PRICE CONTROL

Otago Daily Times, Issue 27211, 14 October 1949, Page 8

PRICE CONTROL

POWERS OF TRIBUNAL FULL DISCRETION CLAIMED PA < WELLINGTON, Oct. 13. The functions of the Price Tribunal are legislative both in substance and form, submitted the Solicitor-general, Mr H. E. Evans, K.C., in the Supreme Court to-day. He was opening the case for the price Tribunal and the Director of Price Control in the action brought by F. E. Jackson and Co., Ltd., Auckland, seeking a writ of certiorari to remove Price Order 1001 into the Supreme Court in order to have it quashed. “The first event in the story was the restoration of New Zealand currency to sterling parity,” said Mr Evans. “This immediately gave rise to a problem in price control. If the matter had been left to itself, competition with parity goods would in time have forced down the prices of non-parity goods. On the other hand, it is necessary in the public interest that consumers should get the full benefit of a change as soon as it is fairly available. The reason for prescribing a deadline date was that without one it would have become increasingly difficult to supervise price orders. “ Price orders have to be made for the control of a few who evade the law as long as possible,” said Mr Evans. “Without a deadline date, it would have been impossible for any supervising officer to be sure that goods offered for sale at pre-parity prices had not been purchased at parity prices.” The problem affected all goods brought into New Zealand, Mr Evans continued. The Government had recognised a single deadline date to be unfair in view of the varying speed of movement of goods. The task of fixing a deadline date was left to the Price Tribunal. “At once the tribunal made Price Order 296. That order was essentially a legislative act applying to the whole community alike. Everything bought at parity price had to suffer a price reduction commensurate with the reduction in the purchase price,” said Mr Evans. Submitting that these orders were legislative in effect through a delegation of legislative powers, Mr Evans said he would refer to the view taken by the Supreme Court, with regard to the functions of the Abitration Court that it was legislative in substance if judicial in form. “ The legislative power of the Price Tribunal is shared with the Minister, who gives his authority to price orders,” submitted Mr Evans. “The tribunal is provided with powers and machinery for holding investigations. These functions are consultative. Its primary method of holding inquiries is by means of public sittings. The proceedings of the tribunal are parallel with those of a committee of Parliament, which sometimes sits in public and 'sometimes in private, to hear evidence, and has behind it the powers of the House. Though it does not legislate itself, it makes recommendations .to Parliament, and • so takes its share in legislation.”

Mr Evans submitted that the tribunal was not compelled to hear any person in particular. It had complete discretion as to its methods of finding out the relevant facts for its consideration. “I submit,” Mr Evans said, “that this court will not interfere with it in its exercise of this discretion. W.hen I say the court will not interfere, I mean that it will not interfere either with the tribunal’s discretion as to method—public or orivate hearings—nor its discretion as to consultations or inquiries. If in any respect the tribunal commits errors of judgment in these matters, the person aggrieved has a remedy through political means or by making application to the tribunal to consider the circumstances of his case and to exercise its powers of amending price orders, or by issuing a new price order.”

Mr Evans said the plaintiff’s remedy was to come to the tribunal again and ask for his representations to be considered after the tribunal had heard him personally or had read any written submissions he might have sent. In the case of a quasi-judicial tribunal, the submission need not be orally made.

“ The tribunal was entitled, with Jackson’s letters before it, to come to the conclusion it was a sufficient indication of what the company wished to put before it.” If it were wrong .in this assumption, it is an error of judgment not open to review by this court, but remediable in the ways I have suggested,” submitted Mr Evans.

After Mr Evans had concluded his submissions, Mr Justice Hutchison reserved his decision.