THE RIVAL FLEETS

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1676, 13 April 1904, Page 16

THE RIVAL FLEETS

A COMPARISON OF THE SEA FORCES. (By Charles Gleig, late Lieutenant R.N.) The famous dictum of Napoleon that “Providence is always on the side of the big battalions” belongs to the class of pithy sayings that are apt to be swallowed whole and undigested by the man in tlie street. To every rule its exception, whilst in naval warfare the larger fleet has many times defeat. The naval situation in the liar East js by no means so simple as ia represented by some of the critics. It is capable- of startling developments. Numerically, the rival fleets now concentrated in the East arc almost equally matched, and I do not propose here to enter into- masses of technical detail with a view to ing that a general action might be expected to result in favour of Japan. Tliis viow r is undoubtedly the populai one, and it has been somewhat hastily assumed. that hostilities will open a ith a sea fight on a large scale. THE FIRST MOVE. Now war is not an eSact science. Like political economy, it is full °f surprises. From time to time a great general or admiral comes to birth who brushes aside the musty platitudes of armchair strategists and proves that long-established rules’ can be broken with the .-happiest results. The armchair strategists have been insisting for the past ten years that the landing of troops cannot be< attempted until command! of the sea> has been, secured. Yet it is very possible that no naval engageent of importance will precede the landing of a Japanese army in Korea. That this will happen, only a fool would venture to predict with confidence, hut there are reasons that may induce the Russian admiral to postpone a sea fight for weeks, even months, to come. For. as the rival fleets non stand, the advantage is on the side of Japan, notwithstanding that Russia has two more battleships than her opponent in Eastern waters. JAPAN’S SUPERIORITY. The superiority of Japan in armoured cruisers is held by most authorities to more than counterbalance the numerical superiority of Russia in battleships, whilst there are other factors of great importance on the side of the Japanese fleet. Briefly stated these are: superior

homogeneity both in battleship® and armoured cruisers; superior speed! to the extent of at least one knot. There are other factors favourable to the Japanese fleet which need consideration. To begin with, three out of the four Russian armoured! cruisers are at Vladivostock. This northern harbour is over a thousand miles from Port Arthur. The width of the Korea Strait is bub 230 miles, and these Russian cruisers may be intercepted if they attempt to join the main fleet. Since it is just now the evident policy of Japan to court a sea action, the Strait will probably be pa,trolled. Detached, as they now are:, the three Russian cruisers are useless. Thus the grave risk of steaming be Port Arthur may be faced anal quite possibly with success. Will the Russian admiral risk a general engagement for the sake of uniting with three cruisers? It is unlikely. RUSSIAN TACTICS. For well matched as the fleets are both numerically ancli in gun power, Russia caiTaft'ord! to play (as regards the sea contest) a waiting game. Japan has no- prospect of increasing her fleet, except by the addition cf the two recently-pur-chased cruisers Nidsliin and Kasxxga, which left Singapore recently. The Russian naval rosiouree© are considerable, anci, given time, the Eastern fleet cam be reinforced materially. Ati addition of even two battleships to the Russian force would turn the tables against Japan, and more ships can be despatched, without breach of the Dardanelles Treaty. As the case stands, the Japanese. cannot force the Russian fleet to conic out and give battle. No effective blockade of Port Arthur can be attempted. The Russian admiral has some 30 destroyers with his fleet, and skilful use of these craft might be made. Japan is credited with 20 destroyers and 40 fast torpedo boats. Among the numerous islands studding the western coast of Korea., these small vessels may be expected to operate.. There cannot be less than 15 modern torpedo boats in Port Arthur. In the matter of protected cruisers, the numbers are: Japan 13. Russia 10, and soma of these on both sides are of high speed. Five of the Japanese cruisers are too, slow for scouting, and in this olass Russia enjoys a distinct advantage in speed, coal capacity, and even gun power. This advantage will be counterbalanced l if Japan detaches one of.her armoured cruisers to co-oper-ate with the protected scouts. „ THE QUESTION OF DOCKS.

Rut, when all has been said a© to numbers and speed and gun power, there remains the vital question of naval bases and docks. Despite the- Russian boasts, it is well known that Pbrib Arthur is still an undeveloped base, ill supplied with large docks. So ill-supplied, indeed, that it is questioned whether an injured battleship, deep in the water, aeccnimodated'. The harbour, too. is very small, its area less than that of Portsmouth. The necessary dredging is not finished and into this cramped l harbour the Russian fleet is closely packed. Vladivostoiek, though well defended and a good natural harbour, will be almost useless to the Russian fleet. It contains no docks, nor appliances for refitting a squadron. ' The splendid naval bases of Japan, on the other hand, are capable of conferring very solid advantages upon her fleet. In the Bay of Tokioi alone there are eight docks, three of which can accommodate battleship®. Again, in the matter of coal, Japan possesses solid advantage©, and none of her bases are readily open to attack. If the Russian fleet puts to sea, it will still be tethered to the vicinity of Port "Arthur, by reason of the coaling difficulty. Thus, Jt may be judged that the Russian fleet is likely to play the waiting game, to, remain a “flee:-; in being,” for the present.