BRITISH NAVAL POWER.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LXIII, Issue 19474, 2 November 1926, Page 7

BRITISH NAVAL POWER.

DECLINING STRENGTH. BELOW PRE-WAR STANDARD. WEAKNESS IN THE PACIFIC. SINGAPORE VITAL TO SAFETY. BY ARCHIBALD HTTEJ3. The extent to which the British Fleethas been reduced in strength under the dual influence of the Washington Treaty and the urgent need of economy is still little realised. Some years ago Mr. Lloyd Gearge, when he was Prime Minister, declared that the naval burden, even with the support which Eome of the Dominions were giving, was proving too heavy for the British taxpayer. This declaration was not taken very seriously at the time because most people assumed that the Navy would be the last service to which the economy axe would be applied in view of the sea dependence of the 45,000,000 people of the United Kingdom and the maritime character of the Empire, which does practically all its external trade in merchant ships, requiring protection in time of wax. Bat events have shown that Mr. Lloyd George was right, as they have shown that Admiral of the Fleot, Earl Jellicoe, was right when ho repeated the warning latter on. Stage by stage the British Fleet has been pared down until, as the Admiralty have stated again and again, it has become inadequate for the duties which might be thrust upon it in time of emergency. The drastic character of the reductions is revealed in the following statement, showing the strength of the Navy, so far as battleships, battle-cruisers, destroyers and submarines are concerned, on the eve of the war and at the present time:—

War of Over 5000 Pennants. That statement takes no account of the small craft, mine-sweepers and auxiliary vessels of one kind and another, which played so important a part in the naval operations of 1914-18, eventually enabling the submarine to be mastered. If these vessels be included, the picture is even more depressing. When the ultimatums began to issue from the Chancellories of Europe in the summer of 1914, there were no fewer than 306 men-of-war of all descriptions under the White Ensign in full commission, while 302 were being maintained with reduced crews. During the ensuing struggle between £250,000,000 and £300,000,000 were spent upon new construction, and when the armistice was signed there were 1211 pennants flying in regular men-of-war, and 3831 in auxiliary craft engaged in essential operations at sea, mainly against submarines and mines. The fleet to-day bears little resemblance to the fleet as it existed when the peace was signed. The reductions were inevitable, and they were inevitably large because money has since been "short.' The significant fact, however, is that the British Battle Fleet which could now be sent to sea if an emergency arose is less than one-third the size at which it stood at the opening of the war. The strength of cruisers has been reduced by rather mora than half, while in the case of destroyers and submarines, the reductions have also been • considerable. Economies have also been effected in the personnel. For every 100 officers on the active list in 1914, there are now 83, and for every 100 naval ratings 68 only are on the pay roll to-day. The paring down of the active list of the Navy, officers and men, has reduced the number by about one-third—that :is, below the figure at which it stood on the eve of the Great War, and not at the end of the war, when the list reached a total exceeding 400,000. Expenditure of £58,100,000.

In spite of this movement, and owing largely to the higher cost of everything required by the Navy, th« maintenance of the fleet is still costing the taxpayers of the United Kingdom £58.100,000, and it is claimed by many politicians in the Mother Country, who are unconscious of the world-wida responsibilities of th» fleet, that the expenditure must be still further reduced, as no doubt it will be, if there is not in the meantime "a panic." They ask against what possible foe are preparations being made. The same question was put on the eve of the Great War. It is not apparently realised that naval power is of very slow growth; it takes three years, and sometimes a good deal more, to build a capital ship or a cruiser, and the construction of a destroyer or a submarine occupies at least two years under normal conditions.

When we tarn to the provision of crews for such ships, the position is even worse, An officer cannot bo trained under much less than twice the time that is occupied in building a battleship or a cruiser in which he may be required to fight in battle, a,nd the position in reference to gunlavers, torpedo-men and other skilled ratings is almost as bad. To postpone making adequate naval preparations until an enemy has declared himself is to court disaster. Weakness in the Pacific. The influence which the purusit of naval economy has had upon the British Fleet as it is now distributed over the seas and oceans of the world has not yot been appreciated. It is true that the White Ensign is supported in power and dignity in the Mediterranean, which is " the Middle Sea " of the Empire, and that, the Admiralty, by developing the base at Singapore «o that it may be able to accommodate the largest ships, is looking forward to the time when it will be possible for squadrons to move from the Mediterranean into the Pacific. But at present, though the British peoples are vitally concerned, both politically and commercially, with the future in Pacific waters, the naval power which they have at * their command oat*ide Euronaan waters is, if not almost negligible, at least so reduced as to justify anxiety. There is no capital ship now in commission east of Malta, a condition of weakness which has not existed in my recollection of the Navy, now extending over a period of 30 years, if we except the years when the whole battle strength of the British Fleet was being concentrated in or about the North Sea in anticipation of the Great War. 'What is the position to-day in the Pacific? Even if account be taken of the vessels of the N<?w Zealand Squadron and the ?hips of the Roy.il Australian Navy, there are only a round dozen cruisers available, and that calculation

includes the ships on the China Station; and tiie strength in destroyers and submarines is inconsiderable. When we turn from this enumeration to ascertain what vessels tho United States and Japan are maintaining in the Pacific, we are confronted with an impressive picture of naval strength, as the following details indicate: — UNITED STATES. JAPAN. BATTLESHIPS. West Virginia Nag*to Pennsylvania Yamaahiro Oklahoma Fuso Nevada Ise Arizona _ Kinu New Mexico Abuhuma Mississippi Jindzu Idaho Naka California Natari Tennessee Ynva Colorado Send&i Seattle (Fleet flag- Eiyi* ehip) Kiriahima* DESTROYER FLOTILLAS. Omaha (cruiser) and Ynbari and Isndru Decatur and Litch- (cruisers), with 15 field*, with 36 boats, boats. AIRCRAFT CARREER. Langley SUBMARINE FLOTUiLAS. 43 Boats. Kitakami (cruiser), with 15 boats. *Bat tie-cruiser. t Leaders. There was a time when the British Fleet in Pacific waters was supreme over the forces of any other two naval Powers, which were France and Russia, for at that period the Americans and the Japanese possessed only small navies, and the German Fleet was of inconsiderable sizs. Later on, the aim of the Admiralty was to have in these waters a force stronger than that under the German ensign, with a good margin over for contingencies. A dramatic change had now come over the situation. The British battle fleets based upon Malta and British ports are now actually weaker than the battle squadrons of the United States, and the representation of British naval power in tho Pacific, as well as in the "outer seas" generally, Is smaller than it has been at any period since the British Empire came into existence. This paring down of British strength by sea is not merely a matter of security, but it also touches tho prestige of the Empire. It used to be said that trade follows the flag. When the. cruisers now building in British shipyards, including the two Australian vessels, have been completed, the position will be rather worse than it is to-day, for by that time a large number of vessels of this type now at sea will, on account of ago, have been withdrawn from service as inefficient, even if they have not been broken up as useless. The hope of the future lies in restoring a full measure of mobility to the fleet, so that squadrons of capital ships, as well as cruisers and destroyers and submarines, enn bp sent anywhere. That involves the provision of larger docks and good repairing facilities, as well as ample stores of fuel. And that is why the development of the base at Sincnpore is so vita! to the safety of the Empire.

Capital Ships— 1914 1926 In full commission . 37 12 With winced crews . SO 9 Paid off .. .. 1 1 OS 22 Cruisers— In full cotnmiss-'on . 44 31 With reduced crews . 54 7 Paid off 2 4 100 42 Destroyers— * In full commission . 110 54 With reduced crews , 192 113 Paid off 14 6 S1G 173 Submarines— In full commission . 72 46 With reduced crew# . 9 Paid oS — 72 55 •Including destroyer leaders aad torpeda boats.