the people, here was a vast over-production of 'oods after the war. America had nore gold than anybody else, she was he most efficient of all the industrial countries. "Had she at any time \ turned all her machinery on full blast, she could have smothered Europe in nanufactured goods and half drowned tin wheat. Consequently she was low relatively the poorest country in ;he world, with 13,000,000 unemployed, ,nd her young men homeless." On .he other hand, Britain had no gold, but only 3,000,000 unemployed. "Final" Settlement The debt problem was a pretty one. "A new committee had been established to make a 'final settlement' of the debts question to take the place of the provisional settlement of 1919, Lhe final one of 1920, and the other final one of 1924, known as the Dawes Flan." The Young Plan eventuated. 'Mr. Lloyd George, who had delounced the financial experts because :hey had misled him in 1919, and who denounced the Dawes agreement because it had been made without the financial experts, denounced the Young Plan because the experts had been called in." The practical politicians met again at Lausanne in 1932 to arrange another final settlement. Mr. MacDonald was chairman. "But as they sat there, the debt question was already settled, as nobody was paying anybody." Few people are benigh about the League of Nations. Mr. Scanlon is not one of them. "Its chief work then was to allow the causes (economic) to operate until the inevitable war had broken out, and then call a conference to decide who had started it . . . The League naturally preferred Mr. MacDonald's time limit as anything that did not require a definite answer for fifty years appealed to the League mentality." At the end of his book, Scanlon offers certain destructo-constructive suggestions. All international friction over the last 20 years has been caused by economic causes; a sensible distribution of the world's wealth is necessary; the vote catching politician is a menace.

Finally Mr. Chamberlain goes to Munich to carry out the policy of post-war Labour. But in September, 19.38, "the need for a war was so urgent that the Labour Party couldn't wait for the League of Nations. Instead of going to Geneva to get Bolivia and Paraguay and Chili, to decide who was the aggressor, they decided they could do it from Blackpool by consulting Eton and Haileybury."