THE KAISER UNMASKED.

Otago Witness, Issue 3313, 12 September 1917, Page 18

THE KAISER UNMASKED.

THE ENEMIES AGAINST BRITAIN. (By Cable.) Private telegrams exchanged between the Kaiser and the Czar during 1904-06 have been discovered at Tsarskoe-Selo. The Kaiser advocated an anti-British alliance, and proposed a secret Russo-Ger-man Convention, hoping by its accomplishment to bring in France. The collapse of the scheme was due to Russia siding with France in the Algeciras affair.

The Now York Herald publishes the series of sensational telegrams covering the Kaiser's effort during the Russo-Japanese crisis to form an alliance between Germany, France, and Russia against Britain. The Czar was disposed to sign a secret treaty, but changed his mind, and sided with France at the Algeciras Conference.

The Kaiser's telegram, dated October 22, ISO 4, informs the Czar: "The English newspapers threaten Germany if she gives coal to the Russian iJaltic fleet going to Japan. Russia and Germany must face this new danger together. You have to remind your ally, France, of her obligations under the Dual Alliance. It is out of the question for France to shirk her implicit duty." The Kaiser added: " Though M. Delcasse (then French Foreign Minister) is an Anglophile, he will understand that the British fleet will be utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combination of the three strongest Continental Powers will be formed, which the AngloSaxon group will think twice before attacking. You ought not to forget to order some new ships, which will be excellent persuaders during peace negotiations. Our private firms will be most g'ad to receive contracts."

The Czar replied on October 29, 1904 : " I have no words to express my indignation at England's conduct concerning coaling the Russian ships by German steamers. It is high time to stop England interpreting neutrality in her own fa,shion. The only way would be for Germany, Russia, and France to unite to abolish English and Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to frame such a treaty? Directly we accept France would be bound to join her ally." A month later a draft of a treaty was sent to the Czar, who proposed to show it to France before signature. The Kaiser immediately telegraphed: " I am convinced it would be absolutely dangerous to inform France before we both sign. Such action would be diametrically opposed to our wishes. If France knows that such a treaty is projected she will immediately tell her friends, and there would be an instantaneous attack by England and Japan upon Germany, both in Europe and in Asia. Their enormous maritime supremacy would make short work of my small fleet. Germany would be temporarily cripplod, and this would upset the equilibrium of the world to our mutual harm, and throw you alone on the tender mercies of Japan and her jubilant friends."

Next day the Kaiser sent a telegram: "No time to lose. Not a third party must hear even a whisper of our intentions, otherwise the consequences would be most dangerous." The Czar replied, agreeing that the German and Russian Governments must come to a permanent understanding. The Kaiser's telegrams were signed " Willy Nilly." In the course of further telegrams during the correspondence the Kaiser suggested that the Czar should ask the Duma to vote on a RussoGerman treaty after its formulation, as the Czar would thus be enabled to throw on the Duma's shoulders the responsibility for failure. The Czar ought also to throw on the Duma the responsibility for stopping or continuing the Russo-Japanese war.

Tiro Kaiser, on September 29, declared that France had left Russia in the lurch during the war, whereas Germany had assisted her to the utmost, putting Russia under moral obligations to Germany. He added that M. Delcasse's (then French Foreign Minister) indiscretions showed that an Anglo-French agreement existed. This telegram specifically states that the Kaiser and the Czar agreed to a treaty at their Biorko meeting. It states: " The settlement over Morocco frees the air for an understanding. We have now a good base on which to build. We have joined hands, and have signed it before God. The treaty can now well come into existence."

The Kaiser, on July 29, 1905, referred to the British fleet visiting German Baltic ports, and raid: " Either England is anxious owing to our meeting at Bjorko in July, 1904, or she wants to frighten me." The Czar replied that he considered the Kaiser's forthcoming visit to Copenhagen would come opportunely. A long telegram from the Kaiser osx August 2, 1905, gave an account of the Copenhagen visit. It shows how he trier! to sound Danish opinion regarding Germany, and says he found the Danes very apprehensive regarding his visit, this feeling being mainly engendered by England. The Kaiser added : "I was afraid to speak to the Danes openly lest our intentions should be communicated to England. 1 found that they are becoming resigned to the necessity of allowing Germany and Russia to occupy their country if an attach is made on the Baltic. Our herd policy would be to let this idea sink into the Danish minds."

The Kaiser also alluded to the proposed foregathering at Cowes of British. French, and Crimean veterans, and commented : *' This idea is very delicate, indeed, and it shows that I was right in warning you two years ago about the Powers forming o.ice more the old Crimean combination."