GUNNERY IN THE RIVAL FLEETS.

New Zealand Mail, Issue 1676, 13 April 1904, Page 17

GUNNERY IN THE RIVAL FLEETS.

JAPANESE PREDOMINANCE AT sea. - (By Fred T. Janed Very little that is reliable is known of the shooting of either of the opposed fleets. What little there is is confined to very few people; the man. in the street has a 'vague idea, that Japan shoots well and Russia badly, and that is all-. Facts, go far as they go l , point in the opposite direction. Here are such facts as are available. When the Russian practice squadron met the German fleet recently the Russians, by way of affording entertainment, did some target practice at fixed targets. They hit the targets every time, to the astonishment and chagrin of their German critics. Making the best of a bad bargain, however, the Teutons, feeling that an object-lesson was intended, drew attention to the fact that the targets were fixed. Thereupon / the Russians started towing the targets, and again hit them nearly every time. The moral effect of this incident was wery great. ; Were all Russian shooting on these lines the Japanese fleet would stand to be annihilated right away. There is however, no reason to believe that it is on such lines. The practice squadron is specially devoted ito gunnery, but it has never been known to shoot so well since, aind there is little doubt but that the whole incident had been

carefully rehearsed beforehand', and specially good shots sent to carry it out. The ordinary Russian sailor is not a very good shot; probably the haystack, more often than not, is liis best target. Oin the other hand, in many Russian ships the shooting is destined to be done by officers, and these, as a rule, shoot well. They may also be expected to shoot intelligently. RUSSIAN SHOOTING MAY BE VERY BAD. Although Russia is credited with forcing war a strong proof against this is that her Far Eastern squadron has not been doing much gunnery for a long, long time. It is no-t, in fine, prepared for battle, and there is much reason to suppose that its ©hooting will be bad —possibly very bad. Gunnery is not a Japanese forte either. Ah that practice can do has been clone, but it is extremely unlikely that it is at all up to British standards. The fault is constitutional rather than anything else; the last thing that can be charged against tho Japanese is lack of endeavour. At tho Yalu and elsewhere during the Chino-Japaneso war, the Japanese shooting was by no means good. Had gunnery been the only issue China would have demolished her antagonist at the Yalu. However, the Chinese fleet lacked suitable projectiles, while the. Japanese were fully up-to-date. Tlieir principal trouble arose from undue excitement. Quite a number of men were absolutely incapacitated from this cause-, others deteriorated largely in efficiency. This, of course, would make the shooting of the others better than the average appears. In the event- of a naval fight it may be expected that Japanese shooting will be more erratic than the Russian. That is to say, some of it will be a great deal better, andi some much worse than the Russian mean. JAPANESE SUPERIOR IN GUN£ AND ARMOUR. In the guns and armour division fortune is all with the Japanese So far as battleships are concerned. The Japanese big gun has better penetration than-tho Russian one, and all six cf the Japanese battleships are better protected! against gun fire than any of the Russians except the Retvizau and Tsarevitch, which have been damaged by Japanese torpedoes. Tho three Poltava class haw vulnerable waterlines, and. relatively little protection to the bases of tlieir big guns. The Pobieda and Peresviet are weakly armed and armoured in comparison with the Shikishima and other Japanese battle units. The llctvizan is—or was —a good ship in liei n ay, but not equal to the Shikishima in bulk, and when taking hits is concerned bulk will tell. Only the Tsarevitch of all the Russians can be considered on a par with the standard Japanese battleships. She is, by the way, commanded by Captain Grigorovitoh who a few years ago: was Russian naval attache in London, where lie made many friends will a will watch liis subsequent operations with interest. He is or was, very alive to- the importance of gunnery. On what his ship did the issue of a fleet action seemed to depend, but she may never fight again.

The weak point of the Japanese fleet lies in the fact that they, to maintain a superiority, must swell their battlefleet with the six armoured cruisers. Assuming, for the moment, that the Russian battleships can be repaired, the Russians ought in a fleet action to single out the Japanese cruisers for destruction. Russian tactical ideas are not, however, in that direction, and it is moire than probable that they will concentrate on the Mikasa unduly, and so suffer heavily from the lesser vessels. It may be added that the Japanese are likely enough to display the same error, undue concentration upon one ship instead of a more distributed and general fire. This opinion I base upon what I have so often observed! done by both nations at a Naval War Game. Both have strongly •the same integral idea—the destruction before all else of the hostile flagship, on the principle that it is the brain of the fleet. The idea, though on the face of it sound, is not so because it is scientifically incorrect to waste effort in double or treble destruction. Whether we take war-game deductions or the independently arrived at results of the last British naval manoeuvres there is no question whatever but that a general distribution of fire is the best policy. JAPAN'S HIGH EXPLOSIVE SHELL. Japan has another gunnery advantage in the possession of high explosive shell. These ought toi stand her in very good stead. Russia has only the ordinary “common” shell, powder-filled. It is probably quite as destructive as the high explosive s'oi far as material results are concerned, but it is infinitely less terrifying and, within, its area of destruction, less annihilating. In practically all the Japanese ships likely to be engaged, Elswick pattern guns are mounted. The so-called Obukoff Russian guns are to. all intents and purposes, careful copies of French models, and the war will be a fight between British and French gun makers. ~ Both types are extremely good 1 ; and 1 it-is rather due to the personal characteristics of the rival Powers than to the guns themselves, that the Japanese pieces are certain to get off three rounds to the

Russian two, perhaps two to the Russian one.

The best brains will be found on the Russian ©idle, but the higher general level of intelligence will as assuredly lie with the Japanese. The Japanese approximate most closely to the French or Irish, the Russian characteristic© arc more these of the Boots, combined with Germans. The “staying power’’ is theirs; but the verve and dash is all to the Japanese. Everything points to victory on the sea for these qualities, not so much on account of Russian inferiority, as because cf Russian unreadiness. Speaking with a. fairly full persona! knowledge of both fleets I may ,sny that the Japanese are as ready as they could ever be, the Russians, despite their preparations., are not ready. And so despite the fact that they have at least two officers who in genius far surpass any Japanese, ail the odds are in favour of Japanese predominance at sea.. One of tho Russian captains is a goni-uK cf the first water, but the greatest genius in the world cannot make bricks without straw.