MOTORING MORTALITY

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIX, Issue 21247, 29 July 1932, Page 11

MOTORING MORTALITY

CHARGES OF NEGLIGENCE RESPONSIBILITY ON JURIES SETTING STANDARD FOR EXCUSE [BY TELEGRAPH —PRESS ASSOCIATION] WELLINGTON, Thursday The great responsibility upon juries in cases in which there has been loss of life through the alleged negligence of a motorist was referred to by Mr. Justice Reed in the Supreme Court to-day in summing up at the conclusion of the trial of James Thomas llutherford, driver of a motor-bus which collided with a train at Masterton. His Honor said without hesitation and with some experience of such cases that fully 90 per cent of them were duo to negligence, ari probably 10 per cent to inevitable accident. Speed was often blamed, but his experience was that speed was not often a factor. The careful driver took no risks, the careless driver often would take a risk. His Honor said it \Vas the juries of the Dominion that had set the degree of negligence they would excuse. The duty was cast upon juries to see if it were possible to reduce the shocking loss of life by insisting upon a high degree of care in the management of motor vehicles. If juries were strict it did not necessarily follow that the person concerned should be punished severely. It was of great importance, however, that a person should not escape being convicted where the jury was thoroughly satisfied there had been negligence, and that loss of life had been duo to tho negligent handling of a car. The higher the degree of care demanded, tho more deterrent there would be to the careless driver. In regard to the compulsory " stop " sign, His Honor said the rule was a stringent one, and it was supposed to be obeyed. He was aware it was not obeyed, that persons did not actually stop, but at all events it was reasonable ground for exercising due caro when approaching a. railway crossing. The fact, however, that a person did not obey that rule was not conclusive evidence of negligence, but it was some evidence of negligence. After reading some observations on negligence by the late Sir John Salmond, His Honor said that, had Rutherford stopped his vehicle, he could have heard the train whistle and could have heard the noise of the train approaching. He thought the jury would agree that a reasonable man, before going on to a level crossing, would look carefully to see whether a train was approaching, and that if he did not do so he was negligent. That was the broad point.